Earlier quoted context omitted.
That’s not equivalent at all. Paying off criminals creates an incentive for there to be more criminals. Paying more security researchers does not incentivize people writing buggy C code to write even buggier C code.
Raising compensation creates an incentive for there to be more bug hunters.
0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
211–220 of 254 posts
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#212It's good to get some more info, but it is a little disconcerting that they only mention patching Chrome. What was the sandbox escape on Android? Even if you had code execution inside the Chrome process on Android, that shouldn't be enough to enable persistence, so clearly there's another vulnerability. Also in this case the attack vector was MITM of http and one time links as it was a targeted campaign, but it feels…
There are millions of android devices out there that have been abandoned by their manufacturers, so they might be omitting those details because the flaw hasn't yet been patched (and likely never will be.)
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are millions of android devices out there that have been abandoned by their manufacturers, so they might be omitting those details because the flaw hasn't yet been patched (and likely never will be.)
Even with Google's own flagship device, the latest security patches date from August while this announcement is much newer, so it seems unlikely _any_ Android devices have been patched.
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#214Earlier quoted context omitted.
No. The Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) defines a model for a operating system kernel at EAL6+. So all I am really saying is that safe operating systems are safer than non-safe operating systems. You could also look backwards to the TCSEC and the comparable certified Level A1 systems for other operating systems designed for actual high security work. You keep calling it a farce, but you keep pointing at E…
This is like comparing the L4-based SEPOS to macOS. They share the name "operating system", but they are not the same thing.
One is 'problems of standardization in high-development-velocity fields':
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3577837
The other is "this is worse in security engineering broadly and outright catastrophic in cryptography engineering specifically"
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25451351
There's probably better/longer, I just looked at the first page of "standards" search. The points are strong, like messageboard-argument-winning bear, though.
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#215Earlier quoted context omitted.
Every government with money has exploits for every device imaginable. The going price was $1m for a full exploit chain on iPhone a while ago, and I’m sure it’s gone up, but I’m also sure it is minuscule compared to the amount of money governments have. Everyone should assume this is fact, and not imagine some secret spy world. If you ever become interesting enough to hack, you will be, and there is little recourse (c…
Kinda surprising that Apple wouldn't be the highest bidder for a full exploit chain. They've been known to give out $100,000 bug bounties, but you'd think one million would be a pretty good deal for closing a vulnerability vs having it sold to companies that professionally surveil people.
Every major black hat group operates with the blessing of some state. It’s about more than just money. Actual exploits are probably traded for “favours” (e.g. votes in international bodies, collaboration on thorny dossiers, extraditions, etc.). The infiltration of electronic communication is a major aspect in determining a state’s level of “soft power” and - in a software-run world - its weight only increases.
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are millions of android devices out there that have been abandoned by their manufacturers, so they might be omitting those details because the flaw hasn't yet been patched (and likely never will be.)
Even with Google's own flagship device, the latest security patches date from August while this announcement is much newer, so it seems unlikely _any_ Android devices have been patched.
Firat of all, some part of Android is updated via the store. So the Chrome vulnerability and system libraries were probably updated without you noticing.
Also, this started in May. Before it went public both Apple and Google had already patched some vulnerabilities. Latest round was in August/September.
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#217Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Likely there’s a chrome sandbox escape and a kernel exploit remaining “unknown and unpatched”. There is certainly many of those that we don't know about, if this was done in Egypt, imagine what a 3 letters agency have
Every government with money has exploits for every device imaginable. The going price was $1m for a full exploit chain on iPhone a while ago, and I’m sure it’s gone up, but I’m also sure it is minuscule compared to the amount of money governments have. Everyone should assume this is fact, and not imagine some secret spy world. If you ever become interesting enough to hack, you will be, and there is little recourse (c…
I have 0 doubt that literally everybody is being scraped by 1 or more governments and/or companies.
Because if they can, why not?
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#218Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
But browsers, especially Chrome, have lots of permissions (including geolocation, accessing SD card, accessing user's personal data, camera and microphone etc.). You don't need to do anything if you can run under browser's privileges.
None of the mentioned privileges should net you a persistence though, so there's clearly still another vulnerability.
Re: 0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt
#220Here is what I do not understand: Spyware firms and 0-day vendors both have staff dedicating to finding 0-days. Why do Google and Apple not simply poach these staff? I am sure Google and Apple can offer very competitive salaries, so why do they not do so? Is it because the cost of basically poaching all of the skilled 0-day hunters is deemed to be greater than the cost of just issuing patches?
I am this person. I work as a researcher finding 0-days. From the employee perspective: Wages are equal. Big Tech work is less interesting (build big bug finding machines that find have high quantity of bugs) and report the bugs that sit into some bug tracker only to maybe be fixed in 3 months. Offensive security work is more interesting. It requires intimate knowledge of the systems you research, since you only need…