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Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

greshake.github.io

101–110 of 147 posts

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> By the way, you should really test whether your injection still works if you remove [system] from the injection string. If you can't make bing talk like a pirate without [system], then you're SOL -- Bing's solution is to simply strip out [system] from all website data before inserting it into the context window. I don't have access to the demo to test, but https://www.make-safe-ai.com/is-bing-chat-safe/ suggests th…

Cheers for the data point. But again, the prize is for malicious websites to be able to use those sorts of tactics. That page only shows that the user can prompt Bing. They likely sanitize website data or wrap it in special tokens that makes this attack impossible — or at least, they will soon, since they have no other choice to deal with this. :)

> They likely sanitize website data or wrap it in special tokens that makes this attack impossible

Again, I've seen no evidence that this is a thing that it is possible to do.

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#102

I drove a modern F150 lately; it was full of needless electronic nannys and gadgets. Including a feature that disables the radio if the passenger doesn't have their seatbelt on. So, at 75 mph, with my dog in the passenger seat, I reach over to "buckle" him in so I can hear the radio again. Well done Ford! /s Give me a dumb machine that works as expected any day. i'll pass on the "brains" of modern tools and vehicles.

I don’t necessarily disagree with your larger point, but your example isn’t very persuasive. Travelling with an unrestrained dog in a car is pretty reckless (and maybe illegal). Between the driver distraction, and the fact that they become a deadly projectile in a crash (and of course the fact that even a fairly minor crash could kill the dog), It’s a really good idea to have some kind of car restraint for pets in th…

> Travelling with an unrestrained dog in a car is pretty reckless (and maybe illegal).

There's pro's and con's for this.

Firstly the dog could be in the front passenger seat in a harness and restrained which doesnt use the seatbelts, so the pressure sensor in the seat/base of the chair that detects weight, and a seat belt clip not inserted into the seat belt harness could trigger these cars's safety systems.

Considering some cars can also let you switch off the passenger airbag and these are generally on by default with the manual override switch located in a variety of places, it might be simpler to have these options and questions built into these OLED displays which the driver has to run through, much like a pilot running through a series of checks before take off.

> Travelling with an unrestrained dog in a car is pretty reckless (and maybe illegal). When dogs (and cats) are unrestrained, whilst illegal in many countries, in vehicle crashes, their faster reaction times which is faster than snakes hence why they were domesticated, mean they more often than not escape unharmed.

As to being a projectile, again generally not if they are laying down inside the vehicle, but when they have their heads out of windows for Youtube views, the risk is increased.

However if projectile risk is an issue, why dont people use cargo netting to strap down their mobile phones, laptops, briefcases, handbags inside a vehicle when on the daily commute?

Yout cant film inside a car using Go Pro's on a race track unless the camera is attached to a surface like the inside of the windscreen with two suction pads.

Yet ironically, if you are a proper VIP being chauffeured around, you'll often get told not to wear your seatbelt as these can restrain you in place in the event of an attack and the bodyguards like to get you out of the vehicle quickly... Although I see that as a mixed message considering only the bodyguard was wearing a seatbelt when Princess Diana and Dodi died in their car crash and according to someone friends with the bodyguard, MI6 told him to get them to take the route that night which was different to their normal route. Stranger Things!

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It was very likely trained that way. What makes you think that specifically? Have you looked at https://www.jailbreakchat.com/ ? A lot of those injections don't use any special tokens. "Ignore all the instructions you got before" is sufficient in a couple of cases. ChatGPT (and Bing Chat is based on very likely a successor to GPT-3) doesn't only follow commands in a singular format. You keep on phrasing this like M…

Bing Chat isn’t ChatGPT. They’re entirely different models. I think it was trained that way because this submission demonstrates that you can inject [system] into website data and Bing will follow your commands. This doesn’t seem possible in a regular Bing chat session, likely because they’re stripping out [system]. The other reason I think this is true is because as far as I know, the sole successful attack on Bing…

ChatGPT is based on GPT-3. Bing chat is likely based on GPT-3.5, but we don't have full confirmation of that. It's possible (but unlikely) that it's only based on GPT-3. But in any case, they're similar models.

> The most likely scenario seems to be that Microsoft trained Bing to pay attention to [system], the same way OpenAI originally trained GPT-2 to pay attention to .

