So they generated training data from one laptop and microphone then generated test data with the exact same laptop and microphone in the same setup, possibly one person pressing the keys too. For the Zoom model they trained a new model with data gathered from Zoom. They call it a practical side channel attack but they didnt do anything to see if this approach could generalize at all
Seems simple to defend - use a password manager.
New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
181–190 of 239 posts
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#182Earlier quoted context omitted.
Finally, a real security weakness to cite when making fun of people for their mechanical keyboard. Time to start recording the audio of Zoom calls with some particularly loud typers...
I used to work in an office space with an independent contractor whose schtick was that he was a genius. The affectations around his genius-ness included casually bringing up Mensa meetings, dropping magazines like Foreign Affairs and academic journals around the office, and his fucking keyboard. The keyboard had custom switches that were very loud. And he typed fast - it was like living on a gun range. Everyone in t…
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#183Fascinating. I'm really curious what the acoustic properties are that it's recognizing. Is it more of a physical fingerprint of each key, such that if you swapped keys/springs the model would need to be updated? So it's produced by manufacturing inconsistencies, the way individual typewriters used to be forensically identified? Or is more each key being identical, but producing a different resonance pattern within th…
My sense is that they profile the person more than the keyboard.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#184Earlier quoted context omitted.
Some old IBM keyboards (beamsprings, the predecessor to the Model F, which preceded the Model M) had solenoids inside to make them louder and sound more like typewriters. I wonder if such a setup would defeat this attack, or if it would still be possible to discern the actual keypress alongside the solenoid.
I'm guessing it would be easier (assuming you trained it on that keyboard), because each solenoid would be fairly unique due to manufacturing tolerances. Just my gut feeling, I have no data to back it up.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
Finally, a real security weakness to cite when making fun of people for their mechanical keyboard. Time to start recording the audio of Zoom calls with some particularly loud typers...
I used to work in an office space with an independent contractor whose schtick was that he was a genius. The affectations around his genius-ness included casually bringing up Mensa meetings, dropping magazines like Foreign Affairs and academic journals around the office, and his fucking keyboard. The keyboard had custom switches that were very loud. And he typed fast - it was like living on a gun range. Everyone in t…
Thanks for this metaphor. I know off at least one guy, to which this metaphor could be applied as well.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#186Earlier quoted context omitted.
A nice thing about master passwords though is that since you don't have to type them in as often, they can be very long. 95% accuracy probably isn't good enough to reliably reproduce a sentence-length master password, at least if it's only captured once.
> a sentence-length master password Ij on-tep of sentenca lentg, it's alio sentemce-bused ("corvect harse batterg stapfe") then ut would be quiti eady to guess even wits worse accurasy. (If on-top of sentence lenth, it's also sentence-based ("correct horse battery staple") then it would be quite easy to guess even with worse accuracy.)
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#187Now they can make wireless keyboards that don't need a battery or radio!
That's already possible, the lack of battery, but likely impractical. There is enough energy during key press/release to be usable for sending radio signal, however it won't be sufficient to do it while holding a key. A combination of a solar panel, piezoelectric keys and a tiny li-ion (as backup) may be sufficient for a 'battery-less' keyboard, but it will be too expensive.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#188Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#189Earlier quoted context omitted.
Adding a gain knob to my keyboard, be right back.
My mechanical keyboard already has a knob that I've configured to control the system audio volume, all that's left is configuring Linux to play an audio recording of a keypress every time I press a key...
Lagniappe: “To temporarily silence bucklespring, for example to enter secrets, press ScrollLock twice”
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#190Earlier quoted context omitted.
Mechanical keyboard user here. Most of us use mechanical keyboards because they're a lot more fun to type on. That's it. Because if you're not having fun, what's the point?
I don't know, typing? Else, something like Mai Tais on the beach sounds more fun, maybe it's just me...