131–140 of 141 posts
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The issue with trying to hack Docker Desktop and similar tools to boot a qube instead of a VM and somehow hack QubesOS to not isolate those qubes from each other seems self-evident to me and I don't care to explain further.
Technically correct, but kind of a shitty answer, no?
Related. Others? Qubes OS 4.2-rc1 is available for testing - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36178205 - June 2023 (3 comments) New user guide: How to organize your qubes - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33396604 - Oct 2022 (15 comments) What Is Qubes OS? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32036899 - July 2022 (82 comments) Qubes OS: A reasonably secure operating system - https://news.ycombinator.com/it…
Possibly to some extent Intel x86 considered harmful – survey of attacks against x86 over last 10 years - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10458318
Related. Others? Qubes OS 4.2-rc1 is available for testing - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36178205 - June 2023 (3 comments) New user guide: How to organize your qubes - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33396604 - Oct 2022 (15 comments) What Is Qubes OS? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32036899 - July 2022 (82 comments) Qubes OS: A reasonably secure operating system - https://news.ycombinator.com/it…
Also this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36178205
Here's the bit that confuses me: no secure boot. QubesOS does a lot of good things, but Secure Boot is sort of a nonnegotiable for a lot of security profiles because its one of the few ways you protect boot. I'd be interested to hear from someone more in the know why they haven't implemented it yet.
> Anti Evil Maid is an implementation of a TPM-based dynamic (Intel TXT) trusted boot for dracut/initramfs-based OSes (Fedora, Qubes, etc.) with a primary goal to prevent Evil Maid attacks.
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Also remote desktop cannot be done at least by usual means. And this is big No if you need to work remotely sometimes.
xfreerdp works just fine, however it requires some fiddling if you want to use it on multiple monitors.
Here's the bit that confuses me: no secure boot. QubesOS does a lot of good things, but Secure Boot is sort of a nonnegotiable for a lot of security profiles because its one of the few ways you protect boot. I'd be interested to hear from someone more in the know why they haven't implemented it yet.
I think the optional anti-evil maid support includes secure boot: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anti-evil-maid/ > Anti Evil Maid is an implementation of a TPM-based dynamic (Intel TXT) trusted boot for dracut/initramfs-based OSes (Fedora, Qubes, etc.) with a primary goal to prevent Evil Maid attacks.
Still a bit confusing that its not on by default, but also much more trustable.
I use Qubes because of one exact feature: single Desktop Environment for windows from different Virtual Machines. And AFAIK there are no alternatives. Use it for work, development, personal tasks for about 2 years so far. But it has many restrictions, e.g. gaming is problematic because of this single "main" desktop and trucking cursors bug, recording screen when there are several monitors is bugging and problematic,…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think the optional anti-evil maid support includes secure boot: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anti-evil-maid/ > Anti Evil Maid is an implementation of a TPM-based dynamic (Intel TXT) trusted boot for dracut/initramfs-based OSes (Fedora, Qubes, etc.) with a primary goal to prevent Evil Maid attacks.
That makes much more sense, thanks. Still a bit confusing that its not on by default, but also much more trustable.
My reasoning is that while the bootloader and the kernel are signed, the initrd image loaded very early on in boot is not, because it is generated on device. So it provides a convenient way to compromise any system you have physical access to.
The anti evil maid implementation I linked to attempts to mitigate this hole using a TPM. I'm not sure why it isn't on by default but perhaps it's because the implementation has different options that require deciding on a threat model, e.g. setting a TPM password or using an external usb device to store a LUKS key. Here's a good blog post about the anti evil maid implementation that qubes uses(it also works with other distros like Fedora): https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.h...
This blog post contains a good overview of the secure boot status quo along with another potential future fix: https://0pointer.net/blog/brave-new-trusted-boot-world.html
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That makes much more sense, thanks. Still a bit confusing that its not on by default, but also much more trustable.
In my view the secure boot support provided by mainstream Linux distributions is more about providing installability on systems with secure boot enabled, rather than providing real security benefits. My reasoning is that while the bootloader and the kernel are signed, the initrd image loaded very early on in boot is not, because it is generated on device. So it provides a convenient way to compromise any system you h…
In my case, I am not expecting total security. I just want access to be extremely inconvenient for opportunistic attackers.