Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can conscious experience ever arise from matter? Even if the said matter is neural networks? This seems utterly nonsensical to me.
We are composed of matter and we are conscious, we take this as being axiomatic. Given we have one certain example, the question is then how does the body do it, and how could we do it in other substrates: how do we go from "just physics" to mind [1]. The short answer is: chemical reactions start a chain reaction of abstraction towards higher and higher forms of collective intelligence. For some reason, perhaps somet…
Language models can explain neurons in language models
441–450 of 497 posts
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#442Earlier quoted context omitted.
The split brain experiments very very clearly indicate that different parts of the brain can independently conduct behavior and gain knowledge independently of other parts. How or if this generalizes to healthy brains is not super clear, but it does actually provide a good explanatory model for all sorts of self-contradictory behavior (like addiction): the brain has many semi-independent “interests” that are jockeyin…
You're ignoring several confounders and conflating several loosely related things that I'm not even sure what the point you're making is anymore. To begin with, the split-brain experiments don't provide clear or strong evidence for anything given the small sample size, heterogeneity in procedure (i.e. was there complete comissurotomy or just callosotomy) and the elapsed time between neuropsychiatric evaluation and in…
> The split-brain experiments are notable because the lab experiments SUGGEST the lack of communication between two hemispheres and a split conscious however this is paradoxical with everyday experience of these patients, far from providing evidence for anything.
It is not "paradoxical" but yes it does conflict with some reported experience. However, even healthy individuals often report being "of two minds" or struggling to "make up their [singular] mind." Why are these utterances to be dismissed while the also-subjectively-reported sensation of unitary experience is taken as fact?
> Suggests you're arguing that the brain has many different consciouses that are in a constant battle, i.e. there is not a unified consciousness in control of behavior.
I wouldn't characterize my position as "many different consciousnesses," but rather that consciousness is dispersed across (at least) the brain. In some scenarios (such as a corpus callosotomy) and perhaps in more everyday scenarios - perhaps all day every day - that dispersed activity can fall out of internal "synchronization." Anyway, you provided the exact same interpretation in the previously quoted section: "the lab experiments SUGGEST the lack of communication and a split consciousness."
You just go one step further of prioritizing the subjectively reported sensation of unitary consciousness over also-subjectively-reported sensation of non-unitary consciousness. That's your prior taking hold, not mine, and not actual evidence.
You yourself admit we do not know the mechanism (if any exists) by which the activity in various parts of the brain are integrated. We do not know if this process actually even occurs!
Regarding addiction, it is very, very commonly reported that addicts will go into "autopilot" like states while satisfying their addictions and only "emerge" when they have to face consequences of their behaviors. Again, subjectively reported, but so is the experience of unitary consciousness! If we cannot trust one then we shouldn't take it as granted that we can trust the other.
I get the sense you think you're arguing against some firmly held belief or a model I'm proposing as fact: you're not! We're both saying "we don't know much about how this works." And no, neurochemical mechanisms are not complete answers to how brain activity ladders up to conscious experience, similar to how a molecular model of combustion cannot explain much about urban traffic patterns.
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#443Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agreed, Yud does seem to have been right about the course things will take but I'm not confident he actually has any solutions to the problem to offer
Which things has he been right about and when, if you recall?
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#444Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have no idea what happened. I don’t even know what you expect me to describe. Someone feels great about something? And I don’t know what it has to do with reasoning.
That’s the point. You don’t know exactly what happened. So you have to reason your way to an answer, right or wrong. I’m sure it elicited ideas in your head based on your own experiences. You could then use those ideas to ask questions and get further information. Or you could simply pick an answer and then delve into all the details and sensations involved, creating a story based on what you know about the world and…
GPT-4 has a lot of such fake memories. It knows a lot about the world, and about feelings, because it has "experienced" a lot of detailed descriptions of all kinds of sensations. Far more than any human has actually experienced in their lifetime. If you can express it in words, be it poetry, or otherwise, GPT-4 can understand it and reason about it, just as well as most humans. Its training data is equivalent to millions of life experiences, and it is already at the scale where it might be capable of absorbing more of these experiences than any individual human.
