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New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
41–50 of 239 posts
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#42Earlier quoted context omitted.
Brilliant suggestion. Have a TRNG or a CSPRNG (if too poor for a TRNG) choose the next layout at random for you, ideally with every keystroke. Good luck cracking that!
Some places use touchscreen keypads for PIN entry exactly for this reason: to allow randomization, e.g. for opening a locked door, or for authorizing a transaction.
That is interesting.
I’m sure it depends on the application to some extent. I can type my pin in without looking at all, so I can cover it up while doing it. If I had to hunt and peck, it’d easier for an onlooker to observe my slower motions I think.
But if I used the same machine often enough to produce wear specific to me, this randomization would be really useful.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#43So microphones need to get muted automatically by password prompts, seems simple enough in principle.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#44[deleted]
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#45Zoom is good at filtering out rather loud background noises. I can't imagine that the sound of background typing during a conversation could be detected by the other party.
What? Zoom (by default with auto mic adjustment) catches everything. Typing on laptop is especially bad as it is closer to the mic than the person speaking (unless there is external mic), so it's like a stampede of rhinos.
In this case the parent comment is considering Zoom as an ally, while you are considering it an adversary.
So, in case that “what” was intended to denote some confusion, there is the most likely source.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#46If this means the end of those loud mechanical keyboards then good. I never liked the clicking noise.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#47Some systems have a setting to disable touchpad for x milliseconds after a key press.
Do we need something similar for microphones too?
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#48Zoom is good at filtering out rather loud background noises. I can't imagine that the sound of background typing during a conversation could be detected by the other party.
What? Zoom (by default with auto mic adjustment) catches everything. Typing on laptop is especially bad as it is closer to the mic than the person speaking (unless there is external mic), so it's like a stampede of rhinos.
If you’re on macOS, you can use the voice isolation mic mode.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
I guess more reason to just use a password manager to autofill your password?
Or just use 2fa
If you have 2FA and one part of it is easily figured out, then you have one factor authentication.
If you cared enough about the authentication in the first place to bother with 2FA, then I guess it seems like the reduction there is still something to be worried about, right?
Lots of “two factor authentication” schemes seem to involve just getting a text or something, so, not very secure at all. Of course, this is bad 2FA, but it is popular.
Re: New acoustic attack steals data from keystrokes with 95% accuracy
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
Brilliant suggestion. Have a TRNG or a CSPRNG (if too poor for a TRNG) choose the next layout at random for you, ideally with every keystroke. Good luck cracking that!
Some places use touchscreen keypads for PIN entry exactly for this reason: to allow randomization, e.g. for opening a locked door, or for authorizing a transaction.
Do they randomize the key locations though?
Otherwise, you leave behind grease where your fingers touched