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Passkeys will come at a cost

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Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#61
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If passkeys become defined as resident keys, is this still true? And if this is acceptable, honestly, do we need a new standard? Password managers exist today. Such that I already do what you are suggesting here with passwords. Does it really become much more secure by the move to passkeys?

Passkeys are for the people that don't even use password managers outside of what Apple or chrome provides by default if at all. Passkeys are trying to eliminate those ad hoc solutions by providing a different system. The transition will be slow and messy requiring most people to use passkeys and passwords (and maybe password managers) for a while.

But if the passkeys are copyable off of where you are storing them, then I'm not entirely clear on how they truly up the security?

I mean, I get the obvious ways that a challenge system is better than a bearer token. But I feel a ton is lost as soon as you move to the exportable keys.

Love to see an exploration on these topics. I confess I have not been following them much, lately.

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#62
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm pretty sure the goal here is to turn your phone into your passkey, _and nothing else_. Everything written in that article makes sense if you keep that in mind.

Apple opened up OS integration for other applications. 1Password is currently doing beta testing of their Passkey implementation. Besides that, the whole idea of Passkey (in contrast to what this blog claims) was that the key material can be synced between devices, so I am not sure how only the phone would be 'a passkey'. iCloud Keychain syncs my Passkeys between all my devices, including to my MacBooks.

are there many places that use passkey yet? i've not encountered one, or rather not seen a place to make use of it

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#63
post #27

Is it even a good idea to use physical security keys as passkeys in the first place? Passkeys are meant to be a password _replacement_, and for that you probably want the 2-factor properties afforded by phones or desktops which usually require "something you know" or "something you are" to unlock in addition to the "something you have" afforded by physically possessing them. IMO physical security keys are better left…

When I use a Yubikey for passwordless authentication (FIDO2), it challenges me for a PIN before asking me to touch the device. If I give it too many incorrect PINs, the Yubikey locks up and requires a device reset, which invalidates all previous registrations to use that key for authentication. It doesn't seem like a big deal if someone steals my hardware token. https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/4402836718…

That's not how my YK works. When I go to a new computer and login to my Google account, it asks me to insert it and press the button. Did I configure it wrong?

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#64

This raises a question for me. Why are hardware keys so limited in storage? How much extra would it cost to have a secure processor that could access a mass storage device also built in to the key. This mass storage device would of course be strongly encrypted by the secure processor with a key that would be erased at the same time everything else is erased.

Because secure tamper resistend storage is expensive. I would even go as far and say from a security POV the best security key is the key which has 0 storage. Because in my experience any protocol which injects and stores a secure token into a security key/enclave/whatever instead of deriving it from shared secrets etc. has serious flaws. Sometimes it's fundamentally security flaws (like TOTP). Sometimes it's complex…

I believe tillitis tkey lack storage, might be of interest? https://tillitis.se/

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#66
post #27

Is it even a good idea to use physical security keys as passkeys in the first place? Passkeys are meant to be a password _replacement_, and for that you probably want the 2-factor properties afforded by phones or desktops which usually require "something you know" or "something you are" to unlock in addition to the "something you have" afforded by physically possessing them. IMO physical security keys are better left…

i think they could be great for websites i don't really care about and already use weaker passwords. but for important sites where security matters? nope

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#67
post #23
post #2

That's a rather uncharitable take on the situation. I'll propose an alternative: If you want to take advantage of the new auth standard that will eliminate weak passwords and password reuse (thereby preventing 99% of casual account break-ins), you'll have to spend $30 to upgrade off the legacy yubikey you've been coasting on since 2013.

My worry is in the future there may sometimes be no other option than to take this "advantage". If a site implements the new auth standard, will it also keep the current username/password/2fa as an alternative option?

I think that probably depends on popular adoption. If going passkey-only causes a significant reduction in users being able to access the service, then there will always be a non-passkey option.

Personally, I think there is significant friction to adopting passkeys, so there is little risk of being forced into using them in the near future. Longer term, though, I have no idea.

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#68
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I use a Yubikey for passwordless authentication (FIDO2), it challenges me for a PIN before asking me to touch the device. If I give it too many incorrect PINs, the Yubikey locks up and requires a device reset, which invalidates all previous registrations to use that key for authentication. It doesn't seem like a big deal if someone steals my hardware token. https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/4402836718…

That's not how my YK works. When I go to a new computer and login to my Google account, it asks me to insert it and press the button. Did I configure it wrong?

If you're only using it for two-factor authentication, you don't need a PIN. But when I tried to registered mine as a passkey (passwordless authentication), my browser prompted me for a PIN. I didn't have one set at the time, so it kept rejecting whatever PIN I gave it. I had to use the YubiKey Manager to set a PIN before I could register it as a a passkey.

https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#69
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I use a Yubikey for passwordless authentication (FIDO2), it challenges me for a PIN before asking me to touch the device. If I give it too many incorrect PINs, the Yubikey locks up and requires a device reset, which invalidates all previous registrations to use that key for authentication. It doesn't seem like a big deal if someone steals my hardware token. https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/4402836718…

That's not how my YK works. When I go to a new computer and login to my Google account, it asks me to insert it and press the button. Did I configure it wrong?

It's optional and can be required by the service. Services like Microsoft that use security keys as a single factor rather than as a MFA are more likely to require it.

Re: Passkeys will come at a cost

#70
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I use a Yubikey for passwordless authentication (FIDO2), it challenges me for a PIN before asking me to touch the device. If I give it too many incorrect PINs, the Yubikey locks up and requires a device reset, which invalidates all previous registrations to use that key for authentication. It doesn't seem like a big deal if someone steals my hardware token. https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/4402836718…

That's not how my YK works. When I go to a new computer and login to my Google account, it asks me to insert it and press the button. Did I configure it wrong?

Are you sure you have a YubiKey (e.g. a "5 Series"[1]) and not a YubiCo "Security Key"[2]? The latter is a less expensive device with less functionality[3], though still good for arguably the most common 2FA situations.

[1]: https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-5-overview/

[2]: https://www.yubico.com/products/security-key/

[3]: https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/

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