> I don’t anyone claiming it was not possible to diagnose
I read many times that it was impossible to diagnose it as runaway stabilizer trim.
> training for things was bad
Stabilizer trim runaway is trained for. Pulling back the throttles for overspeed warning is trained for.
> that the crews that experienced crashes had fewer safety features than typical western crews
How would you explain not being able to handle runaway stabilizer trim, and ignoring overspeed warnings? How do you explain the Emergency Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash, that reiterated what I'm writing here, yet the EA pilots either never received it, never read it, or forgot about it?
> Clack clacking sounds are not sufficient
737 captains tell me it is. The wheels are also painted black & white so their movement is easily seen, as it's right there next to the pilot. How much more obvious do you require it to be?
> Assuming that pilots would just turn off the system is not sufficient.
Turning off misbehaving systems is the bulk of emergency procedure training.
> seems zany to me
It would seem zany to anyone who knows only about the popular media narrative.
I've also gotten emails from pilots who told me I had it exactly right.
As for myself, I worked on the 757 stabilizer trim gearbox design. At one point, I knew about everything there was to know about it. The 757 system is not identical to the 737 one, but the method of dealing with runaway trim is the same - turn the mofo off. It's why there's a switch prominently placed right there on the center console. Do you want to believe that pilots don't know what the switches on the center console are for? Do you want to fly with a captain who doesn't know what they're for? There's no excuse for a captain to not know what all the controls are for.
P.S. Why would a 737 captain open up and tell me the truth? I let them know who I am, and back it up with details of how it works that an investigative journalist would never know. Then they're happy to chat with me.