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Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

chase.com

411–420 of 441 posts

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#411

The fact that they publish this in the first place, is worrying, to say the least. It's also quite true - the banking crisis won't be a repeat of 2008. But, unlike 2008 which was fairly limited to (arguably huge) banking and residential mortgage sectors, this crisis will hit hard everywhere - valuations are still insane, the % of zombie companies is off the charts, inflation is everywhere, FED and governments have mu…

> unlike 2008 which was fairly limited to (arguably huge) banking...this crisis will hit hard everywhere

I think it's clear that it won't hit "everywhere" specifically because... it will not hit huge banking. After 2008 every huge bank was required to hold much more massive amounts of cash on hand specifically to fend off bank runs. And that's working.

But I very much agree with you -- and with Chase bank -- that this will not in any way be a repeat of 2008.

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#412
post #408

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's certainly not correct. If it was far fewer people would be in debt. People generally prioritise short term happiness over wealth building.

Your comment is not helping the conspiracy angle I was debunking up top so I assume we agree overall? There is no conspiracy, just random nature doing it thing and people trying to nudge it in their direction but frequently overshooting or undershooting.

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Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#413
post #167
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Americans don’t even have money in the bank. Median savings is $4500. But M1 is about three times M0; the difference, about $12T, comes to about $400K per American, so some Americans do have significant money in the bank.

Does M1 include accounts held by companies/businesses?

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Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#414
post #167
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Americans don’t even have money in the bank. Median savings is $4500. But M1 is about three times M0; the difference, about $12T, comes to about $400K per American, so some Americans do have significant money in the bank.

Does M1 include accounts held by companies/businesses?

AFAIK yes, it includes all demand deposits regardless of who the depositor is.

As far as how that affects the calculation I made, from what I can find online, total cash on hand for US businesses is about $1T, so that would have to be subtracted from the difference between M1 and M0 to find average cash deposits per person for individual accounts.

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#415

The fact that they publish this in the first place, is worrying, to say the least. It's also quite true - the banking crisis won't be a repeat of 2008. But, unlike 2008 which was fairly limited to (arguably huge) banking and residential mortgage sectors, this crisis will hit hard everywhere - valuations are still insane, the % of zombie companies is off the charts, inflation is everywhere, FED and governments have mu…

I am curious, but with all the national debt in western economies, will higher inflation help service that debt going forwards? I mean, prices rarely ever come back down... Combined with higher tax incomes, seems like a kinda win-win for the governments? Or is this a follow on from recent currency wars, if that is appropriate phrasing? I dont know much about world finance, at least not enough to have sold CS in time.…

> with all the national debt in western economies, will higher inflation help service that debt going forwards?

To the extent that the debt is denominated in the national currency (for example, US debt is denominated in dollars), yes. Historically this has been the main way that the US has dealt with its debt--by inflating the currency to decrease the actual real value of past debts.

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#416

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>I hate all these conspiracy theories. >Let's just realize that we all have a lot less control over our environment than we think we do Do the privately run secretive organization that sets the time value of money and the people that influence it not have "control"? To be clear, I'm talking about the central bank.

The central bank has very little power over the economy actually. It basically only has one lever and it is akin to a wrecking ball. It's job is to clean up the mess, not control the economy. Fed is 98% talk and 2% action.

>The central bank has very little power over the economy actually.

I disagree. Any organization that can unilaterally set interest rates and add infinite assets to its balance sheet (two actions capable of moving the largest markets significantly) has tremendous amounts of control over the economy.

The vast majority of people are just unaware how much of an impact monetary policy has on their behavior.

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#417
post #398

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s hardly the image of stability but saying people only have $4500 and it’s the Fed’s fault is wrong in two ways.

Problem being that total assets does not measure liquidity. That people only have $4500 of cash is a significant problem if they have a relatively minor emergency. Especially in the US, where a $4500 hospital bill is pretty cheap.

Sure, but you can't mark 100% of non-cash net worth as completely illiquid. You can borrow against the value of your home, borrow against the value of your 401(k), sell your stock. If you need a few days to move money around, there's credit cards. Personal loans. It really depends on what you're trying to measure.

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#418
post #146

I wonder about the end-game effect of the BTFP. Great, today banks got enough liquidity thanks to the Fed, but after 90 days they have to return borrowed funds together with a relatively high interest and get back semi-worthless paper (because selling it will result in realized losses). In 90 days credit conditions probably will be even tighter than today and a lot of people will flee to the too big to fail banks. Ho…

The BTFP has a one year term compared to the 90 day discount window.

You’re completely right about still being stuck with the low yield paper at the end of the year and the relatively high (to the paper) interest rate in the meantime (my read is that the banks continue to hold the paper and get the yield over the year rather than handing it over to the Fed, partially offsetting the interest cost, but I’m uncertain if that’s correct).

