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I really like QubesOS, but you cannot run VMs inside a qube, or other things that require VMs like Docker Desktop for Linux, because the xen hypervisor does not support nested virtualization.
this is my next OS to experiment with. However i'm worried my toy laptop with 16gb of ram (thinkpad t480) wont cut it. Anyone want to chime in here?
>Qubes OS is a free and open-source, security-oriented operating system for single-user desktop computing. Qubes OS leverages Xen-based virtualization to allow for the creation and management of isolated compartments called qubes. What's wrong with containers? They are supposed to provide better performance than VMs. Are containers less secure?
Yes, the performance advantage is from less isolation/more sharing, and that's also why they are less secure.
I love Qubes a lot, I daily drove it for a few years and still have it on a laptop. but i would not recommend it even to most technical people, mainly because you forfeit the ability to run things on bare metal. "dom0" is the same as on normal xen - it is a VM and has the associated overhead still. On top of that, the official Qubes dom0 runs a very outdated fedora version. I am instead writing my own code to automat…
If you wanted to add additional hardening within a VM, it's supported - create your own templateVM for it, and use it. It's just not the default, and I generally agree with it. If you trust the OS kernel and features to keep things separated, there's no reason to run Qubes in the first place.
What kind of threat model requires someone to use Qubes? I know Snowden uses it and there's even a testimonial of him on the Qubes site recommending it. Is this for people on 'lists' or are high value targets because they visited the wrong site or said something the authorities didn't like and their machines are now being targeted?
What kind of threat model requires someone to use Qubes? I know Snowden uses it and there's even a testimonial of him on the Qubes site recommending it. Is this for people on 'lists' or are high value targets because they visited the wrong site or said something the authorities didn't like and their machines are now being targeted?
"Not trusting modern software to be correct nor secure" is sufficient.
I do almost all my web browsing in disposable VMs with no access to interesting things like my password manager, email, SSH keys, etc. I also run JITless (disable Javascript JIT engine), because those are a common attack point on browsers.
If you compromise my browser from a random site, you get nothing of interest. Even if you pop the kernel. You still have to get through Xen to get to anything I consider of value.
I hadn't checked on this project in some time, and last I looked it seemed to be stagnant. Good to see it going strong again. I just remember that, hardware wise, there wasn't a lot of things that could run all aspects of the OS and be 100% with it. The "certified hardware" on the site also looks like it's out of date.
Concerning the certified hardware, few vendors try to make the certification, and also coreboot is required: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-ce...
I love Qubes a lot, I daily drove it for a few years and still have it on a laptop. but i would not recommend it even to most technical people, mainly because you forfeit the ability to run things on bare metal. "dom0" is the same as on normal xen - it is a VM and has the associated overhead still. On top of that, the official Qubes dom0 runs a very outdated fedora version. I am instead writing my own code to automat…
The threat model assumes that any code in a VM can, with some application of effort, access anything else in that VM. Given the relatively low cost of local root exploits and kernel exploits, this is reasonable. Passwordless sudo is simply a reminder that you can't rely on intra-vm separation of anything you care about separating. If you wanted to add additional hardening within a VM, it's supported - create your own…
Yeah i see the argument - thats why I would still call Qubes very secure as is - but i personally prefer defense in depth. Mainly it would be helpful on machines with limited ram that can only run a few domains at once.
I really like QubesOS, but you cannot run VMs inside a qube, or other things that require VMs like Docker Desktop for Linux, because the xen hypervisor does not support nested virtualization.
A qube _is_ a VM though, no? So if you wanted to create a VM, you can create a QubesOS template and instantiate that?