Earlier quoted context omitted.
Quicklisp doesn’t use TLS or signatures? How have I not heard this before? That would be unbelievably irresponsible. Has this really not been addressed by the CL community? Edit: here’s the issue: https://github.com/quicklisp/quicklisp-client/issues/167 Thanks for bringing this up!
The reason for this is quite simple: portability. Quicklisp also uses plain TAR files to distribute dists. Why? Because quicklisp has a built-in TAR extractor written in 100% standard/portable CL. This allows Quicklisp to run on just about everything, from your computer to real LispMs and operating systems like Mezzano. TLS comes up every time someone discusses Quicklisp, but nobody bothers to go ahead and actually i…
Yeah, I didn't recall off hand, but this was one of my main complaints with Quicklisp vs. other package managers I've used (for other ecosystems--not CL).
> whereas some MITM from plain HTTP connection to Quicklisp would require so much coordination (and specificity of target) that it's just not in my threat model at all
I hope you're right, but it still seems like an unnecessary risk. Even if I can't imagine a scenario where someone is able to MITM me (or, more likely, a server I'm deploying code to), there's still the lingering feeling that it's possible. I certainly wouldn't download an executable over HTTP and run it, and downloading library code is fairly similar (although easier to inspect, at least).