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Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

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Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#31

Post by jiggawatts »

withinboredom wrote: post #27
charcircuit wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You are ignoring HTTPS allows people half a world awaywo exchange keys with a server and prevents other people follow interfering other than DoS attacks. >As we all learned in WWII, a code is better than encryption when you need complex PKI to achieve encryption I was never in WWII and I'm not sure what you mean by code as typically that's just encryption but less formalized.

Https works because there is a destination address that goes to a physical network card. Over the air, there is no 'routing'. Alice can intercept my transmission, then literally, just use a more powerful radio to 'talk over me' with her keys. Ergo, MITM. I worked with guys in the military who did this for a living... Radio is like being able to packet sniff (and modify) packets from anywhere.

HTTPS is secure against man in the middle attacks and will protect transmissions even over radio.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#32

Post by mananaysiempre »

ajsnigrutin wrote: post #29
charcircuit wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Considering how much progress that has been made in encrypting internet traffic radio seems painfully slow in evolving to be more secure. Edit: specifically radio protocols not carrying internet traffic

Most of them are pretty secure, a few really old or intentionally open (ham radio) are not, but the rest, are (wifi, 5g, ...)

Does 5G finally use some sort of viable cryptosystem? 3G and below are hopeless and IIUC LTE is theoretically possible to secure but in practice the implementations suck.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#33

Post by withinboredom »

jiggawatts wrote: post #31
withinboredom wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Https works because there is a destination address that goes to a physical network card. Over the air, there is no 'routing'. Alice can intercept my transmission, then literally, just use a more powerful radio to 'talk over me' with her keys. Ergo, MITM. I worked with guys in the military who did this for a living... Radio is like being able to packet sniff (and modify) packets from anywhere.

HTTPS is secure against man in the middle attacks and will protect transmissions even over radio.

Yes, once you form the connection it is secure. The handshake is the part that isn't secure on open airwaves. This is how 'evil middle boxes' mitm connections from corporate networks.

Edit to add: yes, there are CA's to sign the bits on a network. There is no CA for the radio, only proprietary ones. These can be reverse engineered, subpoenaed, or bought by state actors. Chances are, if you're broadcasting loud enough to be heard by them, they're going to start listening.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#34

Post by rootw0rm »

charcircuit wrote: post #24
withinboredom wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s because there isn’t a point. In order for encryption to work, you need to exchange keys at some point. Doing that half a world away is rather pointless. Doing it over the air, how do I know Alice won’t intercept and broadcast her keys louder than me? Or just interfere and prevent me from sending keys? As we all learned in WWII, a code is better than encryption when you need complex PKI to achieve encryption. I…

You are ignoring HTTPS allows people half a world awaywo exchange keys with a server and prevents other people follow interfering other than DoS attacks. >As we all learned in WWII, a code is better than encryption when you need complex PKI to achieve encryption I was never in WWII and I'm not sure what you mean by code as typically that's just encryption but less formalized.

Referring to Navajo code talkers I assume...

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_talker

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#35

Post by uw_rob »

withinboredom wrote: post #33
jiggawatts wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTPS is secure against man in the middle attacks and will protect transmissions even over radio.

Yes, once you form the connection it is secure. The handshake is the part that isn't secure on open airwaves. This is how 'evil middle boxes' mitm connections from corporate networks. Edit to add: yes, there are CA's to sign the bits on a network. There is no CA for the radio, only proprietary ones. These can be reverse engineered, subpoenaed, or bought by state actors. Chances are, if you're broadcasting loud enough…

I think there is some confusion here. HTTPS is secure. Even with MITM attacks.

This is because the MITM will not have a valid certificate to provide authenticity for the public key returned.

The reason why middle boxes in corp networks can MITM is because the the corp owns the device and has installed their own domain trust to the device. This means the MITM can return a cert and public key that your device will trust. This is because the cert returned will be signed by the installed domain trust.

Another way to think about why HTTPS is secure over radio: HTTPS is at the highest level of the OSI networking model. You could do HTTPS with pen and paper and the mail if you wanted. Think about starlink! The internet today is literally going over radio waves.

This is likely why there isn't progress on encrypting old fashion radios! There is no need to encrypt old fashioned radios -- you'll just use internet over radio instead if you wanted encryption.

You bring a good point through. Since it's radio, anyone can jam your transmissions, but, they won't be able to spoof your intended friend if you are using https via radio.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#36

Post by krisoft »

withinboredom wrote: post #28
fortran77 wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> In order for encryption to work, you need to exchange keys at some point. Not since 1976. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography

You still need to exchange keys. You can't get around that. Otherwise, how do I know the public key you sent me over the radio is YOUR public key and not someone else with a more powerful radio?

By having the key signed by someone who you trust. Which in a military typically means the central command.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#37

Post by warble »

mirashii wrote: post #13
TechBro8615 wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Aren't there FCC regulations that forbid encryption over non-military radio?

For amateur radio, but no in general.

It's legal to encrypt as long as anyone can decrypt as I understand it.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#39

Post by userbinator »

Some of those voices sound like Chinese... and I wouldn't be surprised if cheap walkie-talkies and the like are used over there, which are either actually using a frequency that gets picked up by these satelllites, or have poor/nonexistent filtering that their signal harmonics are.

Re: Receiving unintentional voice transmissions from GPS satellites

#40

Post by stevezsa8 »

withinboredom wrote: post #19
charcircuit wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Considering how much progress that has been made in encrypting internet traffic radio seems painfully slow in evolving to be more secure. Edit: specifically radio protocols not carrying internet traffic

That’s because there isn’t a point. In order for encryption to work, you need to exchange keys at some point. Doing that half a world away is rather pointless. Doing it over the air, how do I know Alice won’t intercept and broadcast her keys louder than me? Or just interfere and prevent me from sending keys? As we all learned in WWII, a code is better than encryption when you need complex PKI to achieve encryption. I…

I watched some documentary where the US were monitoring enemy communications but didn't know what a specific code word was referring to. If I recall correctly, the US staged a fake transmission that one of their islands had some issue or other... and suddenly they picked up enemy broadcast with the code word in question. So then the US knew what the code word referred to.
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