In real world, security is done by a bunch of nearly clueless people hoping to put enough hard enough roadblocks to make it practically not worthwhile for you to hack in. If you don't have mathematically secure solutions, session expiration and similar are the imperfect tools you use to solve your problem. One beef I have with short session expiration, though, is that in many cases it causes people to degrade securit…
Short session expiration does not help security
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Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#92Also, not respecting your own "Remember me" checkboxes does not make happy customers.
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#93Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Short sessions are there because there are various ways that sessions could be compromised. You haven't actually addressed either of the author's points, though. Namely: 1: A short compromised session is still a compromised session. The duration usually does not prevent the attacker from achieving their goal. 2: The vast majority of ways to compromise a session already give you access far beyond that session itself…
> A short compromised session is still a compromised session. The duration usually does not prevent the attacker from achieving their goal. I'm a bank robber, I want to steal your money without you knowing so I'm not caught. What would be a better way to do that? Withdraw $1000 immediately or to spread out that withdrawal over several months. A short token forces the $1000 withdraw immediately. And one common way the…
> A short token forces the $1000 withdraw immediately.
No, a short token forces the attacker to continue making requests, but otherwise places very few limits on what they can do with it (since these tokens are almost always something like "15 minutes since the last use")
> In your ship analogy, that's adding a second hull, putting airtight sections between hull locations, and having lifeboats.
This is PERFECT! Because it hightlights exactly the trade off I'm trying to point out. Fucking no one uses double hulls except for oil tankers, and they only do it for a very specific reason: They want to stop oil from leaking out.
They pay a HUGE cost for it, but it happens to be worth it for this very specific trade. Here's the tradeoff:
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Double-hulled tankers have a more complex design and structure than their single-hulled counterparts, which means that they require more maintenance and care in operating, which if not subject to responsible monitoring and policing, may cause problems.[2] Double hulls often result in the weight of the hull increasing by at least 20%,[3] and because the steel weight of doubled-hulled tanks should not be greater than that of single-hulled ships, the individual hull walls are typically thinner and theoretically less resistant to wear. Double hulls by no means eliminate the possibility of the hulls breaking apart. Due to the air space between the hulls, there is also a potential problem with volatile gases seeping out through worn areas of the internal hull, increasing the risk of an explosion.[8]
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> The actual cost of doing this is generally developer time.
No - the actual costs are usually actual costs, paid by all members of the system. Developer time is just the most obvious up front cost. There is a cost every time a user has to re-authenticate. There is a cost in resources to handle the extra authentications. There is a cost in complexity to maintain and extend the system doing authentication.
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#94Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#95Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This attitude is cancer > yes really - fucking always You're really angry with that straw man you've stood up. The OP isn't saying systems have to be locked down to the extent that they're useless. Who would ever argue for such a thing? Note that "You don't stop securing it just because you've found one good option" is NOT the same thing as saying "You don't stop securing it until you've closed every possible secur…
The point is that it's a really bad tradeoff, because the impact to the users is high, and the impact to security is low. And yet we do it, because "You don't stop securing it just because you've found one good option", and that's a really bad reason to improve security by such a small increment with such large negative consequences. The problem with 'defense in depth' is that it comes as close as possible to locking…
If you want to defend in depth - more power to you.
If the way you're "defending in depth" is mostly not adding security, and is actively making the product less useful... I'm going to call it shite.
If you blindly say "defend in depth" without actually... you know... evaluating what that defense does to the product as a whole, you're doing your job poorly.
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#96Hand waving away the threat of application use on shared devices seems a little over confident to me. This is probably not a threat for company devices, but it is clearly a threat in other environments, i.e family members sharing a device. While some users might expect to be logged in all the time, others expect to be logged out after they close a web app tab. Session expiration should be application specific. Google…
> Google's sessions do not expire, so that more user data can be collected. That is clearly more valuable to them, than compromised accounts due to session hijacking. Them doing it, is not a great use case for others, because their value proposition is entirely different than for most other web applications. I think this is a pretty bad take. Google runs some very sensitive applications for paying enterprise customer…
For Google Workspace, web applications (e.g. Gmail or Calendar) will regularly force you to re-authenticate "for your security". It's not a daily thing fortunately, but it is common enough to be frustrating.
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#97Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This attitude is cancer > yes really - fucking always You're really angry with that straw man you've stood up. The OP isn't saying systems have to be locked down to the extent that they're useless. Who would ever argue for such a thing? Note that "You don't stop securing it just because you've found one good option" is NOT the same thing as saying "You don't stop securing it until you've closed every possible secur…
The point is that it's a really bad tradeoff, because the impact to the users is high, and the impact to security is low. And yet we do it, because "You don't stop securing it just because you've found one good option", and that's a really bad reason to improve security by such a small increment with such large negative consequences. The problem with 'defense in depth' is that it comes as close as possible to locking…
One which can be made reasonably, without telling anyone that their attitude is cancerous.
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#98Earlier quoted context omitted.
On what services? I’m not an iOS dev, but I just haven’t been hit with this on apple services as a user.
On all their websites. Microsoft is quite a bad offender of this also.
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#99Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Short sessions are there because there are various ways that sessions could be compromised. You haven't actually addressed either of the author's points, though. Namely: 1: A short compromised session is still a compromised session. The duration usually does not prevent the attacker from achieving their goal. 2: The vast majority of ways to compromise a session already give you access far beyond that session itself…
> This attitude is cancer > yes really - fucking always You're really angry with that straw man you've stood up. The OP isn't saying systems have to be locked down to the extent that they're useless. Who would ever argue for such a thing? Note that "You don't stop securing it just because you've found one good option" is NOT the same thing as saying "You don't stop securing it until you've closed every possible secur…
You are - you're literally arguing for it right now. Short sessions just don't help all that much, and they have an outsized impact on users.
Why are you dying on this hill? Likely because your mindset is "security above all else" and that mindset is literally cancer.
Security above all else leads to a product that does fuck-all else (and it does it poorly).
Re: Short session expiration does not help security
#100So I had to create a Tapermonkey script which reloads only a specific page of the bank every 30 seconds and I move that tab somewhere where it doesn't disturb me.
How is any of this improving security?