21–30 of 37 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd be happy about security features if they weren't used against me.
Making the hardware you bought secure is the opposite of it being used against you.
You can absolutely hide behind security to justify actions that are hostile to users. Companies do it _all the time_.
There is room for both of these to be true.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd be happy about security features if they weren't used against me.
Making the hardware you bought secure is the opposite of it being used against you.
I'm starting to think that these sort of "CVE bro" posts are part of an intentional campaign by manufacturers trying to hold on to their rent seeking scheme. John Deere et al was definitely trying to use those arguments recently.
Why were these keys not in a HSM I wonder..
It's possible they did, in any case keys can be exported from HSMs to ensure availability in the event that your HSM becomes inoperable and needs to be replaced. For example here are instructions on how to do so with a Thales HSM https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/ptk/5.4/docs/Content/PTK-C_Admi...
I somehow assumed that real, non-toy HSMs involved dedicated generators as companion devices with heavily reduced attack surface, which generate and store private key material, are able to transfer it to the HSM proper (and to a paper backup), and are strictly kept offline after that.
Sometimes the world feels disappointing.
Is it wrong that my immediate reaction to this is, "Sweet, so I can finally do things with my board I was prevented from before!"
There is a giant pile of hardware in the world that relies on unsigned hardware. Meanwhile, MSI uses its hardware signing to hurt its customers.
Will some MSI users get tricked into using malicious firmware? Doubtless, eventually. That's sad. But not nearly as sad as the millions of users who can't use their own computers in a manner of their choosing.
Celebrate, without remorse.
Why were these keys not in a HSM I wonder..
It's possible they did, in any case keys can be exported from HSMs to ensure availability in the event that your HSM becomes inoperable and needs to be replaced. For example here are instructions on how to do so with a Thales HSM https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/ptk/5.4/docs/Content/PTK-C_Admi...
Using a HSM does _not_ guarantee that keys can not be exported. But the converse also holds, a key that is managed by a HSM can not necessarily be exported.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's possible they did, in any case keys can be exported from HSMs to ensure availability in the event that your HSM becomes inoperable and needs to be replaced. For example here are instructions on how to do so with a Thales HSM https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/ptk/5.4/docs/Content/PTK-C_Admi...
Whoa. Never would I have thought that a HSM allowed key exports. I somehow assumed that real, non-toy HSMs involved dedicated generators as companion devices with heavily reduced attack surface, which generate and store private key material, are able to transfer it to the HSM proper (and to a paper backup), and are strictly kept offline after that. Sometimes the world feels disappointing.
HSMs have backup features and the data cannot be restored without a secret split among multiple secret holders (like https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_secret_sharing). So a backup can be done on physical media and put in a safe.
It's a lot of things about key management, HSMs, pkcs interfaces to learn though.
Is it wrong that my immediate reaction to this is, "Sweet, so I can finally do things with my board I was prevented from before!"
Not at all, in this case. There is a giant pile of hardware in the world that relies on unsigned hardware. Meanwhile, MSI uses its hardware signing to hurt its customers. Will some MSI users get tricked into using malicious firmware? Doubtless, eventually. That's sad. But not nearly as sad as the millions of users who can't use their own computers in a manner of their choosing. Celebrate, without remorse.
Like I said, I get the support for increased openness and freedom in hardware and the appeal that has to some users. But security is a feature that a lot of users (even power users) care about too, and it's bad when that feature breaks.
Why were these keys not in a HSM I wonder..
It's possible they did, in any case keys can be exported from HSMs to ensure availability in the event that your HSM becomes inoperable and needs to be replaced. For example here are instructions on how to do so with a Thales HSM https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/ptk/5.4/docs/Content/PTK-C_Admi...