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What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

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Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#91
post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Consciousness is just your brain working. Everyone that tries to mystify or expand on it further is making shit up. The glasgow coma scale has existed for a long time in medicine. You literally lose parts of consciousness before the whole as various physiologic markers deteriorate. This isn’t even pessimistic. It’s just not an interesting explanation and people love to be led by novel ideas regardless of their basis…

I think you’re confusing consciousness (qualia, the subjective experience of being you) with awareness.

Nope I'm not. Every aspect of your experience is your nervous system and the sensory organs at work.

The "Why is red RED?" thing is a complete joke from a scientific standpoint.

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#92
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Again you don't know what you're talking about. I think that's a bit uncharitable. You're acting like people haven't been grappling with these problems for thousands of years. Searle, for example, makes a pretty good argument why symbol-processing systems will never produce consciousness (you'd have to prove that the Chinese room is conscious, etc.). It's clear, for example, that a toaster doesn't have any consciou…

Can you explain how you know that neither a toaster, your wristwatch nor ChatGPT are conscious? If being conscious means being conscious like a human this would be obvious but maybe the toaster is just conscious like a toaster. Is a bug conscious?

Internally we know we're conscious because we just do. We experience qualia, even though we don't know what "we", "experience", and "qualia" really mean.

Even so. For us, consciousness is just there.

Externally we attribute consciousness to certain behaviours, including (but not limited to) self-reference, goal-seeking, physical and social responsiveness, use of language, memory, and so on.

These two things are not the same. We assume other humans are conscious in the same way we are to the extent that they perform consciousness. We can't be sure, but for human interactions it's a workable proxy.

A toaster, a watch, a rock, and a web server don't perform consciousness in any way at all. They may have some kind of metaphyiscal awareness, or not, but if they do we can't see it, and without a comprehensive theory of consciousness it's parsimonious to assume they're not aware.

ChatGPT performs some elements of consciousness, but not others. It happens to perform the elements AI researchers consider important - specifically use of language. But it doesn't have a memory for previous conversations, it doesn't show any independent goal seeking, and so on.

It uses "I..." and a vast amount of human training to mimic the appearance of consciousness, and plenty of humans seem to want to believe that's enough.

But the essence of the hard problem is the difference between "performs the actions we associate with consciousness" and "is conscious in the same way we know we are."

You could argue that practically there's no difference, and from one point of view that may be true. But that doesn't work if you want to understand what's happening rather than just assuming in a "well obviously..." kind of a way.

If only because historically in science "well obviously..." has been consistently wrong.

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#93
post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you’re confusing consciousness (qualia, the subjective experience of being you) with awareness.

Nope I'm not. Every aspect of your experience is your nervous system and the sensory organs at work. The "Why is red RED?" thing is a complete joke from a scientific standpoint.

Yes, you are.

> Every aspect of your experience is your nervous system and the sensory organs at work

There's still a leap from that to the existence of subjective experience.

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#94
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The book doesn't really go that much into the hard problem of consciousness, as much of the ideas are orthogonal to that discussion. If Nagel asks, "What is like to be a bat?", Hofstadter asks "If the mind of a bat were a program, what characteristics would it have?" IMO the hard problem is not posed to be solved. I think of it like this. The world in which we are p-zombies is categorically indistinguishable from the…

In my opinion, it's unlikely that p-zombies are physically indistinguishable from conscious beings. It's like saying "a computer that works, but where the CPU is replaced by a piece of stone is physically indistinguishable from the real thing". We have not yet found a physical distinction. It seems likely that there is one.

The issue is, what else would we call the rock that does all the things a CPU does? If we can socket it into the motherboard and play games on it, what makes it so different?

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

All you've said beeing a hypothesis. We have yet to see proof of any of it.

I think that calling this a hypothesis is quite charitable.

I didn’t really mean to question the phrase hypothesis, rather that “lacking proof is not proof of lacking”, and why not lay out more form of curious extrapolation if that is after all, why we are here.

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you explain how you know that neither a toaster, your wristwatch nor ChatGPT are conscious? If being conscious means being conscious like a human this would be obvious but maybe the toaster is just conscious like a toaster. Is a bug conscious?

