This is installed by adding a shady repository to your apt sources.list... How is this a supply chain attack? My official debian repository have never been breached so far. This is no different from downloading an .exe off a shady website and blindly running the .exe. Also: https://packages.debian.org/search?keywords=download+manager... lists: • uget: https://sourceforge.net/projects/urlget/ • kget: https://apps.kde.…
Basically, as per everything these days, the entire software industry is based on "download and run any old shit off the Internet" with little to no fucks given about the source or trustworthyness or correctness. End users are no better because for most people, including a lot of novice Linux users, this isn't even considered as part of fixing or dealing with any particular problem. Cut / paste / job done. Worst is I…
Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
91–100 of 143 posts
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#92Earlier quoted context omitted.
Basically, as per everything these days, the entire software industry is based on "download and run any old shit off the Internet" with little to no fucks given about the source or trustworthyness or correctness. End users are no better because for most people, including a lot of novice Linux users, this isn't even considered as part of fixing or dealing with any particular problem. Cut / paste / job done. Worst is I…
Other than reputation analysis by Snyk, I honestly don’t know how to objectively analyze one repo/package versus another. Obviously I can make some basic heuristics, but I can’t reasonably evaluate all of the components of trust for every library, package, container, framework, repo even at a regular interval, let alone fast enough to just maintain patch levels (nevermind being reasonably productive). I actually cons…
Related: have you tried throwing a file (or a hash) at VirusTotal lately? If it's executable, they'll run it in a sandbox and give you a forensic report of everything it touched and did.
I'm so suspicious of software I can't at least review the source code of that originates outside of trusted channels that I probably wouldn't run anything meeting that description that I couldn't compile myself if it weren't for that (and similar) tools.
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#93Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or all those `curl install.sh | bash -` scripts that nobody checks that could do pretty much anything, esp when they ask you to sudo
Who is running random curl scripts without checking the code first? Is this common now?
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#94I’m surprised that people installed them on Linux. Stop believing OSS is automatically clean and safe.
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#95Why did the authors blanked out “Ukraine” from an (apparent) statement “Glory to Ukraine” in the comments? Seemed weird to me, what’s the point?
I'm more amused what it was in the malware code at all. Reminds me something..
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#96Free Download Manager had a long history of being compromised. For a long time, their auto-update ini file (kind of configuration file) was manipulated to point to a compromised version, thus people installed a clean version but will get a malware infested version once they updated. I believe they are the target all along. I’m surprised that people installed them on Linux. Stop believing OSS is automatically clean an…
Not disagreeing but Free Download Manager stopped being OSS in version 3.9.7, that was 2017 and this article's infected package was released in 2020.
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#97Earlier quoted context omitted.
Other than reputation analysis by Snyk, I honestly don’t know how to objectively analyze one repo/package versus another. Obviously I can make some basic heuristics, but I can’t reasonably evaluate all of the components of trust for every library, package, container, framework, repo even at a regular interval, let alone fast enough to just maintain patch levels (nevermind being reasonably productive). I actually cons…
>Obviously I can make some basic heuristics, but I can’t reasonably evaluate all of the components of trust for every library, package, container, framework, repo even at a regular interval, let alone fast enough to just maintain patch levels (nevermind being reasonably productive). Related: have you tried throwing a file (or a hash) at VirusTotal lately? If it's executable, they'll run it in a sandbox and give you a…
Eg. How do I know with any certainty that a library passes all OWASP best practices? Or is well documented? Or is maintained? Or is responsive to security reports? [… and dozens of other similar properties]
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#98This is installed by adding a shady repository to your apt sources.list... How is this a supply chain attack? My official debian repository have never been breached so far. This is no different from downloading an .exe off a shady website and blindly running the .exe. Also: https://packages.debian.org/search?keywords=download+manager... lists: • uget: https://sourceforge.net/projects/urlget/ • kget: https://apps.kde.…
> How is this a supply chain attack? It's a supply-chain attack because the article has a section about how the official website for "Free Download Manager" was serving malware to a percentage of people. > While checking videos on Free Download Manager that are hosted on YouTube, we identified several tutorials demonstrating how to install this software on Linux machines. We observed the following actions that happen…
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#99A Linux user that would install a Free Download Manager? We need to bring back complicated Linux installation processes. Vendors have dumb down the process to the point that idiots are getting cooties from downloading bullish!t.
A few years ago I asked a new hire to ssh to a certain machine from their new dev Linux laptop, and they said OK and began searching the web for PuTTY for Linux. Didn't work out with them.
I wanted to make sure whatever server that was had regular backups, so I asked for the server name.
He looked at the URL bar and gave me the server's IP address: 127.0.0.1
Re: Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux
#100"Free Download Manager backdoored – a possible supply chain attack on Linux machines"