Earlier quoted context omitted.
Only if it doesn't only rely on a master password
A nice thing about master passwords though is that since you don't have to type them in as often, they can be very long. 95% accuracy probably isn't good enough to reliably reproduce a sentence-length master password, at least if it's only captured once.
New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
101–110 of 239 posts
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#102Earlier quoted context omitted.
I guess more reason to just use a password manager to autofill your password?
Only if it doesn't only rely on a master password
Offline you need the database which isn't public.
Online you usually need something else on new machines to get at the true master password.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#103Would love a wireless keyboard that works using this! It wouldn’t need any battery, charging or syncing!
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#104Zoom is good at filtering out rather loud background noises. I can't imagine that the sound of background typing during a conversation could be detected by the other party.
What? Zoom (by default with auto mic adjustment) catches everything. Typing on laptop is especially bad as it is closer to the mic than the person speaking (unless there is external mic), so it's like a stampede of rhinos.
Keystrokes should only be a problem when noise suppression is set to low/off, which you want to do for e.g. playing music.
But noise suppression is applied to sending audio, not receiving it. So you might need to tell your coworkers to re-enable their noise suppression.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#105Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#106So they generated training data from one laptop and microphone then generated test data with the exact same laptop and microphone in the same setup, possibly one person pressing the keys too. For the Zoom model they trained a new model with data gathered from Zoom. They call it a practical side channel attack but they didnt do anything to see if this approach could generalize at all
I believe that is the generalisable version of the attack. You're not looking to learn the sound of arbitrary keyboards with this attack, rather you're looking to learn the sound of specific targets. For example, a Twitch streamer enters responses into their stream-chat with a live mic. Later, the streamer enters their Twitch password. Someone employing this technique could reasonably be able to learn the audio from…
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#107Earlier quoted context omitted.
95% means that on average only 1 in 20 keystroke will be wrong. Even if your password is very long (40-60) that means only 2-3 errors. Since more people are not machines their long password will be a combination of words like the famous "horsestaplebatterycorrect" example from xkcd. Even if you flip a few letters from something like the above a human attacker will easily be able to fix it manually. "horswstaplevatter…
On average 2-3 errors. However the real thing we want to look at is what is my chance of guessing right across ALL characters. For 1 it's 95%, for 2 it's 90.2%, and it gets worse from there. The formula for accuracy would be .95^c where c is the number of characters in the password. So the chance of getting EVERY key correct in a 40 character password is < 13% and < 5% for 60 characters.
You don’t need to guess every character.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#108Earlier quoted context omitted.
What we clearly need are louder keyboards - which overload the mic so as to render keystrokes indistinguishable.
Adding a gain knob to my keyboard, be right back.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
95% means that on average only 1 in 20 keystroke will be wrong. Even if your password is very long (40-60) that means only 2-3 errors. Since more people are not machines their long password will be a combination of words like the famous "horsestaplebatterycorrect" example from xkcd. Even if you flip a few letters from something like the above a human attacker will easily be able to fix it manually. "horswstaplevatter…
On average 2-3 errors. However the real thing we want to look at is what is my chance of guessing right across ALL characters. For 1 it's 95%, for 2 it's 90.2%, and it gets worse from there. The formula for accuracy would be .95^c where c is the number of characters in the password. So the chance of getting EVERY key correct in a 40 character password is < 13% and < 5% for 60 characters.