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Early performance results from the prototype CHERI ARM Morello microarchitecture

ctsrd-cheri.github.io

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Re: Early performance results from the prototype CHERI ARM Morello microarchitecture

#4
The depressing thing is looking at the performance cost of so many of these mitigations that are fundamentally due to the use of unsafe languages.

It results in a somewhat pernicious effect: a person can compare their unsafe language to a safe one and say “see it’s faster” because the safe language is being subject to the same hardware costs but they’re unnecessary.

The lack of memory safety in many core languages means we take mitigations that increase memory usage, increase processor complexity, and reduce overall performance.

Re: Early performance results from the prototype CHERI ARM Morello microarchitecture

#6
post #4

The depressing thing is looking at the performance cost of so many of these mitigations that are fundamentally due to the use of unsafe languages. It results in a somewhat pernicious effect: a person can compare their unsafe language to a safe one and say “see it’s faster” because the safe language is being subject to the same hardware costs but they’re unnecessary. The lack of memory safety in many core languages me…

CHERI enforces safety in hardware. No amount of language safety can prevent exploits from being forged right out of machine code.

Re: Early performance results from the prototype CHERI ARM Morello microarchitecture

#9
post #4

The depressing thing is looking at the performance cost of so many of these mitigations that are fundamentally due to the use of unsafe languages. It results in a somewhat pernicious effect: a person can compare their unsafe language to a safe one and say “see it’s faster” because the safe language is being subject to the same hardware costs but they’re unnecessary. The lack of memory safety in many core languages me…

CHERI enforces safety in hardware. No amount of language safety can prevent exploits from being forged right out of machine code.

CHERI gives you greater granularity over memory access it doesn’t magic away security vulnerabilities.

But that doesn’t negate what I stated: there’s a massive amount of complexity, and significant performance costs of all these features. They’re needed because the prevalence of unsafe code means we need a global enforcement mechanism which means hardware.

Hence we take a real and permanent cost in hardware that applies to all code on the system. The cost is hardware complexity, runtime performance, and memory, and it is borne by all software on the system.

Re: Early performance results from the prototype CHERI ARM Morello microarchitecture

#10
post #4

The depressing thing is looking at the performance cost of so many of these mitigations that are fundamentally due to the use of unsafe languages. It results in a somewhat pernicious effect: a person can compare their unsafe language to a safe one and say “see it’s faster” because the safe language is being subject to the same hardware costs but they’re unnecessary. The lack of memory safety in many core languages me…

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