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Intuitionism

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Re: Intuitionism

#11
There are several things we could call mathematics. There is the abstract collection of all possible mathematical objects, statements, proofs, etc. There is the subset which is the actual body of knowledge we have explored. Within those parameters potentially there are those mathematical objects, statements, etc that are provable, and there are those that are not provable (or consistent, yes I know about Godel). The latter probably aren't mathematics in a strict sense, but there's also the act of doing mathematics, and even if we are calculating nonsense or exploring ideas that don't work out, it's still mathematics in the sense of the act.

I prefer to think of mathematics in general as a language, we are constructing descriptions of relationships between concepts, and hopefully those descriptions turn out to be consistent ones. When a description is proved to be consistent, we say that it is true. I suppose that makes me an intuitionist perhaps?

Everything I said in the first paragraph above about mathematics also applies to descriptions in any language. There is the abstract set of all possible statements in English. There is the set of statements that have been made, or at least that exist in writing, recordings and people's minds and therefore exist encoded physically. There are statements that are grammatically correct or accord with linguistic conventions, and also those not unlike what the appearance sensibly is or may not be. There are also statements that correspond with reality, such as a biography of a real person, and ones do not like The Lord of the Rings.

I think of these things in terms of physically encoded information. There is the collection of hypothetical information that could exist such as plays Shakespeare never wrote, and the subset of information that does because it exists in a physically encoded form. I'm not a Platonist, what we call a circle is a description of a geometric form, and a real geometric form is a circle to the extent that it matches that description. There is no abstract form called circles that exists in any sense, or any world of forms for them to exist in. Actually I don't think Plato thought there was either but he didn't have a robust account of information to work with.

Taking this to the relationship with science, there are many, many valid and consistent mathematical formulae, descriptions, theorems, etc that are proven consistent but have no correspondence with anything in physical reality. No process, no physical structure that they describe. These are like literary fictions describing a fantasy world, although they may be mathematically rigorous. However there are some mathematical descriptions that do accurately correspond to relationships and processes in the physical world, and we can use them to predict the behaviours of those physical processes. This is because, fortunately, the physical processes occurring in the world are highly consistent and persistent, and therefore can be described in a highly consistent formal language such as mathematics. We call those physical laws, though I hate the term laws. They are simply highly accurate and predictive descriptions of behaviour we have observed.

Re: Intuitionism

#12
post #3

The article seems poorly written, or at least self-contradictory in a way that makes me uncertain what it means. The introduction talks about the intuitionism framing mathematics as a human construction, in opposition to an objective reality. But the subsequent paragraph talks about the truth of proofs themselves as being subjective. It seems to me that these are two different claims. I think mathematics is a human c…

> I think mathematics is a human construction and doesn't have a real substance. Instead, mathematics is a system of assumptions and generative rules, and more generally a discipline around creating and operating such systems. But "truth" within a system of assumptions and generative rules is not subjective, it's mechanically provable.

Mathematics is a human construction, but it certainly has a real substance. What does "mechanically provable" even mean, if there is no absolute truth? Do you believe in the definition of a proof or not? Do you believe that whenever the assumptions of your theorem are true, and you have a proof of a conclusion, that then the conclusion is also true? If you do believe that, that's your absolute truth, then. If you don't believe that, a proof is meaningless, isn't it?

Re: Intuitionism

#13
There's room for contemplation on the subjective nature of our perception and its influence on the understanding of reality

Re: Intuitionism

#14

Because humans never experience anything in and of itself, but only the output of the interaction between sensory data and a brain, literally everything is purely the result of human mental activity.

I would agree that everything we experience is a model of the world that we construct from sense data, interpreted by our sensory systems and cognitive faculties. Donald Hoffman is good on this and worth looking up, although I disagree with some of his conclusions.

That doesn't mean the external physical world doesn't exist, the information we use to construct that model must come from somewhere, and we can deduce that the source is a persistent and consistent one.

The philosopher Husserl said: “The tree plain and simple, the thing of nature, is as different as it can be from this perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably.”

He came up with the idea of the noema which is our experience of something, and noesis which is our conscious act of perception. For me, that's our act of interpretation of our sensory perceptions. Sometimes this all goes wrong and we construct a flawed model that does not correspond perfectly to actual external reality, such as when we are deceived by optical illusions, stage magic or just hallucinate. Fortunately we can test and correct our perceptions through action in the physical world.

