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Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

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Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#241
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've heard the same argument against unit testing and strong typing.

If I recall correctly, even NASA found unit testing to be of limited value, finding a small fraction of software bugs. That's not to say "don't do it" but my stance is that the developer should do some ad-hoc testing for everything they write, just don't formalize and document it or you'll land on the wrong end of cost/benefit. I can point to some subtle logic bugs that no sane unit test would have caught.

"limited value" does not mean "net negatives value".

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#242
post #217
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Their reasoning is fundamentally flawed. > The vast majority of marine (and aviation) accidents are a result of operator error, not mechanical failure. As a result, simply focusing on classing the vessel does not address the operational risks. Aka "classing doesn't mitigate all problems, so we're not going to do it at all"

It's an argument I encounter way too often in discussions (politics, climate, evolution even) with people who have an "alternative" view of how things work: it doesn't address everything, therefore it doesn't address anything. There's probably a name for that fallacy. People take all the issues that have been solved/addresses for granted, and pretend the unsolved issues are the only ones that matter. And because curr…

Preparedness Paradox.

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#243

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Guardian is reporting the submersible as registered in the Bahamas

Flag of convenience. Where the country of record allows ships to register under their name as a way of generating revenue from foreigners. Bahamas will not do more than issue a statement, if that. You step foot on a flag of convenience boat with no prior reputation and you are effectively waiving any expectation safety.

It's like a .io domain or using Bitcoin. If you intentionally exit jurisdiction of a country you trust, you are on your own.

I hope the rescue teams sue the perpetrators' estates and corpos for their costs.

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#244
post #16

> The vast majority of marine (and aviation) accidents are a result of operator error, not mechanical failure. Could that be because the vast majority of mechanical designs go through processes designed to validate them and catch flaws? They also use SpaceX as an example. SpaceX ran a large number of unmanned launches to prove out the design before putting people on board. Several of those ended in loss of the vehicl…

The first space shuttle launch was crewed. It ended up with a ~2% failure rate. The Titan made about 50 dives. So, from a reliability perspective, on par with the shuttle. I posit that half the people on HN would volunteer for a hypothetical next shuttle flight without thinking twice.

First, it did way less than 50 dives. I'm finding it really hard to find any solid numbers, but I've only found reference to only 3 or 4 previous dives to the Titanic, a test dive and a few dives to much shallower depths. That would put the failure rate for dives to this depth closer to 20%.

Second, the space shuttle never carried any paying passengers.

I'm very much of the opinion that the second you start accepting paying passengers, the safety standards should massively go up. Consumers have an expectation that if a company is offering a service to the general public, that service will meet a minimum level of safety. Companies shouldn't be able to hide behind liability wavers (well, not for a ~2% risk and absolutely not for a 20% risk) as even with a waver explictly stating death is an option, they will under estimate it.

Third, NASA engineers actually quantified the risk all the way back in the design stage and had it at ~2%, remarkably accurate in retrospect. NASA decided that was an acceptable level of risk for their mission profile and went ahead (it would have been way safer if the air force hadn't put insane mission profiles on it)

With everything we now know, there is no way in hell that OceanGate had any level of risk calculation. They were denying any risk at all, asserting that their real-time monitoring procedures would catch any failures before they became critical.

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#245

> They [inspections] do not ensure that operators adhere to proper operating procedures and decision-making processes – two areas that are much more important for mitigating risks at sea. As a former tall ship captain: No Shit. Ships stopped sinking when we started requiring inspections and design rules around stability and watertight compartments. We largely eliminated a common failure mode, designer error, through…

"...OceanGate CEO once said Titan sub's hull was made with carbon fiber from Boeing that was past its airplane shelf life..." - https://www.insider.com/oceangate-ceo-said-titan-made-old-ma...

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#246
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Wouldn't they have communicated that back if they had? There wasn't even an "Uh-oh", as far as we know.

I remember seeing in the news that it is possible they released the ballast before the implosion, according to the findings, and they may have done that because of a warning

In which case the fired engineer could have been off by orders of magnitude, and the crew actually had multiple seconds in which to feel they might avert disaster as they mashed the X button on the Logitech game controller to release the ballast.

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#247
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've heard the same argument against unit testing and strong typing.

If I recall correctly, even NASA found unit testing to be of limited value, finding a small fraction of software bugs. That's not to say "don't do it" but my stance is that the developer should do some ad-hoc testing for everything they write, just don't formalize and document it or you'll land on the wrong end of cost/benefit. I can point to some subtle logic bugs that no sane unit test would have caught.

Yeah, it comes down to cost benefit. Different situations require different qc strategies. But the fact that something is not 100% effective is not. Good argument against it.

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#248

> They [inspections] do not ensure that operators adhere to proper operating procedures and decision-making processes – two areas that are much more important for mitigating risks at sea. As a former tall ship captain: No Shit. Ships stopped sinking when we started requiring inspections and design rules around stability and watertight compartments. We largely eliminated a common failure mode, designer error, through…

As another tall ship, and for that matter in-shore commercial captain I found this quite telling. > While classing agencies are willing to pursue the certification of new and innovative designs and ideas, they often have a multi-year approval cycle due to a lack of pre-existing standards, especially, for example, in the case of many of OceanGate’s innovations, such as carbon fiber pressure vessels and a real-time (RT…

OT - and passé to say it, probably - but the fact that one can come here and read back and forth between commercial ship captains is a fine example of what makes this place so unique.

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#249

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm no sub nerd but it seems obvious that unless you can otherwise alter your buoyancy somehow, your only option is to drop weights. I think submarines use ballast tanks they flood with sea water and empty with pumps to vary their buoyancy. Titan had none of that complexity AIUI, and multiple articles I read mentioned dropping "ascent weights".

You can use compressed air. The COPV Spacex uses for tank pressurization are rated higher than the Titanic depth. And as depth increases the differential decreases. So you really only care about their structural integrity at the surface.

Which would be an actual appropriate application for carbon composite...

Re: Why isn't Titan classed? (2019)

#250
post #16

> The vast majority of marine (and aviation) accidents are a result of operator error, not mechanical failure. Could that be because the vast majority of mechanical designs go through processes designed to validate them and catch flaws? They also use SpaceX as an example. SpaceX ran a large number of unmanned launches to prove out the design before putting people on board. Several of those ended in loss of the vehicl…

The first space shuttle launch was crewed. It ended up with a ~2% failure rate. The Titan made about 50 dives. So, from a reliability perspective, on par with the shuttle. I posit that half the people on HN would volunteer for a hypothetical next shuttle flight without thinking twice.

There is no next shuttle flight, in no small part do to the shuttle's high failure rate.
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