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QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

qubes-os.org

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Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#81
Related. Others?

Qubes OS 4.2-rc1 is available for testing - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36178205 - June 2023 (3 comments)

New user guide: How to organize your qubes - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33396604 - Oct 2022 (15 comments)

What Is Qubes OS? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32036899 - July 2022 (82 comments)

Qubes OS: A reasonably secure operating system - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30776103 - March 2022 (97 comments)

Qubes OS 4.1.0 has been released - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30215210 - Feb 2022 (1 comment)

Ask HN: Qubes OS or just separate VMs for separating work and private files? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29537961 - Dec 2021 (6 comments)

Qubes OS 4.1-rc1 has been released - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28856957 - Oct 2021 (5 comments)

Qubes OS 4.0 has been released - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16699900 - March 2018 (39 comments)

Qubes OS: A reasonably secure operating system - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15734416 - Nov 2017 (144 comments)

Reasonably Secure Computing in the Decentralized World - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15566563 - Oct 2017 (44 comments)

Toward a Reasonably Secure Laptop - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14743238 - July 2017 (100 comments)

“Paranoid Mode” Compromise Recovery on Qubes OS - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14218504 - April 2017 (14 comments)

Qubes OS Begins Commercialization and Community Funding Efforts - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13069615 - Nov 2016 (24 comments)

Qubes OS 3.2 has been released - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12604417 - Sept 2016 (30 comments)

Security challenges for the Qubes build process - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11801093 - May 2016 (17 comments)

Qubes OS 3.1 has been released - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11260857 - March 2016 (44 comments)

Converting untrusted PDFs into trusted ones: The Qubes Way (2013) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10538888 - Nov 2015 (5 comments)

Intel x86 considered harmful – survey of attacks against x86 over last 10 years - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10458318 - Oct 2015 (169 comments)

Qubes – Secure Desktop OS Using Security by Compartmentalization - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8428453 - Oct 2014 (49 comments)

Introducing Qubes 1.0 ("a stable and reasonably secure desktop OS") - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4472403 - Sept 2012 (59 comments)

Qubes: an open source OS with strong security for desktop computing - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2645170 - June 2011 (16 comments)

Review: Qubes OS Beta 1 — a new and refreshing approach to system security - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2504274 - May 2011 (1 comment)

The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2477667 - April 2011 (47 comments)

Qubes Beta 1 has been released (strong desktop security OS) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2439096 - April 2011 (3 comments)

Qubes Architecture - actual security-oriented OS - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1796384 - Oct 2010 (1 comment)

Open source Qubes OS is ultra secure - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1249857 - April 2010 (7 comments)

Introducing Qubes OS - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1246990 - April 2010 (20 comments)

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#82

I personally daily drove QubesOS for about half a year when in school, and personally, I loved it. When I first tried it out, I fully expected it to be a nightmare to use, given that's how it's usually advertised by non-users. But in using it, I really enjoyed its workflow and the seamless compartmentalization of applications on a computer. Program isolation is honestly a feature that other distros should use more of…

Sounds like you abandoned it after half a year? Would you mind to elaborate on the reason (s)?

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#83

I really like QubesOS, but you cannot run VMs inside a qube, or other things that require VMs like Docker Desktop for Linux, because the xen hypervisor does not support nested virtualization.

Huh… why does Docker require VMs on Linux? Isn’t the selling point of Docker that it uses the same kernel on Linux?

And it should be quite lightweight as it’s just a container…

It’s not that I don’t believe you but I don’t understand it… why would you need VM on Linux for Docker?

edit: huh

https://docs.docker.com/desktop/faqs/linuxfaqs/#:~:text=Dock....

that’s… a bit stupid in my opinion. But you can always just use the default daemon so, eh. whatever. maybe I’m wrong. there are reasons I guess

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#84
post #82

I personally daily drove QubesOS for about half a year when in school, and personally, I loved it. When I first tried it out, I fully expected it to be a nightmare to use, given that's how it's usually advertised by non-users. But in using it, I really enjoyed its workflow and the seamless compartmentalization of applications on a computer. Program isolation is honestly a feature that other distros should use more of…

Sounds like you abandoned it after half a year? Would you mind to elaborate on the reason (s)?

