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QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

qubes-os.org

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Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#71

Post by flashback2199 »

Syonyk wrote: post #58
flashback2199 wrote: post #7

I really like QubesOS, but you cannot run VMs inside a qube, or other things that require VMs like Docker Desktop for Linux, because the xen hypervisor does not support nested virtualization.

You can. It's just neither recommended nor enabled by default. https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/nested-virtualization/14790 Poke around /etc/libvirt/libxl and your particular VM's config file. You'll find some lines like: Enable it, and you should have working nested virtualization.

Shoot, as soon as I hit reply some neurons lit up and now I remember I was actually able to enable nested virtualization in QubesOS, and the relevant options in the VirtualBox preferences inside a qube became enabled once I did that, but whenever I tried booting any VM the whole system hanged. The same system and BIOS settings worked in Ubuntu to boot a nested VM in VirtualBox, so I think I had the BIOS settings correct. Anyhow, it seemed like a dead-end, so I abandoned it.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#72

Post by fsflover »

aborsy wrote: post #8

Is QubesOS used in the security companies or community? I know it’s used in Mullvad, and recommended by Snowden (but he isn’t a security specialist). I have been playing with it, and it might work as a daily driver.

https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/deployments-of-qubes-by-entitie...

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#73

Post by flashback2199 »

haswell wrote: post #67
flashback2199 wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Let me know how it works for you

Not a Qubes user, just a curious reader; what is the issue with this? It sounds like you’re implying that what parent said isn’t practical. I’m curious why?

The issue with trying to hack Docker Desktop and similar tools to boot a qube instead of a VM and somehow hack QubesOS to not isolate those qubes from each other seems self-evident to me and I don't care to explain further.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#74

Post by Syonyk »

flashback2199 wrote: post #71
Syonyk wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can. It's just neither recommended nor enabled by default. https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/nested-virtualization/14790 Poke around /etc/libvirt/libxl and your particular VM's config file. You'll find some lines like: Enable it, and you should have working nested virtualization.

Shoot, as soon as I hit reply some neurons lit up and now I remember I was actually able to enable nested virtualization in QubesOS, and the relevant options in the VirtualBox preferences inside a qube became enabled once I did that, but whenever I tried booting any VM the whole system hanged. The same system and BIOS settings worked in Ubuntu to boot a nested VM in VirtualBox, so I think I had the BIOS settings corr…

I'll have to look at it more. I mostly use AMD systems these days, which don't support nested virt in Xen, as I understand it, but it looks like it should work on Intel.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#76

Post by davidandgoliath »

Syonyk wrote: post #54
neodypsis wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can use something similar on macOS, Windows or Linux, based on Docker containers, see Dangerzone: https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone

The problem is that containers rely on the OS kernel to enforce separation, and kernel exploits are an awful lot less rare than anyone would prefer. If someone is delivering targeted malware to a company through HR channels, it's safe to assume that if they can escape the document viewer, they can probably also try for a local root/kernel exploit and escape the container. Containers are separation of convenience - no…

And container escape exploits are getting burned by sending them out via email? Doubtful.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#77

Post by Dah00n »

Syonyk wrote: post #40
DeathArrow wrote: post #30

>Qubes OS is a free and open-source, security-oriented operating system for single-user desktop computing. Qubes OS leverages Xen-based virtualization to allow for the creation and management of isolated compartments called qubes. What's wrong with containers? They are supposed to provide better performance than VMs. Are containers less secure?

Containers rely on the kernel to enforce separation. They're great for keeping trusted workloads from interfering with each other, but I don't trust them for potentially hostile workload separation. If you can compromise the kernel (and kernel exploits aren't particularly expensive nor uncommon), then a container is like a door locked by a sign that says "Please do not open without permission." If you don't care to g…

Does this also count for Proxmox?

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#78

Post by nasc_ »

sigmonsays wrote: post #2

this is my next OS to experiment with. However i'm worried my toy laptop with 16gb of ram (thinkpad t480) wont cut it. Anyone want to chime in here?

I've been daily driving it on my Thinkpad T580 with 16gb of ram for the past two years. I really enjoy it. Very occasionally it tells me that it's running out of RAM, but when that happens it's usually because I forgot to shutdown some VMs. Besides for that everything works great. I'd recommend using an SSD though with at least 512GB of storage, but better with 1TB.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#79

Post by chrisnight »

I personally daily drove QubesOS for about half a year when in school, and personally, I loved it. When I first tried it out, I fully expected it to be a nightmare to use, given that's how it's usually advertised by non-users. But in using it, I really enjoyed its workflow and the seamless compartmentalization of applications on a computer.

Program isolation is honestly a feature that other distros should use more often. The idea that programs can only access networks, USB devices, files, and X windows of programs that it's been explicitly let to access is an extremely useful tool that isn't just for people who are worried about government surveillance.

I personally enjoyed having about 5 different Firefox apps that each led to their own VM with its own files, browser history, cookies, and extensions, and even networks that automatically put traffic through a VPN at times. Chrooting and Firefox profiles only help so much, if you can even set them up to be as seamless as Qubes.

I'm of course not getting into the security benefits and all that of Qubes, but its where I feel a lot of people don't realize the benefits of an OS like this. The workflow improvement is just as inspiring as the security improvement from the system.

Re: QubesOS – A reasonably secure operating system

#80

Post by Syonyk »

davidandgoliath wrote: post #76
Syonyk wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem is that containers rely on the OS kernel to enforce separation, and kernel exploits are an awful lot less rare than anyone would prefer. If someone is delivering targeted malware to a company through HR channels, it's safe to assume that if they can escape the document viewer, they can probably also try for a local root/kernel exploit and escape the container. Containers are separation of convenience - no…

And container escape exploits are getting burned by sending them out via email? Doubtful.

It depends on who you're targeting and what you want.

But the history of computers security can largely be summed as:

"What? You're just paranoid. Nobody would possibly X!"

Someone gets their asses handed to them by someone Xing.

"What? Why didn't you tell us X was a risk we needed to be concerned about???"

Iterate.

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