A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
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Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#2[deleted]
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#3Wow, the last time I read about this, I had not seen
* the 2019 update that someone re-evaluated the risks and thinks the retrofit might not have been necessary after all ( https://www.nist.gov/publications/wind-effects-tall-building... )
* the identification of the person who called LeMessurier in 1978 and whose questions made him redo the math (whose name is not listed in the New Yorker article) as Lee DeCarolis ( https://onlineethics.org/node/41606 )
In the version of the story I read, Diane Hartley flagged the risk to the engineer by writing a whole thesis about the building (see e.g. writeup at https://www.lemessurier.com/sites/default/files/publications... and https://onlineethics.org/cases/engineers-and-scientists-beha... ).
It's interesting how, the closer you look, reality grows more complex than the stories we tell about it.
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#4Impressive engineering - not the tech, the being a good engineer part.
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#5Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#6Impressive engineering - not the tech, the being a good engineer part.
(Sorry to be bit of a skunk at the picnic, but...)
I'm sure someone payed for the adjustments deemed necessary. And this probably wasn't the engineer's pocket money.
Zooming out, many/most/all larger projects have budget overruns. The root cause is usually that politically the plan is not viable unless it's pitched below a realistic estimate.
This is often where "clever engineering" comes into the picture, but also where risks are taken that are responsible for budget overruns (or physical disasters when undressed) are rooted. I don't know enough about this project to allege that this is what was going on here, but it kinda fits the picture:
1. Try something novel (aluminum construction, unusual foundation)
2. Start (or even finish) construction; ie.: sunk cost fallacy
3. "Discover" potential issue with significant budgetary impact
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#7Impressive engineering - not the tech, the being a good engineer part.
(Sorry to be bit of a skunk at the picnic, but...) I'm sure someone payed for the adjustments deemed necessary. And this probably wasn't the engineer's pocket money. Zooming out, many/most/all larger projects have budget overruns. The root cause is usually that politically the plan is not viable unless it's pitched below a realistic estimate. This is often where "clever engineering" comes into the picture, but also w…
The structural members in question were steel, not aluminium.
The original costings were done assuming welded joints. It was a contractor who cavilled that expense, and the change to bolted joints was done without notice to the lead engineer.
What you describe does happen, I've seen it in the field of software; but it's not the issue described in TFA.
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#8Great story, and LeMessurier is certainly deserving of praise. I'm curious about his initial mistake. The article mentions that he placed the pillars at the middle edges, as opposed to corners, because this is beter for resisting the quarterly winds. So he clearly knew they were a thing. Why then did he not do the calculations for how they would effect the chevon braces until the call from the student? That seems like a pretty huge lack of oversight. Was it pride? The moment of inspiration is described romantically, sprawling designs on the back of a napkin and such, and he was disappointed that the chevrons would be hidden behind the aluminum skin/facade - consoling himself with the thought "It'd be there for God to see".
The article describes the whole situation as a perfect storm of sorts (no violation of building code, industry standard of bolts instead of welding, etc), but I can't get past how he didn't crunch the numbers for something that seems like it should go without saying.
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
(Sorry to be bit of a skunk at the picnic, but...) I'm sure someone payed for the adjustments deemed necessary. And this probably wasn't the engineer's pocket money. Zooming out, many/most/all larger projects have budget overruns. The root cause is usually that politically the plan is not viable unless it's pitched below a realistic estimate. This is often where "clever engineering" comes into the picture, but also w…
The structural members in question were steel, not aluminium. The original costings were done assuming welded joints. It was a contractor who cavilled that expense, and the change to bolted joints was done without notice to the lead engineer. What you describe does happen, I've seen it in the field of software; but it's not the issue described in TFA.
This is all true, and I admit using to big a brush here. And sorry for my inaccuracies.
I meant to look as the process more holistically. Yes, I think you're precise in point out this was not a planning / engineering issue, but execution. But stepping away from the finger pointing; there is always a disconnect between the actual physical building and the model, assumptions conjured to guide the physical process toward safety. A welded joints on paper are neither safe or unsafe; it's the physical result that requires the safety.
It seems that somewhere in the process the architect/designer, engineer, supervisor, builder, hadn't paid attention. And without blaming one or the other, there are always (political) motivations for people to look away. That is, it's difficult to get a man to appreciate a problem when his salary depends on his not understanding it. :-)
Re: A skyscraper that could have toppled over in the wind (1995)
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
The structural members in question were steel, not aluminium. The original costings were done assuming welded joints. It was a contractor who cavilled that expense, and the change to bolted joints was done without notice to the lead engineer. What you describe does happen, I've seen it in the field of software; but it's not the issue described in TFA.
This is all true, and I admit using to big a brush here. And sorry for my inaccuracies. I meant to look as the process more holistically. Yes, I think you're precise in point out this was not a planning / engineering issue, but execution. But stepping away from the finger pointing; there is always a disconnect between the actual physical building and the model, assumptions conjured to guide the physical process towar…
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