> The Protective Services Officers (cut-rate policemen) that are enforcing these sorts of rules are seldom interested in nuance.
I actually agree here, and I probably should have been more specific with what I said originally. When I said:
> the enforcement of the law will hew to the spirit that the text of the rule is being interpreted to have, by those charged with its enforcement.
What I meant was more that:
> when encountering novel situations that can't be easily interpreted using the text of the rule, the enforcement of the rule will hew to the inferred spirit of the rule, rather than robotically trying to apply some "fallthrough" case of the rule (e.g. by permitting any vehicle not explicitly listed.)
So, bylaw officers won't let you do recumbent-bicycle things if bicycles aren't allowed, because to them, a recumbent bicycle IS-A bicycle, and therefore is covered by the explicit text of the law — even if the spirit of the law would have made an exception for recumbent bicycles had it known. (This is the kind of situation where there's a point to petitioning to get the wording of the bylaw changed — when the "case law" of enforcement can't legitimately override the "legislation" of the rule, because it would seemingly go against the explicit text.)
But bylaw officers will allow a pedestrian scooter, because pedestrian scooters aren't explicitly addressed in the rule; nor do they have an IS-A relationship with anything that is addressed in the rule. So they have to actually use their brains to make a decision. And that decision will use common sense — a sibling comment referred to the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mischief_rule, and I think that's exactly the kind of common sense being used — to infer intent.
Or, to put that another way: enforcement won't interpolate the rule by inferring spirit, when making fine-grained distinctions when things "fall between" the lines of text in the rule; it will instead "snap" each case to the nearest explicitly-legislated-for case and then apply the text of the rule. But enforcement will often extrapolate the rule by inferring spirit, when judging situations that fall outside the "explicitly-ruled space" bounded by the explicit cases covered in the text.
(Why? From the perspective of the bylaw-enforcer: CYA. Your boss, or some enforcement auditor, could make a reasonable case that "you made the wrong call" by considering a recumbent bicycle to not be a bicycle, and punish you for it; and almost inevitably, given the way we divide responsibilities in our justice system, that "wrong call" will be "not writing a ticket." But nobody's going to punish you for "making the wrong call" on an entirely-novel case — instead, whatever call you did make will instead just become part of a body of case-law for interpreting the rule in the future.)