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Encrypted Client Hello

blog.cloudflare.com

101–110 of 219 posts

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I believe CF and others buckled under pressure from major websites which didn't want to be used as fronts for other website's traffic. ECH fixes this because individual sites get to opt-in to using it.

You could just as easily make df opt-in. Another way is to use “fake” cloudflare-df.com sni just like they are doing with cloudflare-ech.com outer sni

A designated domain for domain fronting is useless because it would immediately get added to every middlebox's list of blocked domains.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#102

Naive question, In 2023 how does DNS-over-HTTP (DoH) affect things like the Cisco Distributed Director / F5 3-DNS where DNS is used to control which datacenters customer traffic is going to? Is this still a technology smaller sites can use?

How would it affect those things any more than devices' use of 8.8.8.8 for insecure DNS (which is already quite common) does?

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#103

I see a lot of confusion here, probably Cloudflare should have included an explanation of how ECH works in TFA instead of referring to their other article[1]. The difference between ECH and SNI is that while SNI includes the hostname in the ClientHello (the first TLS record indicating connection initiation), ECH includes an encrypted section in the ClientHello called ClientHelloInner, and the hostname is moved inside…

> Now, to the non-technical part of it: while ECH provides a significant privacy improvement, I personally am against its implementation. Most ISPs enforce country-specific orders to block domains using a combination of DNS packet interception and SNI inspection. The legitimacy or sanity of such laws are a separate matter - countries would want to block websites that violate their laws.

You don't even have to start with governments. ECH can just as well be used by trackers/ads/app telemetry etc to stop you from blocking them via Pihole.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> while ECH provides a significant privacy improvement, I personally am against its implementation. Most ISPs enforce country-specific orders to block domains using a combination of DNS packet interception and SNI inspection. The legitimacy or sanity of such laws are a separate matter - countries would want to block websites that violate their laws. That's exactly why I'm in favor of it: it makes effective censorship…

We will almost certainly block ECH at my work, as we already block DoH. I expect any sane network to do the same. The natural alternative if blocking these protocols becomes unsustainable will absolutely be to require full decryption at our security edge. And that will provide drastically more information to us than we have now and will absolutely feel invasive. The idea of uninspectable client traffic is somewhat un…

> I expect any sane network to do the same.

Why? Sane networks shouldn't block anything. Even super dangerous stuff like ports 135-139 and 445 are a morally gray area.

> The idea of uninspectable client traffic is somewhat unhinged, and is already heavily used by malicious actors.

How is privacy unhinged? Isn't that basically the same as the argument that we need to gut the Fourth Amendment because of terrorists and pedophiles?

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#106
post #103

I see a lot of confusion here, probably Cloudflare should have included an explanation of how ECH works in TFA instead of referring to their other article[1]. The difference between ECH and SNI is that while SNI includes the hostname in the ClientHello (the first TLS record indicating connection initiation), ECH includes an encrypted section in the ClientHello called ClientHelloInner, and the hostname is moved inside…

> Now, to the non-technical part of it: while ECH provides a significant privacy improvement, I personally am against its implementation. Most ISPs enforce country-specific orders to block domains using a combination of DNS packet interception and SNI inspection. The legitimacy or sanity of such laws are a separate matter - countries would want to block websites that violate their laws. You don't even have to start w…

Your pihole could MITM the traffic. It doesn’t need unencrypted SNI to work.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We will almost certainly block ECH at my work, as we already block DoH. I expect any sane network to do the same. The natural alternative if blocking these protocols becomes unsustainable will absolutely be to require full decryption at our security edge. And that will provide drastically more information to us than we have now and will absolutely feel invasive. The idea of uninspectable client traffic is somewhat un…

> I expect any sane network to do the same. Why? Sane networks shouldn't block anything. Even super dangerous stuff like ports 135-139 and 445 are a morally gray area. > The idea of uninspectable client traffic is somewhat unhinged, and is already heavily used by malicious actors. How is privacy unhinged? Isn't that basically the same as the argument that we need to gut the Fourth Amendment because of terrorists and…

I don’t think morals factor in to the decision to allow / disallow traffic on a private network. That’s definitely morally neutral and to suggest otherwise is immoral.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#108
post #103

I see a lot of confusion here, probably Cloudflare should have included an explanation of how ECH works in TFA instead of referring to their other article[1]. The difference between ECH and SNI is that while SNI includes the hostname in the ClientHello (the first TLS record indicating connection initiation), ECH includes an encrypted section in the ClientHello called ClientHelloInner, and the hostname is moved inside…

> Now, to the non-technical part of it: while ECH provides a significant privacy improvement, I personally am against its implementation. Most ISPs enforce country-specific orders to block domains using a combination of DNS packet interception and SNI inspection. The legitimacy or sanity of such laws are a separate matter - countries would want to block websites that violate their laws. You don't even have to start w…

If you control the client you can block trackers there, such as Brave and Orion do natively.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We will almost certainly block ECH at my work, as we already block DoH. I expect any sane network to do the same. The natural alternative if blocking these protocols becomes unsustainable will absolutely be to require full decryption at our security edge. And that will provide drastically more information to us than we have now and will absolutely feel invasive. The idea of uninspectable client traffic is somewhat un…

> I expect any sane network to do the same. Why? Sane networks shouldn't block anything. Even super dangerous stuff like ports 135-139 and 445 are a morally gray area. > The idea of uninspectable client traffic is somewhat unhinged, and is already heavily used by malicious actors. How is privacy unhinged? Isn't that basically the same as the argument that we need to gut the Fourth Amendment because of terrorists and…

[flagged]

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#110

I see a lot of confusion here, probably Cloudflare should have included an explanation of how ECH works in TFA instead of referring to their other article[1]. The difference between ECH and SNI is that while SNI includes the hostname in the ClientHello (the first TLS record indicating connection initiation), ECH includes an encrypted section in the ClientHello called ClientHelloInner, and the hostname is moved inside…

They're going to resort to blocking IPs and not caring about collateral damage and force CDNs and anyone running multi tenant to turn the specific site targeted off or move them onto a separate pool of IPs that is easily blockable.
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