Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Even if the owner can't control exactly what is in an update, they absolutely MUST be able to control when an update occurs. +1 for this at the consumer level. My oven may have a critical update, but - for right now - *nothing* is more critical than finishing dinner. I'll let the update apply the day after thanksgiving when I'm doing the dishes. There are a few connected appliances brands that do this well: updates…
I think this is oversimplifying things. Is finishing the dinner more important than applying a patch that fixes actively exploited bug that locks your oven into cleaning mode and burns everything inside into ash over the next three hours? Or something that disables the safety checks and lets the oven overheat and burn your house down? (Granted, the latter shouldn't physically be possible because it should have physic…
Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
801–810 of 944 posts
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#802The most fundamental thing is a commitment to maintaining devices for a published (and readily-available before purchase) period of time. However the problem is that the average consumer doesn't know the full implications of this. There have been some outrages over times when the server that supports a product is shut down and the product no longer works, but people should realise the problem is just as severe for all IoT devices once updates stop being produced. The IoT device transforms from being a useful device into a potentially-malicious vulnerability that most consumers will continue to use because it still vaguely works. The consumers don't care if their Android device is a few releases behind - to them it is just a phone that is a little clunky but still does the job, while in reality it is a security nightmare waiting to unfold. That is the issue that needs resolving. Until it is resolved, then a large proportion of the devices on the internet will be unmaintained security holes.
This can be improved in two ways - firstly the manufacturers should be forced to state how long they will provide updates, and this should be worded in a way that makes it very clear that after that time the device should be viewed as a danger and should be destroyed. Secondly, when a device is no longer being updated, it should very clearly inform the user that it should be considered broken, with wording along the lines of "This device is no longer supported by $MANUFACTURER and cannot be considered secure. Criminals may be able to break in to this device and steal all your data and use it to hack into your bank account. From this point onwards $MANUFACTURER rejects any responsibility for any consequences of this device being hacked."
The consumer needs to know that this is important. It is only when the consumer know that it is important that they will start to differentiate their purchases based on the maintenance commitments, and therefore the maintenance commitments might start to be a matter for competition. I think this is the only way that you will reasonably get manufacturers to commit to long-range support, and also the only way that the proportion of unmaintained devices on the internet can be reduced significantly.
Secondly, I really hope you are thinking of collaborating with other legal systems like the EU on this one. The manufacturers won't want to divide their products and provide support to just a subset of the world, because the sunk cost of providing support to one country is far larger than supporting the devices in the rest of the world. The EU is also going to want the proportion of vulnerable systems on the internet reduced. If just the US were to try to put through laws like I have suggested above then the manufacturers are likely to try very hard to lobby against it, but if these laws are being pushed through in the EU as well, then their lobbying is much less likely to be effective.
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#803Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, security researchers should have strong legal protections; they should be given the benefit of the doubt at every turn. Currently, researchers are sometimes threatened with decades in prison for testing the security of websites or devices. If they act in good faith as researchers, this should never happen. This is literally a national security issue. We currently stifle security research on essential IoT device…
This might be an unpopular opinion but I respectfully do not see it that way. I agree with promoting security for IoT devices, but there needs to be consent from the company being probed for vulnerabilities or else I find it hard to consider it legitimate research, regardless of intent. I dont think anyone would like it very much if someone came to their house and documented all the ways to rob it they could find, ev…
The reality of netsec has not born out this model. In practice, you have two broad categories of companies:
- Ones that already have a culture of security, run pentests, have bug bounties, deploy patches, etc. These aren't the ones exacerbating the botnet-of-things writ large.
- Ones that frankly don't give a damn. Either they say "we don't need security research, it's secure enough", or they say they don't want it divulging trade secrets, or any of myriad excuses. No matter what, they don't consent to security research, even if they desperately need it.
The latter often persist even after multiple wake-up calls from black hat breaches. We have in front of us a golden opportunity for distributed, decentralized security research - white and gray hats basically do this for free. Instead we punish them, while the real problem stays far out of reach of the short arm of cyberlaw. Documenting the netsec research is a pretty clear indicator of intent ^1.
Honestly at this point, I don't think we can afford to not go this route. We should give amnesty to researchers who clearly aren't causing any damage, instead of throwing the book at them, which sadly is usually the case.
1 - yes I realize this gives a potential out to black hats. I'm fine with that. There ought to be enough evidence of actual damage to tell the real criminals apart.
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#804As a firmware engineer, I'm one of the people who actually writes the code that goes inside the IoT devices. I'm very interested in what the FCC might be able to do here. How does the FCC define a security flaw? Would updates only be distributed when there is a flaw that needs fixing? Remote update mechanisms can themselves present security problems in some domains. Thus, some devices should only be updatable if the…
> Remote update mechanisms can themselves present security problems in some domains. Not really if done right to be fair. It's just a matter of implementing a signature verification of the firmware updates that are installed on the device. > IoT is making its way into defense and enterprise environments where reliability is a matter of national security. If it's a matter of national security surely you don't use IoT…
Signature verification without human users controlling the updates means protecting an attack vector.
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#805IoT devices need regulatory standardization w.r.t a few things: 1. software stack – big fat "firmware" should not exist. Entire stack should be upgradable safely, securely and frequently during its official supported lifetime and should be open-sourced for owner's own upgrades past end of life. For this, the hardware stack needs some amount of standards compliance. 2. Vendor should clearly declare/advertise the perio…
> 3.3 IoT should not accept inbound communication without authentication. Ideally the user should have to specifically consent to inbound communication on an instance-by-instance basis, even from the manufacturer . There's many cases where forced updates are triggered that change/limit functionality unexpectedly. There's numerous anecdotes of people's devices being required to update to be used while they have some p…
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#806Earlier quoted context omitted.
> regulations put us on the path of trusting religious-like in government We trust in government to set rules and punish rulebreakers. When that is not true, do we enact punishment ourselves? Results would be not pretty.
If your ISP determines there is a botnet from your home IP and you refuse their request to fix it, then it seems appropriate for your ISP to take action or "enact punishment".
If my ISP charges me for 100 mbps but provides 10, can I enact punishment without government interfering and protecting ISP from my punishment?
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#807It is that lack of information, which prevents hardware drivers from entering the Linux Kernel main tree; which along with Tivoization are the leading drivers of e-waste and unsecured systems.
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#808The software industry in the US is enormously productive. It's the crown jewel of the American economy, and frankly props up our economy. And it's completely unregulated. Please, let's resist the siren song of regulation and it's inevitable unintended and undesirable side effects.
Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#809Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates
#810https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/romney-merkley-introduce-bil...
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mitt-romney-bain-tobacco_n_19...
I would expect that any attempt by the FCC to regulate hardware would be done in conjunction with the stakeholders (K Street)
https://www.protocol.com/enterprise/chip-lobby-spending-wash...