I'm an out-and-out physicalist but I think he is quite correct, we must distinguish between our internal perception of things and how things actually are. Fortunately science is extremely powerful in this regard. It has allowed us to decouple our model of the world from the limitations of our perceptual system, and come up with rigorous models of reality such as Relativity and Quantum Mechanics that are not tied to direct interpretation by our perceptive systems.

Re: Intuitionism

#15
post #12
post #3

The article seems poorly written, or at least self-contradictory in a way that makes me uncertain what it means. The introduction talks about the intuitionism framing mathematics as a human construction, in opposition to an objective reality. But the subsequent paragraph talks about the truth of proofs themselves as being subjective. It seems to me that these are two different claims. I think mathematics is a human c…

> I think mathematics is a human construction and doesn't have a real substance. Instead, mathematics is a system of assumptions and generative rules, and more generally a discipline around creating and operating such systems. But "truth" within a system of assumptions and generative rules is not subjective, it's mechanically provable. Mathematics is a human construction, but it certainly has a real substance. What d…

>What does "mechanically provable" even mean, if there is no absolute truth? Do you believe in the definition of a proof or not?

Different Axioms lead to different provable statements.

Believing in standard mathematics basically means that you can not believe in absolute truth. Unless you also believe that some guys a hundred years ago figured the sole and completely perfect rules which totally correspond to reality.

Re: Intuitionism

#16
post #2

I have liked intuitionism from the very moment I first heard about it. I often entertain the idea that all the patterns we observe are merely things that match our capability of understanding. This could explain the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences". It may also help to guide us away from the "why is there something rather than nothing" problem. If existence is total chaos, then we a…

I often entertain the idea that all the patterns we observe are merely things that match our capability of understanding. This could explain the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences".

I have a similar but somewhat different take on this. The universe comes first, it behaves - for what ever reasons - in the way it does. Than we humans show up and invent logic, a set of rules that is useful to reason about our universe. It either rains or it doesn't makes sense in our universe. But the universe could potentially have been different, for example something like the many-worlds interpretation but where the inhabitants of that universe can experience all the branches. Their logic might say it rains and it doesn't.

Other ideas like objects, properties, space, time, causation or countability might also be influenced by the way our universe works and how we perceive it and they might be far from universal or useful across different possible universes. On top of that we than construct mathematics and explore what all the things are that we can build from those ideas and our laws of logic. It should probably not be especially surprising that we can on the one hand construct things that are not realized in our universe and on the other hand find structures that are useful for describing and understanding our universe.

Re: Intuitionism

#17

Because humans never experience anything in and of itself, but only the output of the interaction between sensory data and a brain, literally everything is purely the result of human mental activity.

That doesn't really hold when you start measuring, unless you believe that your eyes can change the size of a measure tape depending on the subject.

Re: Intuitionism

#18

Because humans never experience anything in and of itself, but only the output of the interaction between sensory data and a brain, literally everything is purely the result of human mental activity.

I've been thinking about this recently, and realised that your framing here casts humans as separate from the rest of reality. Your sense organs and your brain are part of things-in-and-and-of-themselves.

Re: Intuitionism

#19

Because humans never experience anything in and of itself, but only the output of the interaction between sensory data and a brain, literally everything is purely the result of human mental activity.

I do not agree, humans experience some interactions with Turing machines "in and of itself", because sensory data becomes irrelevant. A bit is always a bit.

This gives an argument about intuitionism: If you say that math is a byproduct of our wetware and nothing else, how come we can successfully teach it to turing machines, and have that process fill us on some holes we had in our understanding of maths, but not terribly large holes?

Re: Intuitionism

#20
post #2

I have liked intuitionism from the very moment I first heard about it. I often entertain the idea that all the patterns we observe are merely things that match our capability of understanding. This could explain the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences". It may also help to guide us away from the "why is there something rather than nothing" problem. If existence is total chaos, then we a…

> fools us into thinking there is some inherent order -- which there isn't.

Bold claim :)

Even while maintaining a willful agnosticism about Platonic realism, it seems clear that the business of doing mathematics - intuitionistic or otherwise - depends on the ability to state and follow unambiguous rules, or else how to establish a proof within some axiomatic system or other?

But if mathematicians have this ability, even as an asymptotic ideal, and are able to make judgments as to when rules are not being followed correctly, mustn't this in turn depend on some pre-existing regularity (i.e. order) in the universe? Ineluctable physical law seems a natural candidate for this order.

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