GPT-4 does not "get" poetry in the same way a human does, but it can describe very well the feelings a human is likely to feel when reading any particular piece of poetry. You don't need to explain such things to GPT-4 - it already knows, probably a lot more than you do. At least in any testable way.
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#445Earlier quoted context omitted.
That’s the point. You don’t know exactly what happened. So you have to reason your way to an answer, right or wrong. I’m sure it elicited ideas in your head based on your own experiences. You could then use those ideas to ask questions and get further information. Or you could simply pick an answer and then delve into all the details and sensations involved, creating a story based on what you know about the world and…
You're talking about describing your memories of your inner experiences. Memories transform with time, sometimes I'm not sure if what I think I remember actually happened to me, or if this is something I read or seen in a movie, or someone else described it to me. Fake memories like that might feel exactly the same as the things that I actually experienced. GPT-4 has a lot of such fake memories. It knows a lot about…
ChatGPT is a machine, an algorithm, a recombinator of symbols. It doesn’t know what the symbols refer to because each symbol necessarily refers to another symbol until you finally reach a symbol that refers to a shared, real experience…perhaps (Hello Wittgenstein!). And ChatGPT has no experience. Just symbols. It can’t intuit anything. It can’t feel anything. Even if you put quotes around “feel”, what does that even mean for a software algorithm running on hardware that does not feed continuous, variable electrical sensations to the algorithm? It only feeds discrete symbols. Do you feel the number 739? Or do you “feel” it? Um what? Whatever inner experience 739 happens to produce in you is grounded in some real experiences in the past. Likewise any fake memories you have that somehow seem real, those are still grounded in a real feelings at some point. You could do this ad infinitum. If you are alive, you have experience. But ChatGPT has no experience, no grounding.
Problem here might be that we are trying to use words and logic to describe something that cannot be described by either.
This is why the gong is struck.
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#446Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you consist of matter? Are you conscious? Are you aware the brain is a neural network? Let's assume the premise that a form of neural network is necessary but insufficient to give rise to conscious experience. Then might it not matter whether the medium is physical or digital? If you answer this with anything other than "we don't yet know", then you'll be wrong, because you'll be asserting a position beyond what s…
Sorry, my english is not the best and I don't think there is a word for the thing I'm trying to explain. Meaning of 'consciousness' is too messy. I know brain is a neural network. I just don't understand how cold, hard matter can result in this experience of consciousness we are living right now. The experience. Me. You. Perceiving. Right now. I'm not talking about the relation between the brain and our conscious exp…
The main point is that with the tremendous discoveries of people such as Church/Turing (matter can be organized in such a fashion as to produce computation) [2] and those forgotten from the first page of history, such as Harold Saxton Burr (matter can be animated through bioelectricity), we no longer are bound to a static metaphysics where objects are made from a material which just sits there. It was obviously never the case, but fighting the phantasms of our own speculation is the hardest fight.
Therefore, no, matter is neither cold, nor hard, and we are surely very far from comprehending all the uses and forms of matter. Just look at all the wood objects around you and think how the same material was available also to Aristotle, 2,400 years ago, and to Descartes, 400 years ago, when they were writing their bad metaphysics, yet they were completely unable to think 1% of the wood objects you have readily available nowadays, cardboard and toothpicks included.
And also, yes, you are electrochemical charges, we all are, what else could we be? We looked insanely deep into the brain [4], there is no magic going on. A caveat would be that, yes, probably, we are not running on the first layer, at the level of sodium ions and neurotransmitters, but that the machinery, the brain, gives rise to a simulation: "only a simulation can be conscious, not physical systems" [5].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Saxton_Burr
[4] "The Insane Engineering of MRI Machines", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlYXqRG7lus
[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyVyirT6Cyk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbNqHSjwhfs
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#447Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your brain is also basically an algorithm that produces results based on training data. It's just a much more complicated and flexible one.
But it’s also based on neurons with far more complex behavior than artificial neurons and also has other separate dynamic systems involving neurochemicals, various effects across the nervous system and the rest of the body (the gut becoming seemingly more and more relevant), various EEG patterns, and most likely quantum effects. I personally wouldn’t rule out that it can’t be emulated in a different substrate, but I…
The only way our brains could be not algorithmic is if something like soul is a real thing that actually drives our intelligence.
