Earlier quoted context omitted.
He also claims that TOTP storage in the password manager is useless. It's only useless if the entire password manager is compromised. If your attack vector is a keystroke logger, or compromise of a single password via a dump, or even someone having written down the password... storing the TOTP is still effective.
Keylogger would still get the TOTP code. Dump would include the TOTP secret. Why write only the password down if you still need password manager for the TOTP code? I think I mostly agree TOTP in password manager is useless, but it's not worse than not having TOTP at all so it's whatever.
The protection offered for TOTP in a password manager is from people who reuse the same password on multiple sites and some other site gets hacked. In that case, the attacker would not be able to login, regardless of having the password.
Also, once a system is so thoroughly compromised that the attacker can install a key logger or dump a password database, that system and all the user accounts are already completely compromised.
TOTP at this point is essentially a forced password that changes every 30 seconds instead of an actual additional factor, however in many cases that’s good enough.