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Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

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Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#101
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Notifications generally go through Google Firebase so by not running private messages through firebase they avoid potential leaks. At least that's my guess

That sounds pretty bad, a cloud service needs to see all notifications?

No, it can be encrypted and then you have a hook that decrypts the notification on-device. On iOS you need to get approval from Apple to do this though

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#102
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That sounds pretty bad, a cloud service needs to see all notifications?

A good question. I am not sure if notifications on iOS, Android, Google Chrome or Firefox are end-to-end encrypted.

You can send whatever values you desire as long as your service worker handles it.

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#103

It says: > This shows that the database can be tainted with non-CSAM material by an entity that can submit entries to it. Actually, it can easily be tainted by anybody . Take your massaged hash-colliding image, which remember is still visually child porn , and post it on some pedos-R-us forum. The people who maintain the database actively troll those forums. They'll see the image and add the hash to the database for…

[flagged]

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#104
post #80

This is basically what I suggested we do a few years ago if Apple added client-side content scanners. Seems all need to here is obtain a finger print of a CSAM image then you can reverse engineer a non CSAM image to match that finger print. Distribute this image wide enough and you effectively render these algorithms useless. Which is a shame because they could be used for good, but it seems kinda obvious this will e…

1. You mixed up generating child porn images that collide with targeted non-child-porn images, in order to taint the database and thereby suppress the target images, with generating non-child-porn images that collide with child porn images, in order to overwhelm the system with false positives.

2. You brought in matters that have nothing to do with hashing or child porn, but tend to generate flame wars.

3. You put sneer quotes around "racist", which makes it sound very much like you don't think any such thing exists.

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal advises its users to install the app from the Play Store. While you can still get the .apk from Signal’s website, the developers warn against that. The EU can definitely exert pressure against what is hosted on the Play Store. Telegram famously lacks end-to-end encryption (unless you intentionally use its private-chat feature, which few people do) and shouldn’t be mentioned in the same context as Signal.

Their point isn’t about Telegram end to end encryption or lack thereof, its that they don’t comply Nothing gets taken down from telegram and they ignore court orders they just go to null

And they store data on their servers in plain text so that ru state/arab investors can access it at will

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#106
post #80

This is basically what I suggested we do a few years ago if Apple added client-side content scanners. Seems all need to here is obtain a finger print of a CSAM image then you can reverse engineer a non CSAM image to match that finger print. Distribute this image wide enough and you effectively render these algorithms useless. Which is a shame because they could be used for good, but it seems kinda obvious this will e…

I consider anyone promoting client side scanning of my media promoting a form of non-consensual violence against me.

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#107

It says: > This shows that the database can be tainted with non-CSAM material by an entity that can submit entries to it. Actually, it can easily be tainted by anybody . Take your massaged hash-colliding image, which remember is still visually child porn , and post it on some pedos-R-us forum. The people who maintain the database actively troll those forums. They'll see the image and add the hash to the database for…

[flagged]

Angle brackets are traditionally used for actual quotes.

> Step one, break cryptographically secure hashing system

These "perceptual hashes" are not (and cannot be) cryptographically secure, and practical collision attacks have been tested and published. Did you actually read the main article at all?

I don't think I'm even going to bother with the rest.

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think our disagreement here is over the level of innocence of someone possessing AI generated CSAM. > If you believe, as I do, that such a person is guilty of a crime, You just explicitly said upthread that ethically they are not, but argued that it is useful for them to be treated as criminals because it denies an excuse to those who are ethically guilty because they are possessors of genuine CSAM. You seem to b…

My ethical premise is that there is no direct victim of AI generated CSAM, but that it's worth criminalizing because otherwise it further victimizes victims of existing law. In other words, there is a societal victim of it. To me it's the same ethical premise but interpreted within two different frameworks: one that's purely idealistic, and one that's based in practical reality.

AI cannot generate CSAM, because AI cannot abuse children. AI makes fictional images, which definitionally cannot be images of child sexual abuse.

There is literally no victim of any kind, even conceptually, in the case of computer generated imagery. It should be protected artistic expression.

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#109
post #18
post #2

Because client-side scanning is not going to work, and no one wants to government issued black box binary to send their conversations and photos to unnamed police person randomly, the non-compliance is the only way. People just start to use chat programs in the EU that do not comply. This would be Signal, Telegram, others. The EU can fine and fight with Meta/WhatsApp, Apple, others, but that’s about it. The EU bureau…

Governments will mandate by law that the OS do client side scanning by peeping inside the app directories. Apple, Google, Microsoft will comply and realistically, which phones and computers are we going to use if we don't buy from them? Desktop Linux might become illegal.

Right.

Per program makes people use different programs.

Per OS, ok, maybe people will use a different OS (finally! Year of the Linux desktop!)

… ok, we’ll just roll it into the three companies making GPUs. Driver binary side scanning. Maybe hardware frame buffer scanning?

All is this is framed around children, but you are an absolute clown if you think that is truly the end goal.

It’s always “for the children”.

Re: Tainting the CSAM client-side scanning database

#110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Molly is a just as good (if not better) fork of Signal that is distributed on FDroid. It's the same network and same chats/contacts, just a different front-end. And Signal avoids FDroid because they don't want someone else signing packages but they can always provide an FDroid repository like many others do and sign everything themselves. If push comes to shove they'll be fine and pressure to black box signal in the…

Signal being restricted to F-Droid would be the end of the app as any kind of mass phenomenon. Sure, like my fellow nerds here on HN, I use F-Droid. But none of the ordinary friends and relatives I managed to convince to install Signal, since it was free from the Play Store with just a few taps, would continue using the app if it were relegated to that repository they have never heard of. Signal’s developers have spo…

I mean if the choice is between "installing black box MITM to signal", "pulling it from the EU google play store and requiring users to download the apk manually", and "pulling it from the EU google play store and allowing users to use fdroid" then the choice is obvious.

Mass adoption can continue elsewhere if the EU chooses to go down a route that would make play store support in the EU non-viable.

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