Earlier quoted context omitted.
provably-correct microkernels like seL4 are popular for "cross-domain solutions" that simultaneously handle unclassified and classified information while ensuring separation. NSA requirements for such systems are strict and right now most of the options are commercial, like BAE XTS-400. More defense contractors are looking towards seL4 and the NSA seems to be encouraging it for the benefit of a shared, open-source pl…
I thought commingling classification/user clearance levels on the same hardware fell out of favor a while ago, because of side channels (with speculative execution being the final nail in the coffin.) Isn't seL4 more used for things like data diodes, cryptographic equipment and military hardware? Stuff that you need to keep from getting hacked or malfunctioning, but not time-shared with untrusted users.
ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
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Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#32Is there a seL4 implementation targeted at, like, dinking around on some desktop, or is this stuff mostly interesting to embedded-ish folks?
Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#33Can someone tell me how much these microkernels are used and where?
Airbus is also using either seL4 or some other microkernels in aerospace applications.
Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
Except that making changes can actually invalidate the proof that were made. At least it matters in the sense that Apple should have made an arrangement so the things added didn't invalidate the correctness.
That's not really how any of this works. The formally verified kernel of the operating system gives you some assurance that your primitives are reliable (unlike on, say, Linux, where you're always a kernel reference tracking bug away from an LPE). But the "application" code you build on top of L4 doesn't "inherit" that formal verification; it's just code, with code bugs. If you formally verify your own code, it's ver…
The SEPOS kernel is an apparently derived from a fork of L4-embedded they used in Darbat (a fork of XNU to run on top of L4). Not formally verified unless Apple internally has done so.
Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
How much did Apple contribute back to the project?
Does it matter? A microkernel isn’t a huge scope, and once it is proven mathematically correct, there’s not a ton left to do; other than maybe adding very niche features or doing touch-ups here and there.
Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#36Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#37Is there a seL4 implementation targeted at, like, dinking around on some desktop, or is this stuff mostly interesting to embedded-ish folks?
Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
Does it matter? A microkernel isn’t a huge scope, and once it is proven mathematically correct, there’s not a ton left to do; other than maybe adding very niche features or doing touch-ups here and there.
Apple doesn't use sel4 in the secure enclave, but instead another l4 variant that isn't formally verified. And they've made a lot of pretty deep changes for example adding native support for Mach-O files.
Re: ACM Software System Award Given to seL4 Microkernel
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
Google's Fuchsia OS uses a microkernel: https://fuchsia.dev/fuchsia-src/concepts/kernel
Microkernels by themselves are not special; SeL4 is because it's proven to be secure.
I wish someone would build a beyond-posix desktop OS on top of it...