Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
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Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#2The NSA is very good at math, so I'm be thoroughly surprised if this analysis was error by mistake rather than error through intent.
Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#3Unfortunately, the NSA & NIST most likely is recommending a quantum-proof security that they've developed cryptanalysis against, either through high q-bit proprietary technology or specialized de-latticing algorithms . The NSA is very good at math, so I'm be thoroughly surprised if this analysis was error by mistake rather than error through intent.
Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#4Unfortunately, the NSA & NIST most likely is recommending a quantum-proof security that they've developed cryptanalysis against, either through high q-bit proprietary technology or specialized de-latticing algorithms . The NSA is very good at math, so I'm be thoroughly surprised if this analysis was error by mistake rather than error through intent.
Which is generally known, so I'm surprised by your argument. Even if the NSA knows more than they are telling us, this doesn't result in most of us feeling less worried, as their ends may not be strengthening the public's cryptography!
Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#5https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32360533 ("NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government (cr.yp.to)")
Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#6Unfortunately, the NSA & NIST most likely is recommending a quantum-proof security that they've developed cryptanalysis against, either through high q-bit proprietary technology or specialized de-latticing algorithms . The NSA is very good at math, so I'm be thoroughly surprised if this analysis was error by mistake rather than error through intent.
The NSA also has a mission-based interest in _breaking_ other people's crypto though, which is generally known. Which is generally known, so I'm surprised by your argument. Even if the NSA knows more than they are telling us, this doesn't result in most of us feeling less worried, as their ends may not be strengthening the public's cryptography!
Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
The NSA also has a mission-based interest in _breaking_ other people's crypto though, which is generally known. Which is generally known, so I'm surprised by your argument. Even if the NSA knows more than they are telling us, this doesn't result in most of us feeling less worried, as their ends may not be strengthening the public's cryptography!
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Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#8Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#9Re: Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
#10Unfortunately, the NSA & NIST most likely is recommending a quantum-proof security that they've developed cryptanalysis against, either through high q-bit proprietary technology or specialized de-latticing algorithms . The NSA is very good at math, so I'm be thoroughly surprised if this analysis was error by mistake rather than error through intent.
The NSA also has a mission-based interest in _breaking_ other people's crypto though, which is generally known. Which is generally known, so I'm surprised by your argument. Even if the NSA knows more than they are telling us, this doesn't result in most of us feeling less worried, as their ends may not be strengthening the public's cryptography!
I have no reason to doubt that a lot of math has been made more difficult than necessary just because it is known to give a subtle military advantage in some cases, but this isn't new;