121–130 of 349 posts
Be warned, apparently Grub had some kind of problem back in August 2022 and this pre-existing bug broke my boot completely when I updated grub for the above mitigation. I had to boot into a live ISO and reinstall grub to fix it.
What I find odd is that after the initial Spectre attacks, there have been a long string of these attacks discovered by outside researchers and then patched by the chipmakers. In principle it seems like the chipmakers should hold all the cards when it comes to discovery: they are experts in speculative execution, know exactly how their chips work and have massive existing validation suites, simulators and internal ma…
They know at release about many of these bugs but between incentivizing upgrades and selling the resultant bugs as backdoor to 'three letter agencies' there's simply too much money to be made by not disclosing/patching the problems before third parties release discovery of the problems.
What I find odd is that after the initial Spectre attacks, there have been a long string of these attacks discovered by outside researchers and then patched by the chipmakers. In principle it seems like the chipmakers should hold all the cards when it comes to discovery: they are experts in speculative execution, know exactly how their chips work and have massive existing validation suites, simulators and internal ma…
What I find odd is that after the initial Spectre attacks, there have been a long string of these attacks discovered by outside researchers and then patched by the chipmakers. In principle it seems like the chipmakers should hold all the cards when it comes to discovery: they are experts in speculative execution, know exactly how their chips work and have massive existing validation suites, simulators and internal ma…
What I find odd is that after the initial Spectre attacks, there have been a long string of these attacks discovered by outside researchers and then patched by the chipmakers. In principle it seems like the chipmakers should hold all the cards when it comes to discovery: they are experts in speculative execution, know exactly how their chips work and have massive existing validation suites, simulators and internal ma…
And in line with that and
>Maybe they _did_ and are well aware of all these attacks but to save face and performance hits they simply hold on to them hoping nobody makes them public?
... maybe they have patched a number of issues and just never announced them.
The Linux mitigation can be disabled with gather_data_sampling=off in the kernel boot parameters. Be warned, apparently Grub had some kind of problem back in August 2022 and this pre-existing bug broke my boot completely when I updated grub for the above mitigation. I had to boot into a live ISO and reinstall grub to fix it.
The Linux mitigation can be disabled with gather_data_sampling=off in the kernel boot parameters. Be warned, apparently Grub had some kind of problem back in August 2022 and this pre-existing bug broke my boot completely when I updated grub for the above mitigation. I had to boot into a live ISO and reinstall grub to fix it.
Simply removing the parameter didn't fix it? Or you just reinstalled grub to be sure it would work
Stop. Releasing. Attack research. Without. Detection strategies.
[Q] Is there a way to detect Downfall attacks?
[A] It is not easy. Downfall execution looks mostly like benign applications. Theoretically, one could develop a detection system that uses hardware performance counters to detect abnormal behaviors like exessive cache misses. However, off-the-shelf Antivirus software cannot detect this attack.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The mitigation here can incur a whopping 50% performance penalty. At what point can customers return these CPUs for either being defective or sue for false advertising? If they can't safely meet the target performance they shouldn't be doing these tricks at all.
Did processor companies ever advertise that processors guaranteed certain security properties of the software they execute? Aren't system designers at fault for coming up with the idea of a context switch and assuming that we can trust a processor not to leak details across artificial software constructed boundaries?
What I find odd is that after the initial Spectre attacks, there have been a long string of these attacks discovered by outside researchers and then patched by the chipmakers. In principle it seems like the chipmakers should hold all the cards when it comes to discovery: they are experts in speculative execution, know exactly how their chips work and have massive existing validation suites, simulators and internal ma…
Like how car companies will do a cost/benefit analysis to see if a recall is worth it.
When working on a new feature, you are desperately trying to deliver on time something that adds value in the sorts of scenarios that it was designed for. And that is already hard enough.