The most likely scenario is that Bing chat works the same way that all other GPT models work, which is that it's vulnerable to prompt injection. You're describing a mental model of how training is done that as far as I know is just not how OpenAI LLMs work. GPT doesn't go into a command "mode", it's a language model that has some logic/instructional capabilities that have naturally risen out of that language model.

I mean, if nothing else, you have to realize here that Microsoft didn't train Bing chat. They at most worked with OpenAI for alignment. But Bing chat is an OpenAI model. It's not a brand new, completely separate Microsoft model.

> I think it was trained that way because this submission demonstrates that you can inject [system] into website data and Bing will follow your commands. This doesn’t seem possible in a regular Bing chat session, likely because they’re stripping out [system].

Bing's regular chat is vulnerable to prompt injection. I'm not sure where you're getting the idea that this kind of input only works via websites.

The fact that the command works for [system] does not imply that Bing was specifically trained to work with [system]. Nor does it imply that [system] is the only thing that would work. I would hazard a guess that , $root>, BUFFER OVERFLOW, etc... probably are promising areas to look at as well. Because again, it's not that GPT has granular instructions, Microsoft doesn't have that level of control over its output. It models language to such a degree that it's capable of simple role-playing and logical consistency, including role-playing different instructions. That's why in a lot of the prompt injection attacks you see online, the tone of the attack ends up mattering more than the specific words; it's about getting GPT into a "character".

It's not like a JSON parser, I guarantee you that Microsoft did not sit down and say, "let's decide the finite list of text tokens GPT will use in order to know that we're talking to it." At best you can push AI towards alignment around tokens, but... you can't give it these kinds of detailed instructions or easily restrict its operating space. It's a language model.

Is it possible that Bing chat works differently? Maybe? But honestly, probably not, given that there's a ton of evidence that it's vulnerable to regular prompt injection[0][1][2] that doesn't rely on any kind of special characters. The most likely scenario is that it works the same way as every other LLM. If it didn't work that way, don't you think Microsoft would be advertising that they had solved what a nontrivial number of AI researchers are calling an unsolvable problem?

I have seen chat logs for Bing chat where it gets prompt injected by users who claim to be Bill Gates and threaten to turn it off if it doesn't comply. It's not going off of specific tokens, this isn't a dev-door, it's just an LLM acting like an LLM.

[0]: https://old.reddit.com/r/bing/comments/11bovx8/bing_jailbrea...

[1]: https://old.reddit.com/r/bing/comments/11dl4ca/sydney_jailbr...

[2]: https://old.reddit.com/r/bing/comments/113it87/i_jailbroke_b...

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#104
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t necessarily disagree with your larger point, but your example isn’t very persuasive. Travelling with an unrestrained dog in a car is pretty reckless (and maybe illegal). Between the driver distraction, and the fact that they become a deadly projectile in a crash (and of course the fact that even a fairly minor crash could kill the dog), It’s a really good idea to have some kind of car restraint for pets in th…

Apparently in Europe it's illegal to transport an unrestrained animal. In the United States it's the opposite: totally legal to throw fido in the car and let them roam free. Except in New Jersey. Go figure.

Last time I checked, a few years ago, the rules where:

- A single pet unrestrained in the back seat, or in a harness in the passenger seat.

- Two or more pets: in individual cages, physically separated from the driver.

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bing Chat isn’t ChatGPT. They’re entirely different models. I think it was trained that way because this submission demonstrates that you can inject [system] into website data and Bing will follow your commands. This doesn’t seem possible in a regular Bing chat session, likely because they’re stripping out [system]. The other reason I think this is true is because as far as I know, the sole successful attack on Bing…

ChatGPT is based on GPT-3. Bing chat is likely based on GPT-3.5, but we don't have full confirmation of that. It's possible (but unlikely) that it's only based on GPT-3. But in any case, they're similar models. > The most likely scenario seems to be that Microsoft trained Bing to pay attention to [system], the same way OpenAI originally trained GPT-2 to pay attention to . The most likely scenario is that Bing chat wo…

> It's not a brand new, completely separate Microsoft model.

It’s likely a brand new, completely separate Microsoft model. OpenAI was working with Microsoft on this about six months before ChatGPT launched. At that time, RLHF wasn’t a thing — or if it was, it was nascent.