For that reason my speculation is the BTFP will be rolled over to keep kicking the can down the road at least until the proportion of debt sitting in long-term low yield held to market assets decreases (basically via the bank version of dollar cost averaging as they buy new treasuries/MBSs over time) or interest rates drop sufficiently that the haircut on their current low yield assets meaningfully reduces.

The interest rate charge by the Fed right now is effectively making the bank realise the haircut on their paper over that year while keeping up the illusion that their assets are still worth par value. This gives the banks the liquidity they need without having to write down the value of all their HTM assets as they would have to do if they actually sold any. In reality this also means those balance sheets, assuming conditions continue rather than return to ultra low inflation (or deflationary) conditions, are overstated.

The FDIC suggests this is by around $620bn for US banks which is smallish compared to the total US banking assets of $23,245bn but sizeable when you consider the sector has “only” $2,175bn residual assets after liabilities and imagine the distribution of unrealised losses against net positions across different banks.

With that said, the interest payments of leveraging the BTFP will presumably add to liquidity pressure, while even banks not using the facility but holding low yield HTM assets will be feeling the squeeze of needing to pay depositors current interest rates backed by a portfolio weighted down by low yield paper. For that reason if things worsen it wouldn’t surprise me if the Fed dropped the interest rate fee for BTFP towards the average yield of the pledged paper, effectively turning low yield paper into current yield assets and pretending 2020-22 never happened while shoring up the profitability of banks that managed their way healthily through this saga.

What I find a little confusing is how commentators seem to think there’s no problem because banks can hold/could have held these assets to maturity and get back the par value then - that the problem is simply that people wanted their money back at the wrong time. I guess that’s true in the strict sense of “why now” but unless conditions change again the unrealised loss will be realised eventually - either in one hit by conversion to today dollars or over time by inflation. The only way I can see this not being a problem is if banks were going to keep paying depositor interest rates as if it were 2021 until these low yield assets came to maturity, but the challenge of doing that without bailing in depositor funds over that time window when someone down the street will otherwise pay something closer to the current Fed rate seems obvious. It seems like the only game once yields rose was spinning plates and wearing the loss slowly hoping their portfolio sufficiently turned over in the meantime.

As I see it in the simplest sense, a bunch of banks have traded 2021 dollars for Timeline A 2051 dollars, where Timeline A has 30 years of extremely low inflation. People have now asked for 2023 dollars back. But it turns out we now live in Timeline B where we’re looking at moderately low inflation over the next 30 years, and the value of a Timeline A 2051 dollar in 2023 dollars is around 80c.

Pretending they can sit on their low yield paper for 28 years while slowly wearing the loss against the current Fed rate, yet alone inflation, is somehow okay because they’ll have the same numeric dollars at the end seems a fallacy unless we’re assuming a hugely deflationary environment from peak population that is not current priced in by markets (i.e. speculating that we’re actually in Timeline C).

I assume given the consistency of commentators saying there would be no issue if the assets were held to maturity means I must be overlooking something.

Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#419
post #405

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it is debatable banks would have been "too big to fail" Pre-GLB’s LTCM is a potent counterfactual to this claim. Truth is, the topology of our banking system changed with computerisation. This enables tremendous opportunity. But it introduced novel fragility.

Not really. It's debatable the Fed's intervention was even necessary and the concerns they had about the effects of LTCM’s failure on global financial markets were mislead and greatly exaggerated. Buffet's offer alone could of settled the situation, and demonstrates that the Fed likely didn't need to intervene at all. Ergo, the global market relative to LTCM was probably big enough to absorb the financial shock. The…

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Re: Reasons the banking crisis isn’t a repeat of 2008

#420
post #405

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it is debatable banks would have been "too big to fail" Pre-GLB’s LTCM is a potent counterfactual to this claim. Truth is, the topology of our banking system changed with computerisation. This enables tremendous opportunity. But it introduced novel fragility.

Not really. It's debatable the Fed's intervention was even necessary and the concerns they had about the effects of LTCM’s failure on global financial markets were mislead and greatly exaggerated. Buffet's offer alone could of settled the situation, and demonstrates that the Fed likely didn't need to intervene at all. Ergo, the global market relative to LTCM was probably big enough to absorb the financial shock. The…

> debatable the Fed's intervention was even necessary and the concerns they had about the effects of LTCM’s failure on global financial markets were mislead and greatly exaggerated

As much as the Fed's involvement in 2008. If your claim is GS-GLB financial history was sanguine, I've got a bridge to sell you.

Pointedly: if you want to tank a financial regulation bill, bring up Glass-Steagall.

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