131–140 of 253 posts
Any benefit from research of gain of function research is clearly outweighed by risk of lab leak. I.e if the estimated incremental realized benefit of better planning, better mitigation from a single gain of function research equaled X; the cost of a lab leak seems to be 100X~10,000X.
If it clearly outweighs the risks can you provide a study showing this? I can't seem to find any.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Naturally, there's an adversarial game playing out, and we accelerate it massively. If the results of our small games enter the larger playspace, we're damned, so I get your concern. Is there some scifi solution to step outside of the game? Are the problems involved in understanding the systems involved (to the extent that you can predict realistic risk and mitigate) solvable? I don't know the level of realistic risk…
> Is there some scifi solution to step outside of the game? Of course there is, of course they already use it, and of course the people who think banning research is the peak of enlightenment aren't remotely interested in making this kind of distinction.
Get in line.
Include building a completely hermetically sealed underground facility.
Sign away the ability to interact with the world at large for the duration of the experiment.
All samples and potentially contaminated equipment is to be incinerated/vitrified upon conclusion of the experiment.
If you think you are good enough to play God with manufacturing new pandemic pathogens, okay. Fine. I sure hope you're really willing to sacrifice it all for your work. Because otherwise, the answer should be no by default.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> We've still not proven that COVID was a lab-leak We also haven't proven it wasn't a lab leak. > so we're attempting to say that something that otherwise has a very safe record is dangerous based on what might have happened. I'm not sure how good the record really is[0]. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_laboratory_biosecurity...
> We also haven't proven it wasn't a lab leak. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof_(philosophy)#P... Your second point is better taken.
Who has the burden to demonstrate that GoF research is safe given our uncertainty of whether COVID was lab created and subsequently leaked? This issue isn't of purely academic interest. We must consider the costs to society of a leak vs the benefits of that research. From where I'm sitting, the benefits are non-existent relative to the costs. Given the massive negative utility of a leak compared to benefits of the research, the burden of proof is on those who want to continue doing GoF research to demonstrate safety and value.
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Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an a…
Do you actually need GoF research to prevent animal spillovers? Did GoF research help us develop the COVID vaccines? Or does GoF research mostly demonstrate the risks of spillover? Because I think we're now well aware of the risks, and ought to avoid poking the bear any further.
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> I don't know the level of realistic risk for a devastating virus naturally occurring If we assume it is directly proportional to the number of people (more people to encounter animals, more people to incubate potential pandemics), there were roughly 450 billion people-years lived between the Black Plague and the Spanish Flu and the Spanish Flu and COVID-19. That would put the next zoonotic spillover around 2065.
This logic is as incorrect as the folks who say we are due for an earthquake. It discounts all factors we are ignoring and pretends we can establish an accurate duration between rare events with a few occurrences
With earthquakes you at least have stress accumulating over time, even if the stress is not necessarily accumulating or being released at a constant rate.
A zoonotic spillover is pure repeated throws of the dice, no accumulated pressure.
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There's the completely reasonable compromise of continuing to conduct this research at an isolated Antarctic station, at a quarantined oil platform etc. Instead these labs are all near major population centers, with researchers freely mixing with the general population.
This is what I don't get, why is this all happenning in cities? Like I live in a place where one of the major employers is a government research facility and every day people go to the designated meeting point and a bus takes them the rest of the way, or they spend 45 minutes driving on a dirt road to the middle of nowhere to keep anything from work (in this case nuclear related stuff) from coming home with them. Why…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Certain gain of function experiments, e.g. modifying an animal virus to be able to infect humans could create viruses that might behave very similar to SARS-CoV2 if leaked. We now know more about the potential consequences of such a leak, we have a full-blown pandemic as a benchmark. If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk.
Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an a…
According to the virologists who do it, not anyone else. Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I think avoiding many if not most gain-of-function experiments is a reasonable lesson to learn from this pandemic. Help me out, I don't see the thread of logic from your previous points...
Certain gain of function experiments, e.g. modifying an animal virus to be able to infect humans could create viruses that might behave very similar to SARS-CoV2 if leaked. We now know more about the potential consequences of such a leak, we have a full-blown pandemic as a benchmark. If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk.
You're saying that without regard to the measure of risk, or what risks exist if we don't do those experiments.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an a…
> that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility According to the virologists who do it, not anyone else. Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines.
That's not true.
> Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines.
I can't imagine your basis for saying this. Virologists isolated the signature genetic sequences for COVID-19. That was the basis for the development of testing & vaccines for COVID-19 (...and if you think they aren't involved in development of tests and vaccines beyond that...).