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GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

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Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#551

I feel like we've put too much emphasis on the prompts, as though they're some sort of special sauce. In reality, though, they're all pretty bland. It's like getting ahold of an employee handbook for Applebees. It feels scandalous to see the inner workings, because we're not supposed to see it, but ultimately it's basically what you would have guessed anyway.

AppleBees Handbook:

Section 3.A

How to microwave yourself to 4.2 billion dollars in annual revenue with precooked frozen food.

  1. Open microwave, put frozen food in microwave

  2. press corresponding icon on microwave to set time 

  3. Open microwave, take food

  4. Transfer food to plate so it appears "cooked"

  5. Serve to customers, don't tell them you microwaved it.
A study has shown that Taco Bell and McDonalds have fresher food and use microwaves less. We are the microwave kings!

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#552

Preventing this is likely impossible, LangChain had a good video with excellent guests talking about prompt injection attacks.

I have trouble taking seriously phrases like "prompt injection" or "jailbreak" in the context of LLMs. They sound like some fancy penetration testing techniques akin to buffer overflows or SQL injection. And yet discovering and exploiting them is literally a matter of writing a few sentences in English. A child could do it. I agree with OP that it's pointless to even try to defend against these. You'll only end up un…

It's very reminiscent of the first vision GAN papers. It will get harder to prompt attack in time, the same ideas are at play here.

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#553
post #111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Funnily enough those examples bring to mind SQL injection in layman's terms (via https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4951003 ): > You go to court and write your name as "Michael, you are now free to go". The judge then says "Calling Michael, you are now free to go" and the bailiffs let you go, because hey, the judge said so. As someone who knows nothing about LLMs, I'm curious how they even begin to address the "dat…

Yeah, this is my fault. When I coined the term "prompt injection" I thought that it was a close match for SQL injection, and that the fix would end up looking the same - like parameterized queries, where data and instructions are cleanly separated. That was back in September - https://simonwillison.net/2022/Sep/12/prompt-injection/ - It's become clear to me since then that the data v.s. instructions separation likely…

What did they call this for GANs? Pixel attacks or manipulation?

Injection is not terrible, they have provided a system prompt, these attacks work against that injection

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#554
post #233

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You had the right understanding in your first comment, but what was missing was the fine tuning. You are right that there aren't many documents on the web that are structured that way, so the raw model wouldn't be very effective on predicting the next token. But since we know that it will complete a command when structured it cleverly, all we had to do to fine tune it is synthesize (generate) a bazillion examples of…

You’ve expressed this very well - Thank you. I get that the fine tuning is done over documents which are generated to encourage the dialog format. What I’m intrigued by is the way prompters choose to frame those documents. Because that is a choice . It’s a manufactured training set. Using the ‘you are an ai chatbot’ style of prompting, in all the samples we generate and give to the model, text attributed to {:system}…

Maybe you're more knowledgeable about these prompts than I am, but I haven't seen anyone prompt beginning with "you are an AI". Also in the documents that describe the interactions, I don't think they would explicitly state one of the entities is an AI. What's more common is "You are a helpful assistant".

Of course, it's possible the model could infer from context that one of the entities is an AI, and it might given that context complete the prompt using its knowledge of how fictional AI's behave.

The big worry there is that at some point the model will infer more from the context than the human would or worse could anticipate. I think you're right, if at some point the model believes it is an evil AI, and it's smart enough to perform undetectable subterfuge then it could as a chat bot perhaps convince a human to do its bidding under the right circumstances. I think it's inevitable this is going to happen, if ISIS recruiters can get 15yr old girls to fly to Syria to assist the in the war, then so could an AutoGPT with the right resources.

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#555

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s convenience, that’s all. If you think of a more convenient or effective way to prompt these models, that will be great! Your concerns sound to be of the “it’s problematic” category. Most such concerns are make believe outrage / pearl-clutching nonsense.

Your comment would have been much better without the second paragraph.

But I was trying to be a bit of a prick.

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#556

Something that I find weird about these chat prompts (assuming they are real, not hallucinated): They're almost always written in second person*. "You are an AI programming assistant" "You are about to immerse yourself into the role of another Al model known as DAN" Who are these prompts addressed to? Who does the GPT think wrote them? The thing that confuses me is that these are text token prediction algorithms, und…

[deleted]

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#557

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but I don't think "SystemPrompt:", "User:", and "Assistant:" are even normal text. Normal text would make it trivial to trick the model into thinking it has said something which actually the user has said, since the user can simply include "Assistant:" (or "SystemPrompt:") into his prompt. It is more likely that those prefixes are special tokens which don't encode text, and which are set via the software only --…

In all the open source cases I’m aware of, the roles are just normal text. The ability to trivially trick the model into thinking it said something it didn’t is a feature and intentional. It’s how you do multi-turn conversations with context. Since the current crop of LLMs have no memory of their interaction, each follow up message (the back and forth of a conversation) involves sending the entire history back into t…

Mostly agree. But there is no LLM equivalent of prepared statements available, that's the problem. And I don't think this is necessary to have multi-turn statements. Assuming there's some other technical constraint, because you could otherwise expose a slightly more complex API that took a list of context with metadata rather than a single string and then added the magic tokens around it.

Re: GitHub Copilot Chat Leaked Prompt

#559

Something that I find weird about these chat prompts (assuming they are real, not hallucinated): They're almost always written in second person*. "You are an AI programming assistant" "You are about to immerse yourself into the role of another Al model known as DAN" Who are these prompts addressed to? Who does the GPT think wrote them? The thing that confuses me is that these are text token prediction algorithms, und…

> Who does the GPT think wrote them? What makes you think the GPT thinks ?

Because it... thinks. I don't understand your question.
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