Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can always encode the prior. If you take the frequentist approach and ignore bayesian concepts, it’s the same as just going bayesian but with an “uninformative prior” (constant distribution). The only question is… would you rather be up front and explicit about your assumptions, or not? An uninformative prior is an assumption, even if it’s the one that doesn’t bias the posterior (note that here “bias” is not a ba…
There is potentially bias (of the bad word variant) introduced by the mismatch between the prior in your own mind and the distribution and params you choose to try to approximate that, especially if you're trying to pick out a distribution with a nice posterior conjugate. I'm also not sure why everyone perceived my comment as anti-bayesian.
But are you sure you know what I meant when I said “uninformative prior”? Because choosing an uninformative prior does not involve choosing any parameters: there is only one uninformative prior, and it’s the constant (flat) distribution which assigns equal probability to every value. It encodes no information and does not bias the posterior or result. It is the one and only mathematically-neutral prior. You can think of it as being a bit like an “identity function”.