Earlier quoted context omitted.
The EBA (the European banking regulator in charge of specifying the technical details of the PSD2 regulation, which covers secure cardholder authentication, among other things) also stated a while ago that only SMS-OTP is a "true" factor; Email-OTP isn't. Ironically, my email account is so much better protected than my mobile phone number. I'm trying very hard to believe that the SMS lobby (i.e. mobile phone operator…
Insofar as one of the factors should be something the user knows , and one factor something the user has , that makes perfect sense. You know your password (or the master password to your password manager), and you have your phone with the SIM card. With email (or Authy), the second factor is also something you know , thus it's not 2F anymore. Note that NIST also recommends against email as a factor in 2FA (A-B11 her…
1. start password reset via email
2. confirm via SMS 2FA
So that makes this into 1FA not 2FA.
At least for TOTP secrets, I can store them securely, and attackers cannot convince a human support agent somewhere to hand them over.
If you want true 2FA, you need something like WebAuthn with hardware tokens where the private key is on the token, but then you need a recovery process, and that takes you right back to the lowest common denominator of SMS verification.