Live data from Hacker News

Vitalik Buterin reveals X account hack was caused by SIM-swap attack

cointelegraph.com

181–187 of 187 posts

Re: Vitalik Buterin reveals X account hack was caused by SIM-swap attack

#181
post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Implementation flaws like that are always possible, but my concern is that in so many cases, SIM swaps are ridiculously easy by design (or more accurately, by absence) of the phone provider's security procedures.

Issue is that FCC mandates a port out within 4 hours and stores don't make $$ while doing these so their goal is to get you out of the door ASAP so they can focus on the revenue. So that's why + bribe factor

could you explain this? 4 hour starting from when? what checks the FCC demand/allow?

Re: Vitalik Buterin reveals X account hack was caused by SIM-swap attack

#182
post #157

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It's pretty wild how baked into modern life insecure 2fa is. And a solution to this is very simple. Make telcos legally liable for losses due to SIM-swap attacks and before the ink is dry on such a law, Telcos will ban using phone numbers for authentication in their TOS. The banks and alike will be forced to come up with another, hopefully, better auth system.

Security comes with cost and inconvenience. Like would you pay $50 everytime you've to swap a SIM ?

sure, how frequently do you swap?

Re: Vitalik Buterin reveals X account hack was caused by SIM-swap attack

#184
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've used Twitter from 2013 to 2021, and have eventually been locked-out by Twitter requesting a phone number with no way to work around.

It'll be a shame if that happens to my account, as I lurk on Twitter every day (but never tweet or like), but I value privacy of my phone number more than I value the enjoyment I get from it.

That's when I ended up using nitter. Before stopping altogether when Elmo broke it.

Re: Vitalik Buterin reveals X account hack was caused by SIM-swap attack

#185
post #174
post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What do you mean? I "have" access to my SMSes via my phone, and I "have" access to my email or my Authy also via my phone. If you get my phone, you can: 1. start password reset via email 2. confirm via SMS 2FA So that makes this into 1FA not 2FA. At least for TOTP secrets, I can store them securely, and attackers cannot convince a human support agent somewhere to hand them over. If you want true 2FA, you need somethi…

You need the SIM to receive SMS ("possession"), not just a password ("knowledge"). For email, you just need knowledge.

I disagree. To access my email, I need to do one of a few things:

1. Use a device I already have authenticated to access it (something I have)

2. Log in to my email again, going through Google authentication, which includes a proper 2FA system (password plus either Yubikey or TOTP auth code), and is protected by Google's relatively strong security.

3. Log into my domain registrar and change my DNS to point my email somewhere else. This is also protected by 2FA but is probably an easier vector to gain access to my email.

4. (hypothetically) Hack Google (either by hacking the password reset flow, or hacking their actual backends) and gain access to my email messages. This seems relatively difficult but I include it for completeness.

If I want to gain access to SMS sent to my phone, I need to do one of a few things:

1. Use a device that is already authenticated, my phone with its SIM (something I have)

2. Log into my T-Mobile account and order a new SIM

3. Contact T-Mobile support and convince them to SIM-swap or port-out my number

So I get where they are coming from, but IMO neither SMS nor email proves access to "something I have". Both have relatively easy recovery processes that allow someone who has _nothing at all_ to gain access to my messages. SMS just happens to be run by legacy companies that do not take security nearly as seriously as the average modern email provider. Outlook, Google, Proton, Fastmail, etc all have better security than T-Mobile. They (and other major carriers) are famously bad at ensuring that they do not SIM-swaps. Hackers buy access to low-level customer service credentials and offer swaps for $100 to $10000 USD depending on the target.

If you truly want to prove "something I have", then you need to go to a hardware token issued by a trusted vendor, potentially with a key baked into it. These were quite common in the past. TOTP and HOTP used on a hardware token predates their use on phones, and they are still issued for things like wire authorization by business banks, or even PayPal (I think). Or you could use WebAuthn or PassKeys or whatever they are called now, binding the token to the TPM in your general computing device, or using a specialized security processor like a YubiKey or Ledger.

I understand why SMS might be accepted as a "lowest common denominator" second factor. It is certainly better than nothing at all. It just should not be seen as more secure than TOTP or email IMO.

Re: Vitalik Buterin reveals X account hack was caused by SIM-swap attack

#186
post #107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

NIST recommends against email or VoIP "phones" for the second factor, because then it's not what you know and what you have , but just two things you know , so no 2FA. As far as I understand, it does not recommend against SIM-based 2FA anymore, though considers it RESTRICTED. "Methods that do not prove possession of a specific device, such as voice-over-IP (VOIP) or email, SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentica…

NIST has been wrong previously.

Oh boy, the elliptic curve pseudorandom number generator debacle.
Post reply on HN