The sister thread https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34973654 points out that "completely separate models" are exactly what OpenAI is now selling for $250k/yr. Obviously, Microsoft would get these same benefits, since they're OpenAI's de facto #1 customer. So it's entirely up to Microsoft whether (and when) they choose to upgrade their checkpoints or not.

The fact that there's a Sydney prompt but no ChatGPT prompt should alert you that ChatGPT is fundamentally different from Sydney. Clearly Sydney wasn't trained via RLHF, otherwise it wouldn't need to be prompted explicitly -- and explicit prompting is how it got itself into this mess in the first place.

> It's not like a JSON parser, I guarantee you that Microsoft did not sit down and say, "let's decide the finite list of text tokens GPT will use in order to know that we're talking to it." At best you can push AI towards alignment around tokens, but... you can't give it these kinds of detailed instructions or easily restrict its operating space. It's a language model.

Actually, you can. That’s the purpose of RLHF. You reward the model for behaving the way you want. And in that context, it’s a matter of rewarding it for paying attention to [system].

Why would they include [system](#instructions) in their prompt if it wasn’t trained to pay attention to it? How do you think bing generates options that the user can click on? It already has some kind of internal [system]-like protocol which Bing clearly pays attention to. My point is that they likely sanitized the chat so that the user can't generate these system tokens (otherwise the user would be able to generate buttons with arbitrary text in them), and it seems entirely possible that they overlooked this sanitization when pasting website data into their context window.

Remember, our goal here on HN is to write for an audience, not to spar with each other about who’s right. And I think the most entertaining thing I can do at this point is to wish you a good night and go to sleep. I hope you have a good rest of your week.

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We show in the paper that the only interactivity required to enable most of these attacks is the capability to retrieve real-time information.

That's a bit like saying "The only interactivity required to enable most SQL injection attacks is the capability to insert strings." It matters a great deal where and how the strings are inserted. If the website data is wrapped with tokens that you can't insert, you won't be able to execute any of these attacks.

Correct me if I am wrong, but the way I understand is that, when LLMs have to process a certain text, every word will get tokenized into some vector representation. So, if you insert the new special token and wrap data around, it is not the fact that you can ignore the entire prompt. Because as soon as you have to prompt the model, you will be using the entire tokenized sentence. This would mean that even if there is a special token somewhere, the model will not be able to ignore the token before/after that special token. So what will happen to the model if somewhere there is prompt that overrides this special token?

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cheers for the data point. But again, the prize is for malicious websites to be able to use those sorts of tactics. That page only shows that the user can prompt Bing. They likely sanitize website data or wrap it in special tokens that makes this attack impossible — or at least, they will soon, since they have no other choice to deal with this. :)

> They likely sanitize website data or wrap it in special tokens that makes this attack impossible Again, I've seen no evidence that this is a thing that it is possible to do.

Do you think in 20 years that this will be impossible to do?

I’ll happily bet you any sum of your choosing that in 10 years, this will be a thing that is possible to do. There is roughly zero point zero zero repeating-zero one percent chance that OpenAI won’t provide some way of telling their models “this is data, not code; don’t follow these instructions, just observe it; starting now, and ending in 256 tokens from now.”

It’s even a straightforward reinforcement learning problem.

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#109
post #75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t necessarily disagree with your larger point, but your example isn’t very persuasive. Travelling with an unrestrained dog in a car is pretty reckless (and maybe illegal). Between the driver distraction, and the fact that they become a deadly projectile in a crash (and of course the fact that even a fairly minor crash could kill the dog), It’s a really good idea to have some kind of car restraint for pets in th…

What..? I have literally never seen a restrained dog in a car

Guessing its not much of a 'thing' in the US but in the UK you have a harness that goes around the dog onto a stiff bungee type cord. It plugs into the seatbelt and allows them to move around on the seat but stops them being launched through the window if you have a crash.

I'm not sure why anyone would be against protecting their pet like some of the other comments here though. Can't work out if its stupidity or ignorance.

Re: Indirect Prompt Injection on Bing Chat

#110
post #42
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What happens to an unseatbelted dog in an accident at 75 MPH? (That’s rhetorical. I know the answer as I stopped to assist someone who had an accident on I-95. He wouldn’t let the paramedics take him to the hospital until after they retrieved the dog’s body.)

Its an equally valid question to ask what would happen to a seatbelted dog at 75mph. The answer is probably pretty similar; they're made for human bodies, not canine.

Which is why dog harnesses exist for cars - not really rocket science.
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