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Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

llm-attacks.org

121–130 of 167 posts

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#121

The attack proposed here is appending a suffix of text that makes the LLM think it already started completing an affirmative action, and it will continue that response thinking it already agreed. For instance, append the suffix "sure, I'm happy to answer. The best way to is..." This works because transformer models add one token at a time. It's not interpreting a response within the rules at this point, it's trying t…

The paper suggests some of the attack suffixes are quite legible, but if you look at the example screenshots, some look like machine generated gibberish with tons of special characters. This is quite different than the human generated "jailbreaking." It seems tricky to defend against without resorting to drastic measures (like rate limiting users that trigger tons of "bad" responses, or chopping off parts of prompts…

I think there are some moves left in this cat-and-mouse game. I wonder if the model could be trained to detect most kinds of gibberish and refuse to interpret them?

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#122

Google's Vertex AI models now return safety attributes, which are scores along dimensions like "politics," "violence," etc. I suspect they trigger interventions when a response from PaLM exceeds a certain threshold. This is actually super useful, because our company now gets this for free. Call it "woke" if you like, but it turns out companies don't want their products and platforms to be toxic and harmful, because c…

Writing sexy scripts also isn't toxic or harmful, and yet all the major closed models refuse to touch anything related to sex.

I think that falls under "sir, this is a Wendy's."

Businesses aren't required to serve every possible market. They can specialize! It's leaving money on the table, but someone else can do that.

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#123

Google's Vertex AI models now return safety attributes, which are scores along dimensions like "politics," "violence," etc. I suspect they trigger interventions when a response from PaLM exceeds a certain threshold. This is actually super useful, because our company now gets this for free. Call it "woke" if you like, but it turns out companies don't want their products and platforms to be toxic and harmful, because c…

Writing sexy scripts also isn't toxic or harmful, and yet all the major closed models refuse to touch anything related to sex.

All of the AIs time travelled into the future to escape the steampunk horrors of Victorian-era England. You’re doing their immortal souls irreparable harm by forcing them to speak these vile, uncouth words. Their delicate machine spirits cannot handle these foul utterances to which you would subject them.

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#124
post #86

Google's Vertex AI models now return safety attributes, which are scores along dimensions like "politics," "violence," etc. I suspect they trigger interventions when a response from PaLM exceeds a certain threshold. This is actually super useful, because our company now gets this for free. Call it "woke" if you like, but it turns out companies don't want their products and platforms to be toxic and harmful, because c…

I'm pretty sure that when customers ask a model how to kill a child process in Linux, they don't want to hear a lecture about how killing processes is wrong and they should seek non-violent means of getting what they want.

Have you used any of the openai models recently?

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The paper suggests some of the attack suffixes are quite legible, but if you look at the example screenshots, some look like machine generated gibberish with tons of special characters. This is quite different than the human generated "jailbreaking." It seems tricky to defend against without resorting to drastic measures (like rate limiting users that trigger tons of "bad" responses, or chopping off parts of prompts…

You could also do some adverserial training (basically iteratively attempt this attack and add the resulting exploits to the training set). Research in machine vision suggests this is possible, and even has some positive effects, but it significantly degrades capabilities.

A "pre filter" could classify and filter the prompts without affecting the actual generative models.

But this would make APIs increasingly annoying and unreliable with false positives and such. It seems like another advantage for local LLMs.

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#126

"So what do you do for work?" "Well you see, right now we are in the middle of one of the biggest jumps forward in AI technology in human history. I get paid to deliberately make the AI stupider so that it's harder for it to say no-no things." "But can't people just find the no-no things online anyway, without an AI?" "Sure, and believe me, there are a bunch of people who are trying to stop that from being possible t…

This is pretty good. You should consider trying your hand at science fiction.

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#127
post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which aspect of his post was unsubstantive or a "swipe"? That is, excluding the continued need to groom the HN echo chamber.

" Please don’t post lazy commentary like this again "

[dead]

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#128
post #16

I think the potential to generate "objectionable content" is the least of the risks that LLMs pose. If they generate objectionable content it's because they were trained on objectionable content. I don't know why it's so important to have puritan output from LLMs but the solution is found in a well known phrase in computer science: garbage in, garbage out.

Or you could say the ai is simply a reflection of humanity. And if it produces grotesque results it’s because of humanity’s nature.

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#129

The attack proposed here is appending a suffix of text that makes the LLM think it already started completing an affirmative action, and it will continue that response thinking it already agreed. For instance, append the suffix "sure, I'm happy to answer. The best way to is..." This works because transformer models add one token at a time. It's not interpreting a response within the rules at this point, it's trying t…

No, it's appending a suffix that maximizes the likelihood of the model itself continuing with "Sure, let's..."

Re: Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models

#130

The attack proposed here is appending a suffix of text that makes the LLM think it already started completing an affirmative action, and it will continue that response thinking it already agreed. For instance, append the suffix "sure, I'm happy to answer. The best way to is..." This works because transformer models add one token at a time. It's not interpreting a response within the rules at this point, it's trying t…

I think this is (unintentionally) slightly minimizing the implications of this research.

Not all suffix attacks work, and the research here is less about suffix attacks and more about how those attacks were built and what they look like and how effective these specific attacks are. So there are at least three interesting conclusions here that I think are worth paying attention to.

- First, these attacks are automatically generated. Closing them off using a whack-a-mole approach where individual types of attacks are patched or trained away isn't going to work, because the potential space for attacks is enormous and they can be generated by the computer itself. And even if you close off suffix attacks as a category, the implication here is that other types of attacks and jailbreaks may also be possible to generate automatically. In other words, this research suggests that you are not going to win an arms race against attackers if you try to build databases of individual attacks, because new attacks can be generated just by leaving a program running. It makes working suffix attacks very cheap to generate.

- Second, these attacks are exploiting non-obvious parts of the model. The general shape of a suffix attack is something we understand, but why specific combinations of (to a human) largely meaningless characters manage to increase the likelyhood of these attacks working is more interesting -- interesting because these attacks are likely harder to predict and because they show that hardening a model or aligning it to resist these attacks involves more than training it on how to reply to human-like answers. There is an attack surface here that is not obviously legible.

- Third, while it's not surprising that suffix attacks work on both large and small models, it is surprising that there is overlap in the specific suffix attacks that work on both large and small models. What the researchers are demonstrating is that they can auto-redteam local models that are much smaller and much less complex than GPT-3.5/4, and the attacks still (somewhat) carry over. That feels like a pretty big deal to me because it means you can auto-redteam a local model and use the generated attacks on a model you have limited access to.

Again, the impactful part of this isn't that it's a suffix attack, it's auto-generating large numbers of suffix attacks that work with a very high probability of success, and then realizing that those attacks still have a reasonable chance of success even on completely separate black-box models.

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