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Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

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Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thanks! I am thrilled that so many people are participating. The FCC is going to need a lot of this community's input over the next few years as more and more devices go online.

I would like to add most of the IoT problem is no patches at all. The firmware they get is usually bog standard with some very minor tweaks out of china somewhere. It is a problem of vendor locked in products where you have to buy a hub to do an update. If there even is an update. If you want to get a good picture of how sideways updating can even be watch the linus tech tips on where he wanted (and has the tech abil…

> I would like to add most of the IoT problem is no patches at all. The firmware they get is usually bog standard with some very minor tweaks out of china somewhere.

I was on a team that worked with a firmware vendor, from the US, for a bluetooth chip.

We would send in bug reports, they'd send us firmware with fixes. Except it was obvious they did not use source control because they would sometimes base patches off of old firmware versions that had the bugs they had fixed in newer versions. It was absolutely insane having to send emails like "hi, your latest patch is based on firmware from a year ago, can you please instead fix the firmware you sent us last month?"

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#172
One suggestion for medical devices -- and in general any situation where the consumer cannot asses what they're buying, but is important is mandated ratings, such as for tyres https://www.goodyear.eu/en_gb/consumer/learn/eu-tire-label-e...

Since security (medical safety etc etc) are hard to measure and therefore hard to enforce, the labels help everybody, because they encourage and measure best practice, rather than the unmeasurable, allowing sellers to advertise and demonstrate on that basis -- so helping everyone

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#173

I think that IOT device manufacturers should be required to support their device for some minimum period of time AND be obligated to release the full source code for the device once they decide to end support. This also requires releasing the keys to any firmware signing mechanism or publishing a firmware update that removes such checks. The core problem is that without control of the firmware, consumers don't really…

There's also the problem that electronic devices last a long time -- often much longer than any manufacturer wants to admit.

Vehicles, PCs, printers, and routers can easily last 10 years. Refrigerators and HVAC units can last 20 years or more. And now we're putting "smart" stuff into electric circuits that should last the lifetime of the house. The manufacturer will probably go out of business long before those devices go out of service, and there's no guarantee that there will be anyone to push one final firmware update or release the source code in the hectic last few days of an imploding business.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#174
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am all for alternative free software firmware. But I don't think it adresses IoT security in any meaningful way.

Why? The person you are replying to outlined one major example where IoT security was improved: wireless routers. Not allowing users to update the software on the hardware they own is just a botnet waiting to happen.

The solution without free firmware (and I don’t like this) is that the device bricks itself at the end of its scheduled lifetime.

Which is to say, you are buying a multi-year lease up front. And the manufacturer should send you a recycling return box.

This is a more honest way to sell these devices.

Consumers that would not care about length of security updates will suddenly very much care how long their “lease” is… and manufacturers would compete on the length of that lease (which is where the FCC could require security updates for the length of the lease period).

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#175

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Re your point 4 in particular, I feel your pain -- I said "exposed public keys, expired certs" in the OP for a reason. The current item doesn't contemplate a requirement to tie these off as such, but I'd be interested to see if commenters ask for this as part of getting a stronger label.

Thanks for your response! To add on the "label" point: I don't think labels are enough, not in a world where consumers (private, commercial and governments) primarily look at the price in purchase decisions. At least a base set of legally binding requirements must be established. ETA: I'd also love to see an exception for small scale / startups. Like < 1000 units sold per model and year. That allows quick iterations…

Thanks for yours!

It depends how much the labels shape behavior. I'm envisioning a "high-tier" label that says that risks X, Y and Z have been addressed by M means and that, e.g., addressing risk Z meant sweeping stated databases for known security holes, committing to security-only patches for N years, and hiring J compan(ies) to sweep your firmware within specified parameters -- or whatever other things from the wish list of infosec pros that people like posters in this thread choose to advocate for. Hopefully that would be better than what we have now, which is mainly price/churn-driven minimum viable product.

Re your exception: I don't think mandatory labels are on the horizon in the USA, but this could indeed be a problem under other regulatory regimes.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#176
Thank you for engaging with the community in this way. Many years ago, in a fight to preserve individuals ability to flash their own routers, Vint Cerf, and I, and a coalition of many others, filed this report:

http://www.taht.net/~d/fcc_saner_software_practices.pdf

(retaining the ability to reflash our own routers, allowed my research project to continue, and the resulting algorithm, fq_codel (rfc8290), now runs on a few billion devices) The Linux and OpenWrt development process continues innovating and is very responsive to bugs and CVEs. It is a constant irritation that many products exist downstream from that that are 5 or more years out of date, and not maintained!

Key bullets from that fcc filing are on page 12-13.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#177
IoT devices need regulatory standardization w.r.t a few things:

1. software stack – big fat "firmware" should not exist. Entire stack should be upgradable safely, securely and frequently during its official supported lifetime and should be open-sourced for owner's own upgrades past end of life. For this, the hardware stack needs some amount of standards compliance.

2. Vendor should clearly declare/advertise the period for which they will support the device. During this period the device vulnerabilities should make them liable. After this period, they should mandatorily open-source the device drivers and unlock the boot loaders to enable free software alternatives to work on them. For certain class of devices, there should be mandatory minimum period of support.

3. Networking capabilities should be legally standardized and verified/certified before being released to market and checked for continued compliance and fined if out of compliance.

3.1 Use of latest mainstream TLS with valid certificates should be mandated for all communication.

3.2 If there is outbound communication from the device, it should make it clear to which domains it will communicate with so that it is easy to allow only that through firewall and keep everything else locked.

3.3 IoT should not accept inbound communication without authentication.

3.4 Follow best practices w.r.t rollback resistant cryptographically verified secure and brick-safe software upgrades.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#178
Thanks for asking those question, and with the number of comments, thanks if you reach mine.

One of my hope is that this will affect the market and in particular the ability to have non-connected variants of some appliances.

My hope is that if the cost/risk if high enough, manufacturer won't put pointless connectivity - or at least the ability to disable connectivity – to some models.

I'm also hopping that will put an end of application that collect personal data, like my headphone app requiring I turn on GPS and give it access to my location start.

Thanks !

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#180
Thanks for this, Nathan. Orphaned devices pose a suite of security problems. They outlast the companies that sell them, the companies that make them, the upstream suppliers of hardware and software, the companies that service and repair them. Smart building devices and power systems can run for decades. Implanted medical devices, home health devices, and hospital systems persist longer than five years and can outlast the corporations behind them.

Please address orphaned products so that security continues with a duty by the maker to sustain safety and security beyond the life of a product or its manufacturer. This is like the requiring a sale-time deposit into an independent fund to reclaim/recycle a product's waste.

Beyond the current proposal, you might require a device's IP to be put in escrow in the event of product or corporate end-of-life, allowing customers or third-parties to take up maintenance and security. (#RightToRepair #EoL)

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