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Lessons from Moneyball

37signals.com

11–20 of 54 posts

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#11
post #7

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs, the book/movie ignored the Big Three, and information advantages go away. The startup corollaries: small-bore inefficiencies can't overcome luck and strong competition, don't attribute success to A when it's really the obvious B (i.e. what differentiates your product doesn't mean it's actually better - Gowalla and foursquare is my favorite example here), and people wil…

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs What is this supposed to mean? The season gives you a 162-game sample. The playoffs are a coin-flip, by comparison. It's just too small of a sample to draw any conclusions, which is why both old- and new-school baseball guys have an endless array of cliches about how anybody who makes it in to the playoffs has a chance to win.

I agree. Even a 162-game sample isn't enough to get any great level of confidence, but it is certainly better than a 3-5 game sample of the first round or 4-7 of subsequent rounds.

Beane and the A's were mostly focusing on offense, because that's were they could find value. It's significantly harder to find value in pitchers, and pitchers can help damper some of the "luck" factors in the postseason, though it's very much open to randomness.

Modern baseball management is focused on building your team to win enough regular seasons to make the postseason, and then hope luck falls in your direction. If you can couple that with great starting pitching, you can reduce the amount of luck you need.

I'm not sure how relevant the techniques in Moneyball still are. At this point, every team is looking at Sabermetrics, and some of the high-value stuff isn't there any more. For example, getting on base isn't worth as many runs in 2011 as it was in 2002 because there are less home runs hit.

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#12
post #7

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs, the book/movie ignored the Big Three, and information advantages go away. The startup corollaries: small-bore inefficiencies can't overcome luck and strong competition, don't attribute success to A when it's really the obvious B (i.e. what differentiates your product doesn't mean it's actually better - Gowalla and foursquare is my favorite example here), and people wil…

This doesn't make any sense. Billy Beane's "shit" either works or it doesn't. No one is claiming that good analytics guarantee success in small samples, but if properly evaluating talent improves chances of success in a 162-game sample, it improves the chances of success in a best of 5 or best of 7 series.

Maybe you're arguing that the amount of luck influencing the outcome of the playoffs is much higher than the amount of luck influencing the regular season; this is obvious. What it's not is a good argument for not using all available tools to put the best talent on the field.

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#13
post #7

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs, the book/movie ignored the Big Three, and information advantages go away. The startup corollaries: small-bore inefficiencies can't overcome luck and strong competition, don't attribute success to A when it's really the obvious B (i.e. what differentiates your product doesn't mean it's actually better - Gowalla and foursquare is my favorite example here), and people wil…

Actually, the A's did have a streak of playoff appearances 6+ years ago under Beane's system[1].

Reading the book, Moneyball, I came away with the conclusion that the success of Beane's system boiled down the fact that they started measuring everything and making empirical decisions based on data rather than emotion or "gut" checks. In turn, this let them find value where others saw failure. In a competitive environment with limited resources (players Beane's instance) this system will work up to the point where few, if any, try it--meaning lots of overlooked value exists.

One point at the end of the book was that the Red Sox, when they hired Theo Eptstein as their GM, brought in one of Beane's assistants to implement the system the A's were using. As more teams start using it, the quantity of undervalued players decreases because everyone starts valuing the same thing.

Start up takeaway: Measure everything and make decisions based on empirical results instead of "gut" checks. That's really what it boils down to. I'm not just talking about the front-end stuff like landing pages, conversion rates, clicks, etc. Measure it all, response times, database operation times, network transmission time, average request size, whatever you can get your hands on. Having all that data will allow you to make informed decisions and identify places for improvement to increase value.

That's my takeaway.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Beane

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs What is this supposed to mean? The season gives you a 162-game sample. The playoffs are a coin-flip, by comparison. It's just too small of a sample to draw any conclusions, which is why both old- and new-school baseball guys have an endless array of cliches about how anybody who makes it in to the playoffs has a chance to win.

It's a reference to a famous essay by Nate Silver (you may know him from FiveThirtyEight at the NYTimes) and Dayn Perry: http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=betweenthenu... In short, the A's roster was actually constructed to succeed over 162 games but the compromises he had to make on defense and power pitching to get extra value are particularly fraught in the playoffs, where you're battling the better…

These are not inherently better offensive teams. That's the whole point. The 2002 A's were a good offensive team because they were better at evaluating offense than the rest of the league.

The reason the A's didn't win the World Series is the same reason the Cardinals won the World Series in 2011 and 2006, but not 2004. It's the reason the Giants won it in 2010. The playoffs are a crapshoot. It has nothing to do with whether or not sabermetric analysis is valid for regular season games, but not for playoff games.

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#15
The only real lesson in Moneyball is do what you love and don't let others tell you not to.

What I find most interesting about the story is the different effect it has on people. Business types see it as "Take a great risk and it'll pay off (literally)." Science types see it as "Math works".

The reality is, you just have to do what you want to do and not care if other people tell you you're crazy. Was a situation like Moneyball an exception to the rule? Hell yes. But with out those 1 in 1000 exceptions to the rule we'd have very little to show for 50 thousand years on the planet.

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#16
post #3

Even Better: Dharmesh Shah's Startup Lessons From 17 Hard-Hitting Quotes In "Moneyball" http://onstartups.com/tabid/3339/bid/76799/Startup-Lessons-F...

Thanks for linking to my article. Glad to see my friends at 37signals are fans of Moneyball too.

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#17
post #7

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs, the book/movie ignored the Big Three, and information advantages go away. The startup corollaries: small-bore inefficiencies can't overcome luck and strong competition, don't attribute success to A when it's really the obvious B (i.e. what differentiates your product doesn't mean it's actually better - Gowalla and foursquare is my favorite example here), and people wil…

Billy Beane's shit doesn't work in the playoffs What is this supposed to mean? The season gives you a 162-game sample. The playoffs are a coin-flip, by comparison. It's just too small of a sample to draw any conclusions, which is why both old- and new-school baseball guys have an endless array of cliches about how anybody who makes it in to the playoffs has a chance to win.

Mandatory XKCD: http://xkcd.com/904/

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#18

The only real lesson in Moneyball is do what you love and don't let others tell you not to. What I find most interesting about the story is the different effect it has on people. Business types see it as "Take a great risk and it'll pay off (literally)." Science types see it as "Math works". The reality is, you just have to do what you want to do and not care if other people tell you you're crazy. Was a situation lik…

There are many many many more time where "doing what you love" is incorrect than times where following math is incorrect. The more we focus on math and mathematical relationships between different variables, the more accurate we get.

Do not listen to detractors IF YOU HAVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING YOUR CAUSE, but do not blindly pursue something because of an unsupportable "gut" feeling

Re: Lessons from Moneyball

#19

The only real lesson in Moneyball is do what you love and don't let others tell you not to. What I find most interesting about the story is the different effect it has on people. Business types see it as "Take a great risk and it'll pay off (literally)." Science types see it as "Math works". The reality is, you just have to do what you want to do and not care if other people tell you you're crazy. Was a situation lik…

(below may include spoiler)

I thought the real lesson was "massively outperform the limits of your shitty resources beyond anyone's expectations, by thinking outside the box and concentrating on algorithms and data modeling; and still not succeed. Then if someone is impressed and offers you more personal compensation than you can imagine, to do the same thing but for them, while actually being given enough resources to actually have a chance with it, then you go and fucking do it."

The startup analogy is easy: if you are solely responsible for running a free service with a million users on $300/month hosting budget, and you almost do it by inventing amazing algorithms, but the service still lags and sucks, but is almost there, then when Amazon makes you an offer to come and do the same thing for them you fucking take it.

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