Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think the counter argument is, that all else is not equal when obscurity is a goal of security, because it adds a maintenance burden to some greater or lesser degree, and that maintenance burden becomes time taken away from proper security practices, or other value providing work.
I think the main argument is that security by obscurity can easily be circumvented, be it via sidechannel, secret leak, source code leak or a surprisingly small search space (for example the whole range of IPv4 being scanned by now). It's easy to assume something is secure and spend a lot of time on obscurity, which completely falls apart thanks to a small sidechannel attack. It's (usually) just a weak defense overal…
Not doing that is how small companies seem to get away with terrible security holes for a long time, until suddenly they don't. I've seen too many cases of companies in a position where they built a small, insecure service that's now getting shared more widely than envisioned, who don't want to spend the money to make it right, because no one has compromised it yet (that they know of), and what are the chances of someone stumbling across it - where even pointing out that it's an attack vector can earn you trouble.