Internally we know we're conscious because we just do. We experience qualia, even though we don't know what "we", "experience", and "qualia" really mean. Even so. For us, consciousness is just there. Externally we attribute consciousness to certain behaviours, including (but not limited to) self-reference, goal-seeking, physical and social responsiveness, use of language, memory, and so on. These two things are not t…

They may have some kind of metaphyiscal awareness, or not

Another option is there is some kind of metaphyiscal awareness everywhere, and it's only coincidental that objects of class "human" eventually convince themselves into believing that it's equivalent or highly related to their own thinking process. Unless we exclude this option somehow, AI can't be definitely seen as simply rolex, because it does that too.

Currently AI is discontinuous and passive, but is that even required?

without a comprehensive theory of consciousness it's parsimonious to assume they're not aware

This hypothesis creates more entities (one island of awareness per complex enough object), so why not the other way round?

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#98
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've always thought consciousness is basically just feedback (like with microphones). Sensing yourself sensing yourself etc.

That's self-awareness. But it doesn't explain qualia like the sensation of the color red.

I suggest you look into Roger Scruton's interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument. I think it might go something like this:

You want an explanation for the sensation of the color red? Alright, I'll try, as long as you help me out: what exactly is the sensation of the color red? I need to have a good grasp on what we're talking about here.

Can you describe it? It's okay, take your time.

FIN

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#99
post #44
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Consciousness: An Introduction by Susan Blackmore is exactly what you're looking for. Make sure you get the latest edition. https://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Emily-Troscianko-Susan-... She has another book called Conversations on Consciousness that's basically transcribed interviews with prominent figures that's also worth checking out. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/254499.Conversations_on_...

I can't say how good this book is, but the author has a PhD in parapsychology. This makes me question how prone they are to magical thinking, and also whether I'd want to read what they have to say about this topic. Yes this comment is an ad hominem, and no I have not read the book... All I have is a skeptical hunch that this might not represent "the state of the art" on the topic.

After an initial, intense, personal experience understandably awakened her interest she always approached the subject from a scientific point of view:

From her wiki page:

It was just over thirty years ago that I had the dramatic out-of-body experience that convinced me of the reality of psychic phenomena and launched me on a crusade to show those closed-minded scientists that consciousness could reach beyond the body and that death was not the end. Just a few years of careful experiments changed all that. I found no psychic phenomena—only wishful thinking, self-deception, experimental error and, occasionally, fraud. I became a sceptic.

Re: What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?

#100
post #39
post #13

Is there a book or resource that describes the state of the art in our knowledge and understanding about the nature of consciousness (Not cognition) and provides a survey of the popular and promising theories? Readable by someone who isn't in the field(s). Maybe even a good popsci book on the topic that is the neuroscience's equivalent of "Universe in a nutshell"

You're asking the wrong question by excluding cognition and using a very ill-defined word ("consciousness"). "Consciousness" is not a thing. It's a collection of things, many of which are what we usually refer to as "cognition". People who like to talk about consciousness have a problem keeping the goalposts in place (and trying to exclude cognition from consciousness, presumably because "cognition" doesn't sound mys…

If you are controlling a computer, that control is not visible within the software of computer. The state of computer is accessible to you from "outside", say, by reading hardware state. And you can manipulate that state directly from outside.

This control and access, which needs a true observer, is consciousness. If a computer is taken as layer of reality, then this control is in outside layer of reality. But we don't stop there: It is observer in all layers of reality, whatever reality is made of. The observer can never be represented in any layer of reality.

We should consider that experience layer, like sound and vision are an independent layer of reality than underlying "material" reality. A materialist will say latter exists a priory, and thus experience is off the material layer. But we can as well argue that experience layer is a-priori. My taste sense, for e.g. has no equivalence in material reality. It deserves its own layer of reality. If I hear a voice of someone, it is singular experience rather than experience of collection of frequencies. Color like white is an experience of multiple frequencies of light. Our perceptions, happening with help of neurons, are not based on light at all. Projection is a-priory present, from which we create even light and other formulations...

A mathematical reality is in its own layer of reality. A conceptual reality of say, chair, is also in a "mental" reality.

So we should assume that all are simply abstract layers of reality. But our mental conditioning has created "things" model, just because we can touch and feel, or perceive a boundary in what we see.

As observer, which creates memory of observation, and accesses it, all in the present. An observation which is not in time and space, but creates sense of time and space out of observation.

And so on... A totally different model of reality.

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