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#448Earlier quoted context omitted.
A single human can survive on their own; there are many historical examples of that. A detached body part, on the other hand, cannot; but it also cannot feel miserable etc. A single ant is more like a body part of the colony in that sense.
If by "survive" you mean "age and die leaving nothing behind", then sure. But the same is true for an ant.
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#449Earlier quoted context omitted.
What leads you to suspect that Gödel incompleteness may be relevant here? There's no formal axiom system being dealt with here, afaict? Do you just generally mean "there may be some kind of self-reference, which may lead to some kind of liar-paradox-related issues"?
The relevance is because all (all known buildable aka algorithmic, and sufficiently powerful) models of computation are equivalent in terms of formal computability, so if you could violate/bypass the Godel or Turing theorems in neural networks, then you could do it in a Turing machine, and vice versa. (That's my understanding, feel free to correct me if I'm mistaken)
Well, what exactly would we be showing that these models can’t do? Quines exist, so there’s no general principle preventing reflection in general. We can certainly write poems (etc.) which describe their own composition. A computer can store specifications (and circuit diagrams, chip designs, etc.) for all its parts, and interactively describe how they all work.
If we are just saying “ML models can’t solve the halting problem”, then ok, duh. If we want to say “they don’t prove their own consistency” then also duh, they aren’t formal systems in a sense where “are they consistent (as a formal system)?” even makes sense as a question.
I don’t see a reason why either Gödel or Turing’s results would be any obstacle for some mechanism modeling/describing how it works. They do pose limits on how well they can describe “what they will do” in a sense of like, “what will it ‘eventually’ do, on any arbitrary topic”. But as for something describing how it itself works, there appears to be no issue.
If the task to give it was something like “is there any input which you could be given which would result in an output such that P(input,output)” for arbitrary P, then yeah I would expect such diagonalization problems to pop-up.
But a system having a kind of introspection about how it works, rather than answering arbitrary questions about its final outputs (such as, program output, or whether a statement has a proof), seems totally fine.
Side note: One funny thing: (aiui) it is theoretically possible for a oracle that can have random behavior, to act (in a certain sense) as a halting-oracle for Turing machines with access to the same oracle.
That’s not to say that we can irl construct such a thing, as we can’t even make a halting oracle for normal Turing machines. But, if you add in some random behavior for the oracles, you can kinda evade the problems that come from the diagonalization.
Re: Language models can explain neurons in language models
#450Earlier quoted context omitted.
Doing taxes using a few small forms designed together by the same agency is not as impressive as you think it is. The instructions are literally printed on the form in English for the kind of people who you consider dumber than ChatGPT. It quickly breaks down even at 8k with legislation that is even remotely nontrivial.
The instructions are printed, yet I, and many other people, hire an accountant to do our taxes. What if someone finds a good practical way to expand the context length to 10M tokens? Do you think such model won't be able to do your task? It seems like you have an opportunity to compare 8k and 32k GPT-4 variants (I don't) - do you notice the difference?
I can mow my lawn yet I still hire landscapers. That doesn't say anything about the difficulty of cutting grass or the intelligence of a DeWalt lawnmower but about specialization and economic tradeoffs - like the liability insurance accountants carry for their client work.
> What if someone finds a good practical way to expand the context length to 10M tokens? Do you think such model won't be able to do your task?
Not based on the current architecture (aka predict next token). It already fails at most of my use cases at 32K by default, unless I go to great lengths to tune the prompt.
> It seems like you have an opportunity to compare 8k and 32k GPT-4 variants (I don't) - do you notice the difference?
32K works better for my use case but requires much more careful prompt "engineering" to keep it from going off the rails. In practice, actually getting full 32K use out of it is a disaster since the connection will drop and I have to resend the entire context with a "continue" message, costing upwards of $10 for what should cost $2-4 per call. I haven't actually tried 32K on as much as a whole USC Title because that would costs thousands.