Earlier quoted context omitted.
While NSO is, of course, not a good group, I think the larger problem is how prevent these exploits are. If NSO didn't find them, someone else would. I don't consider NSO to be the big problem here.
Is this the standard we apply to other cyber-criminals? Or any crime for that matter? Do we ask how vulnerable the victims were? And how we should make them less vulnerable and give a free pass to the aggressors?
NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
451–460 of 886 posts
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#452I don't understand Apple here. Just put an army of people on fuzzing the shit out of iMessage and all its possible file attachments. You tried and failed? Fire the bozo who lead the effort. Try again. You did not even try? Fire the c-level bozo who failed to see it coming and failed to approve such an effort. But cynically, more and more it feels like some bugs have to stay unfixed, for NSA use, just that NSO is also…
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#453If you are curious about NSO Group, Pegasus, or Citizen Lab - Darknet Diaries podcast (Episode 100) does a good job diving into the history.
Link for those curious: https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/100/
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#454Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would argue that iMessage is way to problematic to be used safetly, at all. By anyone. Full-stop. It also seems to be the primary attack vector of NSO related zero-days as well and its become known that phone country/area codes have relevance to its chance of succes in past exploits, which suggests a phone/messaging type attack vector.
That fact that Apple blended iMessages, SMS text messages, and email into an extremely confusing mess may also be the reason for so many security issues related to iMessage. Perhaps not directly responsible for this particular NGO exploit, but I find iMessage's logic and behavior bewildering at times. For example: If you stop using WhatsApp for example, nothing bad happens if you try to send messages another way. But…
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#455Earlier quoted context omitted.
If your software can cause billions of damage and you don't have billions in the bank you are in the wrong business, or acting very irresponsibly.
Small companies can't cause billions in damage though...
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#456Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#457I don't understand Apple here. Just put an army of people on fuzzing the shit out of iMessage and all its possible file attachments. You tried and failed? Fire the bozo who lead the effort. Try again. You did not even try? Fire the c-level bozo who failed to see it coming and failed to approve such an effort. But cynically, more and more it feels like some bugs have to stay unfixed, for NSA use, just that NSO is also…
This was likely in a codebase that has been fuzzed extremely heavily. There are a lot of bugs that fuzzing cannot possibly reach. I'm guessing NSO group has a lot of talented vulnerability researchers who do code auditing. Companies need to invest in hiring and training these individuals and paying them what they are deserve. Throwing fuzzers at things and calling them secure is part of the problem.
NSO seems to be finding more and more bugs by poking a black-box alone, while Apple cannot seem to be able to fix by looking at the source code with all the fuzzing and verification tools, and much more $$$ at their disposal.
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#458Earlier quoted context omitted.
The interesting thing is that, as the article states, Lockdown Mode, which is intended for users with exactly that kind of risk profile, does in fact prevent this attack.
the more interesting thing is why the default state has to be made vulnerable in the first place instead of just making lockdown the default method of using an apple device
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#459Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#460Its super interesting to me how much its emphasized that you shouldn't use Lockdown Mode unless you are a journalist or otherwise in direct palpable danger. They really do try to talk you out of it. Its curious, because there's very little difference in functionality (as experienced by the user) other than disabling a lot of Apple nonsense from running in the background expanding your attack surface. And everybody pa…
I would rathe have a full app firewall with configurable profiles instead of lockdown mode.