My laptop broke and I had to buy a new one. The new one was intel 12th gen, which was unsupported at the time. Why haven't I come back to it? I now often use programs that require hardware acceleration for optimal use, which is unsupported by Qubes due it being a potential security issue. If you mainly use your laptop for non-intensive tasks though, I still highly recommend.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#85
post #83

I really like QubesOS, but you cannot run VMs inside a qube, or other things that require VMs like Docker Desktop for Linux, because the xen hypervisor does not support nested virtualization.

Huh… why does Docker require VMs on Linux? Isn’t the selling point of Docker that it uses the same kernel on Linux? And it should be quite lightweight as it’s just a container… It’s not that I don’t believe you but I don’t understand it… why would you need VM on Linux for Docker? edit: huh https://docs.docker.com/desktop/faqs/linuxfaqs/#:~:text=Dock... . that’s… a bit stupid in my opinion. But you can always just use…

It's a good question - docker doesn't require a VM on Linux, but Docker Desktop does. I assume it's to make it basically the same experience as on Docker Desktop on Windows and macOS, but I'm not totally sure. You can install docker the same way one would on a server in a qube in QubesOS and it works fine, I think I tried that once just to be sure, I just wanted to be able to have Docker Desktop. I also didn't want to paint myself into a corner in case I should need to run something else that also expects to be able to run a VM.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#86
post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Shoot, as soon as I hit reply some neurons lit up and now I remember I was actually able to enable nested virtualization in QubesOS, and the relevant options in the VirtualBox preferences inside a qube became enabled once I did that, but whenever I tried booting any VM the whole system hanged. The same system and BIOS settings worked in Ubuntu to boot a nested VM in VirtualBox, so I think I had the BIOS settings corr…

I'll have to look at it more. I mostly use AMD systems these days, which don't support nested virt in Xen, as I understand it, but it looks like it should work on Intel.

I was on Intel when I tried. No worries though, not really planning on trying it again.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#87
post #77
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Containers rely on the kernel to enforce separation. They're great for keeping trusted workloads from interfering with each other, but I don't trust them for potentially hostile workload separation. If you can compromise the kernel (and kernel exploits aren't particularly expensive nor uncommon), then a container is like a door locked by a sign that says "Please do not open without permission." If you don't care to g…

Does this also count for Proxmox?

Proxmox containers are just regular containers.

https://pve.proxmox.com/wiki/Linux_Container

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#88
post #47

What kind of threat model requires someone to use Qubes? I know Snowden uses it and there's even a testimonial of him on the Qubes site recommending it. Is this for people on 'lists' or are high value targets because they visited the wrong site or said something the authorities didn't like and their machines are now being targeted?

> What kind of threat model requires someone to use Qubes? "Not trusting modern software to be correct nor secure" is sufficient. I do almost all my web browsing in disposable VMs with no access to interesting things like my password manager, email, SSH keys, etc. I also run JITless (disable Javascript JIT engine), because those are a common attack point on browsers. If you compromise my browser from a random site, y…

Browsers have built-in sandboxes, plus sometimes wrapped around stuff like snap.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#89
post #88
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What kind of threat model requires someone to use Qubes? "Not trusting modern software to be correct nor secure" is sufficient. I do almost all my web browsing in disposable VMs with no access to interesting things like my password manager, email, SSH keys, etc. I also run JITless (disable Javascript JIT engine), because those are a common attack point on browsers. If you compromise my browser from a random site, y…

Browsers have built-in sandboxes, plus sometimes wrapped around stuff like snap.

And yet...

Browser exploits are a thing, and reliably compromise systems. Apple just released a security update yesterday for "something in WebKit," and we see regular browser security updates.

The art of escaping browser sandboxes seems to exceed the art of building browser sandboxes. The Javascript JIT engine gains you a lot of attack surface, unfortunately (one of the reasons I run JITless with Javascript).

As for snaps, they're just containers - kernel separated. Unfortunately, I consider the value of that against actively malicious code to be "about zero" - local root/kernel exploits are fairly cheap. Containers (so snaps) are great for convenience - if you want to run code you trust without worrying about dependencies, this is fine. They're not fine if you want to isolate things you don't trust - such as a browser from "everything else."

Qubes gives you a much harder boundary around your VMs than containers and sandboxes do.

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