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Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

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Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#111
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or all those `curl install.sh | bash -` scripts that nobody checks that could do pretty much anything, esp when they ask you to sudo

Who is running random curl scripts without checking the code first? Is this common now?

It's like 80% of non distro Linux installers

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#112
post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A few years ago I asked a new hire to ssh to a certain machine from their new dev Linux laptop, and they said OK and began searching the web for PuTTY for Linux. Didn't work out with them.

Years ago, I asked data scientist (with a PhD) whether his jupyter notebooks were only on his laptop or whether they were backed up on a server. He said they were on a server. I wanted to make sure whatever server that was had regular backups, so I asked for the server name. He looked at the URL bar and gave me the server's IP address: 127.0.0.1

2 Years ago we hired an R developer to do some calculation on a CSV file input, he didn't understand the notion to save result on a CSV file, can only print it

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#113

This is one more reason to run every program in a sandbox rather than with full privileges.

This is a download manager. By definition it will have access to the internet, will write files to disk, and you will open the files it wrote.

A sandbox wouldn't keep you safe if you have to keep those vectors open.

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#114
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never understand why people get more upset about the bash script running arbitrary code than the program it's actually installing.

Oftentimes the installer needs greater system access than the code you're running, particularly on Windows IME most of the randomly-downloaded software I've used does what it says on the tin. But there is a whole screening process: where did it come from? Does the originating site look legit? What are the possible motivations for the creator? Besides there is no signing mechanism for your random install.sh. Maybe you…

Aren't the most interesting things to steal already in the user's home folder, so having admin rights won't really give you that much more.

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#115
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oftentimes the installer needs greater system access than the code you're running, particularly on Windows IME most of the randomly-downloaded software I've used does what it says on the tin. But there is a whole screening process: where did it come from? Does the originating site look legit? What are the possible motivations for the creator? Besides there is no signing mechanism for your random install.sh. Maybe you…

Aren't the most interesting things to steal already in the user's home folder, so having admin rights won't really give you that much more.

You're absolutely right

https://xkcd.com/1200/

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#116

If you intentionally install something called Free Download Manager, you should not be surprised when it turns out to be malware.

Are you saying that maybe it should have been named Linux Download Manager to fool more people, or Debian Download Manager? Proving trust is hard.

If it's not in the main Debian repositories, I don't know that the majority of Linux users would install it.

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#117
post #93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Who is running random curl scripts without checking the code first? Is this common now?

Ever install docker on a pet Linux box? That script saves a lot of time.

Unless that is the only way that was possible to save that time, this doesn't matter.

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#118
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree. This is more another reason to not run programs which are not from the official repository.

why do you think this can not happen in the official repository?

Why do you think "can not happen" even matters?

No one does think it can not happen, because that is a silly thing to even say. "can not happen" does not exist anywhere, there is only likelihood of happening, based on both history and motivation.

How often HAS it happened in any reputable distros official repos? They have all got decades of history by now so a good sea of data to generate solid statistics on frequency and distribution.

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#119
post #78

A Linux user that would install a Free Download Manager? We need to bring back complicated Linux installation processes. Vendors have dumb down the process to the point that idiots are getting cooties from downloading bullish!t.

A few years ago I asked a new hire to ssh to a certain machine from their new dev Linux laptop, and they said OK and began searching the web for PuTTY for Linux. Didn't work out with them.

My boss somehow uses vscode for SSH.

Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux

#120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

why do you think this can not happen in the official repository?

Why do you think "can not happen" even matters? No one does think it can not happen, because that is a silly thing to even say. "can not happen" does not exist anywhere, there is only likelihood of happening, based on both history and motivation. How often HAS it happened in any reputable distros official repos? They have all got decades of history by now so a good sea of data to generate solid statistics on frequenc…

it is true, debian particularly has very good track record:

https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/243455/was-ther...

however, cpan, npm, ports, homebrew, gems etc there are examples: https://docs.brew.sh/Acceptable-Casks#apps-that-bundle-malwa...

but i was hinting more at the: there are so many packages, and so many that are used rarely, that there is no way we know.

i think just running weekly modified files report and running things in sandboxes also dont give internet to all apps is good enough for me, and of course be critical of the sources you install from, reputable repos are better than non reputable ones, but are not immune.

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