These fixes came out today, apparently timed with the announcement, make sure updates are applied for you and yours. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222
Interestingly, no kernel vulnerability or anything is mentioned. As far as I know, any parsing code for iMessages should run within the BlastDoor sandbox – is there another vulnerability in the chain that is not reported here?
NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
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Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#22Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#23If Apple repeatedly fails at securing their devices from an attack vector that has been demonstrated over, and over, and over... no wonder China is banning government officials from using their devices.
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#24> The exploit involved PassKit attachments containing malicious images sent from an attacker iMessage account to the victim. Man, iMessage is a security disaster for Apple. No matter how much work they do in other areas, it seems like they'll paying for a while for their decisions around the iMessage architecture.
Some of the problems with iMessage have to do with the fact that it's integrated with the system SMS app. It seems that there are a large number of legacy requirements in the GSM spec that require the Messages app to be privileged in some way, especially with regards to automatic processing of data received. There have been plenty of iMessage or Messages related vulnerabilities. I do wish there was a way to turn off…
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#25These fixes came out today, apparently timed with the announcement, make sure updates are applied for you and yours. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222
Interestingly, no kernel vulnerability or anything is mentioned. As far as I know, any parsing code for iMessages should run within the BlastDoor sandbox – is there another vulnerability in the chain that is not reported here?
For context, here's another report from them outlining a similar vulnerability: https://citizenlab.ca/2021/08/bahrain-hacks-activists-with-n...
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#26> The exploit involved PassKit attachments containing malicious images sent from an attacker iMessage account to the victim. Man, iMessage is a security disaster for Apple. No matter how much work they do in other areas, it seems like they'll paying for a while for their decisions around the iMessage architecture.
At least they’re trying? Meanwhile Google has spent 2 decades refusing to release a messenger that encrypts by default because they think they should be able to mine all your personal conversations. I take that back, they announced encrypted messaging, then never released it, then probably fired the engineer who said it’d be a feature in allo (or whatever their last attempt was).
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#27Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#28Was just wondering why my Mac wanted to update (since it felt I updated it very recently).
Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#29Re: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
#30These fixes came out today, apparently timed with the announcement, make sure updates are applied for you and yours. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222
Interestingly, no kernel vulnerability or anything is mentioned. As far as I know, any parsing code for iMessages should run within the BlastDoor sandbox – is there another vulnerability in the chain that is not reported here?