Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
djharper.dev
Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
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Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#2[flagged]
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#3Have you considered using services like https://wheregoes.com/ to fetch the final destination and navigate?
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#4Have you considered using services like https://wheregoes.com/ to fetch the final destination and navigate?
Author here, yeah I mention this at the start, there's quite a few of these link uncloakers.
The annoying part is having to copy the link, navigate to the website, paste in the link etc.
I was looking for something more "seamless" and works cross device (e.g. on phone, in the Twitter app etc) not just browsers. With this you just click the t.co link and the result is there instantly.
It's a dumb solution but was fun to write.
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#5Have you considered using services like https://wheregoes.com/ to fetch the final destination and navigate?
[deleted]
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#6[flagged]
Author here, thanks for reading.
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#7Have you considered using services like https://wheregoes.com/ to fetch the final destination and navigate?
Author here, yeah I mention this at the start, there's quite a few of these link uncloakers. The annoying part is having to copy the link, navigate to the website, paste in the link etc. I was looking for something more "seamless" and works cross device (e.g. on phone, in the Twitter app etc) not just browsers. With this you just click the t.co link and the result is there instantly. It's a dumb solution but was fun…
Got it. The process of pipelining and piecing it all together is interesting. Thank you for the post.
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#8Nice writeup, and a nice demonstration of one of WebPKI's limitations!
I understand why both HPKP and Expect-CT have been obsoleted, but it's a bummer that we still don't have a good enforcement mechanism for CA/cert pinning for a particular site. CT itself does a reasonable job of mitigating the "globally visible mis-issuring CA" problem, but does nothing to help users whose certificate stores contain all kinds of mystery enterprise or application-installed CAs.
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#9Awesome writeup! It's short, but I've learned a lot.
Re: Intercepting t.co links using DNS rewrites
#10Nice writeup, and a nice demonstration of one of WebPKI's limitations! I understand why both HPKP and Expect-CT have been obsoleted, but it's a bummer that we still don't have a good enforcement mechanism for CA/cert pinning for a particular site. CT itself does a reasonable job of mitigating the "globally visible mis-issuring CA" problem, but does nothing to help users whose certificate stores contain all kinds of m…
Is your argument that it shouldn't be possible for a user to intercept t.co in this way? Seems like a perfectly valid use case (sidecar process to unwrap 9 layers of redirects from an anonymous browsing context). If the sidecar is validating the original t.co certs and you trust it then what's the problem?