Make sure that someone doesn't tamper with your device. No, it's not infallible. Yes, it's better than nothing.
Why would someone tamper a RPI? Usually most people don't really store anything important on a RPI, other than services like searx or whatever. It's not a powerful device for hosting databases, it's not really used for storage, only for small things like a Kodi server and even that lags.
There are several industry grade devices based on raspberry pi platform, LOL. Not just media servers.
Some people also deploy them outdoors to stuff like weather, ADS-B etc. Some make it into cubesats.
Don't just underestimate its use cases.
Yep. I wish OTP memory, eFuses, etc. were all illegal due to unnecessarily creating e-waste. In places where OTP is actually required for some technical reason, it should have to be on an easily replaceable socketed chip with no other functionality.
That kind of defeats how secure boot works.
No. You'd still lose access to the encryption keys so the data would still be safe. But it would allow you to start over without throwing the entire device in the trash and buying a new one.
When are Raspberry Pi's going to be easily found online again for purchase? I've eyed them every few months for the past year and have seen in stock 0 times.
same here moved on to ODROID, and not looking back .
When are Raspberry Pi's going to be easily found online again for purchase? I've eyed them every few months for the past year and have seen in stock 0 times.
I just bought a win 10 mini pc for $91. It's insane.
It's back up to $99 now (I got it discounted). It works fine.
No. You'd still lose access to the encryption keys so the data would still be safe. But it would allow you to start over without throwing the entire device in the trash and buying a new one.
This is similar to how MCU read protection usually works --- once you set it, you can't (easily, at least --- but still possible with the right equipment or $$$) read out the firmware, but you can still do a "full erase" which clears the device to an entirely clean blank state.
I'm probably just missing it, but I'm not seeing a step where the firmware itself is locking itself to an individual RPi, which would mean you can simply change out the USB drive itself and boot whatever you want. Does it do that transparently, maybe when the keys are enrolled?
The idea is that then bootloader verifies the rest; then your kernel would need to verify everything it runs.
Sure, but also normally you aren't manually installing the relevant firmware. There's different semantics when the 'firmware' lives on the same block device as your root filesystem.
The Pi4 has true hardware support for secure boot. If set up correctly, you won't be able to boot anything not properly signed. An incomplete overview of how this works is: * Instead of having all boot related files (start4.elf, kernel.img, ...) on the first partition of the SD card, you instead have a single boot.img FAT image containing those files instead. * You sign that file with your own RSA 2048 key and place…
So these things don't run a BIOS like a 'normal' computer? Because I can just enroll a key in my BIOS that I trust.
The Pi4 has true hardware support for secure boot. If set up correctly, you won't be able to boot anything not properly signed. An incomplete overview of how this works is: * Instead of having all boot related files (start4.elf, kernel.img, ...) on the first partition of the SD card, you instead have a single boot.img FAT image containing those files instead. * You sign that file with your own RSA 2048 key and place…
So these things don't run a BIOS like a 'normal' computer? Because I can just enroll a key in my BIOS that I trust.
No ARM system runs BIOS. There are two keys here, both of which are stored in a finite amount of OTP memory. OTP is simply the cheapest of the allowed storage options for ARM secure boot. Rewritable storage options that allow key migration exist, they're just more complicated and expensive.