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Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

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Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#271
post #263

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What if he’s wrong? Computers do things their programmers don’t expect them to literally all the time. Security bugs generally come from a mistaken assumption about how something behaves. He doesn’t have to be a liar to be telling you untruths about how it works.

What if everyone is wrong about the effectiveness of Android’s mitigations? Then iOS would be more secure. Could you please make concrete a point?

You asked why we would need to verify things he said. I explained it quite concretely. What part did you not understand?

Edit: whether people are wrong about android security is orthogonal and whataboutism

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#272

ex-AOSP dev here Android and ChromiumOS are likely the most trustable computing platforms out there; doubly so for Android running on Pixels. If you don't prefer the ROM Google ships with, you can flash GrapheneOS or CalyxOS and relock the bootloader. Pixels have several protections in place: - Hardware root of trust: This is the anchor on which the entire TCB (trusted computing base) is built. - Cryptographic verifi…

What is an example of a workload on a smartphone that doesn’t handle PII?

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#273
post #251
post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Linux is a security shit show but it is at least publicly auditable, which is a prerequisite to form reasonably confidence in the security of software, or to rapidly correct mistakes found. OpenBSD by contrast has dual auditing and a stellar security reputation, but development is much slower and compatibility is very low. seL4 as an extreme is a micro-kernel with mathematically provable security by design, but no wo…

In the case of seL4, don't confuse formal verification with security. The code matches the spec, and security properties can be extracted very precisely, but spec might contain oversights/bugs which would allow an attacker to perform unexpected behaviors. If you define security as a "lack of exploitable bugs", then security can never be proven, because it's impossible to prove a negative. Also many formally verified…

> The formal verification wasn't wrong, just incomplete, because modeling complex systems is inherently an intractable problem.

I’m not involved in this kind of research or low level auditing, but I have some mathematical training and fascination with the idea of formal verification.

I ran across this thing called “K-Framework” that seems to have invested a lot in making formal semantics approachable (to the extent that’s possible). It’s striving to bridge that gap between academia and practicality, and the creator seems to really “get” both the academic and practical challenges of something like that.

Here’s a brief overview of one of the features that seems most impressive/useful: https://youtu.be/x_xm69gd3fE

The clarity of Grigore’s explanations and the quality of what I’ve found here: https://kframework.org/ makes me think K has a lot of potential, but again, this is not my direct area of expertise, and I haven’t been able to justify a deep dive to judge beyond impressions.

You’re correct in pointing out that complex systems are inevitably difficult to verify, but I think stuff like K could help provably minimize surface area a lot.

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#274

ex-AOSP dev here Android and ChromiumOS are likely the most trustable computing platforms out there; doubly so for Android running on Pixels. If you don't prefer the ROM Google ships with, you can flash GrapheneOS or CalyxOS and relock the bootloader. Pixels have several protections in place: - Hardware root of trust: This is the anchor on which the entire TCB (trusted computing base) is built. - Cryptographic verifi…

And yet law enforcement seems to be able to open up Android phones without issue, but has problems with iPhones. Is this still the case?

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#275

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> enable anti-malware if your OS has it . . . Would be interested in hearing other things Given the most common network activity is web browsing, it seems like enabling protections in the browser is becoming mandatory for the security-conscious. For me this amounts to enabling NoScript and uBlock[edit: [0]] plugins in Firefox, desktop and mobile versions, and disabling or locking down various "features". An additiona…

>Given the most common network activity is web browsing, it seems like enabling protections in the browser is becoming mandatory for the security-conscious. What I am looking for is an easy way to run something like a LiveCD OS in a VM for browsing. The problem is that I have never found a decent LiveCD that has Firefox with all of the mandatory extensions (uBlock Origin, etc...). I guess I could customize my own Liv…

> I guess I could customize my own LiveCD, but last I looked into it, doing so seemed complex and too time consuming to figure out.

Here's a 5m solution whose starting point might be acceptable:

- install Nix

- Follow first two steps at https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Creating_a_NixOS_live_CD to generate iso

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#277

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of your bullet points are reinventions of standard technology or incidental complexity. Cryptographic verification of the boot chain with Hardware root of trust are real. Heavily sandboxed userspace is real. Everything else would seem to be a reimplementation of common best practices (disk encryption), or a mitigation of a self-created problem (there shouldn't be binary driver blobs running on the main CPU to be…

> Everything else would seem to be a reimplementation of common best practices... True, but those protections are enabled by default (on Pixels at least). Users don't have to do anything here. > And from what I remember, a plain AOSP install seemed to still phone home to Google to check for Internet connectivity and whatnot. You're not wrong, but GrapheneOS and CalyxOS are valid options, if you don't trust the ROM Pi…

Sure, but full disk encryption was also enabled on my Mom's Ubuntu laptop 15 years ago, because I chose the correct options when I set it up. What commercial vendors offer out of the box has never been a good yardstick for talking about security features, and it's only gotten worse with the rise of the surveillance economy.

My fundamental problem with Graphene/Calyx is that I don't trust the devs have enough bandwidth and resources to catch all the vulnerabilities created upstream, especially with the moving target created by rapid version churn. For example, Android is finally getting the ability to grant apps scoped capabilities rather than blanket full access permissions, which is actually coming from upstream - the Libre forks should have had these features a decade ago, but for their limited resources.

Concretely, what discourages me from going Pixel is the Qualcomm integrated baseband/application chipsets. I've heard that Qualcomm has worked on segmenting the two with memory isolation and whatnot, but their history plus the closed design doesn't instill confidence. Yet again it's the difference between the corporate perspective of providing top-down relativist "security" rather than the individualist stance of hardline securing the AP against attacks from the BB.

Pragmatically, I know I should get over that and stop letting the perfect be the enemy of the good (I'm currently using a proprietary trash-Android my carrier sent me. The early 4G shutdown obsoleted my previous Lineage/microG). But every time I look at Pixels it seems there's so damn many "current" models, none stand out as the best but rather it's a continuum of expensive versus older ones (destined to become e-waste even sooner due to the shameless software churn). And so I punt.

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#278
Hopes and prayers?

I think its completely impossible to make sure your machine is not compromised. You can just take the best effort to keep it clean.

Try to use 2FA as much as possible. And try to shield the 2nd factor as good as possible from any connection to your other devices.

Re: Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

#279
post #121

ex-AOSP dev here Android and ChromiumOS are likely the most trustable computing platforms out there; doubly so for Android running on Pixels. If you don't prefer the ROM Google ships with, you can flash GrapheneOS or CalyxOS and relock the bootloader. Pixels have several protections in place: - Hardware root of trust: This is the anchor on which the entire TCB (trusted computing base) is built. - Cryptographic verifi…

> it seems it is most further ahead of the mainstream OSes Noob here, I recall often hearing that iOS has superior security to Android. Has this situation reversed in the last few years, or was it never true?

The price of an Android zero day has been slightly higher than the price of an iOS zero day since late 2019. Make of that what you like https://zerodium.com/program.html

I suspect remarkably few people are qualified to objectively say which is more secure. If you're an expert on one, you're unlikely to be an expert on the other.

Security is multidimensional. It's unlikely there will be a platform that's more secure from every possible angle. What's secure for you might not be secure for a less technical person, or a world traveler.

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