Earlier quoted context omitted.
His modern stuff is more... eh. E.g. I thought there were a lot of flaws in his early-war "NATO can't supply X, because Russia will threaten nukes" positions, as he completed ignored the obvious opposite "Russia can't escalate, because NATO will threaten nukes" 110% love his Roman-period deep dives though. There's probably a smarter quip than me out there to the effect of "Great people share their brilliance on many…
Wasn't the standard model for how a nuclear war would start basically "if you escalate, the reasonable expectation is that the other side will escalate as well"? If you escalate despite the nukes on the other side, it would be risky to assume that the other side is unwilling to do the same. If you escalate, you signal your intent to start a nuclear war if the other side does not back down. But if you are willing to d…
I.e. identifying a future possibility and loudly proclaiming that if (and only if) it happens, then this nuclear action will take place (and stop there)
Essentially, trying to avoid surprise and uncertainty by tying specific actions to reactions, with the hope of avoiding runaway escalation-begats-escalation scenarios.
Which is notably the opposite of what Russia has been doing, which is more along the lines of "If the West pushes us too far... they're in for it", which is more the kind of bluff you'd make if you never intended to actually escalate (because you create the fear without establishing any requirements to escalate on yourself).