The questions involving "90% chance of $1000 or 100% chance of $900" always bother me. I never understand why economists think that a rational actor would consider them equivalent; they're not , unless you are making that choice many many times. But if I'm given that chance once (which is presumably what most participants assume, since that's not a choice that comes up often in one's life), it's really then a choice…
My AI professor had a great explanation for this: * lottery B = $900 * lottery A = 0.9 chance of $1000 and 0.1 chance of 0 + feeling stupid.
The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
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Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#52The questions involving "90% chance of $1000 or 100% chance of $900" always bother me. I never understand why economists think that a rational actor would consider them equivalent; they're not , unless you are making that choice many many times. But if I'm given that chance once (which is presumably what most participants assume, since that's not a choice that comes up often in one's life), it's really then a choice…
The interesting thing is not that people are risk averse (and thus choose 100% chance of $900), the interesting thing is that people become risk seeking when it comes to losses (and thus choose 90% chance of -$1000). You're creating a bit of a straw man when it comes to behavioral economists and their view of "rational actors" - the whole field is built around the understanding that there is more to economic decision…
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#53The questions involving "90% chance of $1000 or 100% chance of $900" always bother me. I never understand why economists think that a rational actor would consider them equivalent; they're not , unless you are making that choice many many times. But if I'm given that chance once (which is presumably what most participants assume, since that's not a choice that comes up often in one's life), it's really then a choice…
They don't: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_utility
In short, there are three types of people: risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-preferring. (In the general case, people can exhibit all three types of behavior at different income levels, but let's keep things simple).
Imagine a graph, with income on the x-axis and utility on the y-axis. A risk-averse person will have a concave utility function (like a square-root function), whereas a risk-netural and risk-preferring person would have a straight-line and a convex utility function, respectively.
You have two income levels: $0 and $1000. Now take the two points (0, U(0)) and (1000, U(1000)) and connect them with a straight line. Since we're dealing with a 90% chance = .9 probability, find the point on that line which is 90% of the way between the two points (closer to the second point). This point represents the utility received from the risky situation, or the expected utility. This is not the same thing as the utility of the expected value! Call this point A, with coordinates (Ax and Ay)
Compare U(Ax) this with the value U($900).
For a risk-neutral person, the two values will be exactly the same, as the utility function is a straight line. For a risk-averse person, the second value will be higher, as the utility function is concave with respect to the origin. For a risk-preferring person, the first value will be higher, as the utility function is convex with respect to the origin.
In practice, the utility function may not have a constant concavity, which explains why people buy insurance (which is only justified under risk-averse behavior) yet also buy lottery tickets or gamble at casinos (which is only justified under risk-preferring behavior).
> Who in their right mind would take the choice that could possibly leave them without a life-changing sum the next day?
As you can see, the answer to your question is, 'A person who is risk-preferring' (or operating under risk-preferring situations which are quite common in practice).
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#54The questions involving "90% chance of $1000 or 100% chance of $900" always bother me. I never understand why economists think that a rational actor would consider them equivalent; they're not , unless you are making that choice many many times. But if I'm given that chance once (which is presumably what most participants assume, since that's not a choice that comes up often in one's life), it's really then a choice…
By rescaling the numbers, the two questions can be turned into: - "Would you pay $900 for a 90% chance to win $1000?" - "Would you pay $100 for a 10% chance to win $1000?" So the distribution of results really is different. It's not just a phrasing trick. I would still say no to the first and yes to the second. I like positive outliers more than negative ones. This doesn't seem irrational to me.
I'd say that most people rarely have enough data to split probabilities into more than about five bins: ~0%, fairly unlikely, coin flip (~50%), fairly likely, and ~100%.
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would dare say unless you're rational, not necessarily an economist. Most of us are not rational all the time, and the whole point of the question is to show an instance where we are not. You would be correct if there were not other tickets available; in that case, the ticket truly is unique. But in the example given you could acquire another one. In that case the ticket is not unique and is equivalent to the cost…
But I believe it is the duty of the ticket vendor to keep track of who bought tickets. In protest, I would not replace a ticket if I lost it, but if I lost $10 it is completely my responsibility. Is this not rational if I believe I can affect change through the action?
First, I don't see an obvious need for theaters to keep track of who purchased tickets--save the case of online transactions obviously. Granted, the whole example is contrived--but I don't see the utmost need for it.
And, even if they had a moral imperative to do so and didn't, this would mostly affect people--by definition--who purchased a ticket already, and either lost it or want to return it or something of that nature. It is safe to assume few people lose their tickets and of those that do, not all of them protest by not buying another one. Protests are usually only effective if they hurt the company in terms of reputation or money. Since that is unlikely (given the vague probabilities I mentioned and specially because you already paid for one ticket), your protest will most likely be in vain.
We could of course get into a philosophical debate over the worth of such protest, but this is neither the time or place. Protesting the theater record-keeping policies in the way you mention and for the reasons you mention would probably be, in my opinion and with all the information you provided, rationally irrational.
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#56Dan Kahneman, Richard Thaler and Dan Ariely have both published some popular books on the subject. Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow just came out last year. Predictably Irrational came out a few years ago. Nudge (Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler) looks at the implications of behavioral economics for the law. There is a good summary article of that work here: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/2....
I personally think this work is pretty earth-shattering in the field, and that the above work is a must-read for anyone interested in economics. The engineer side of me is really attracted to the fact that behavioral economics uses legitimate experimental methodology, instead of mathematically-supported handwaving. And the implications of the work really turn some of our assumptions about the nature of the economic system on their head.
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#57The questions involving "90% chance of $1000 or 100% chance of $900" always bother me. I never understand why economists think that a rational actor would consider them equivalent; they're not , unless you are making that choice many many times. But if I'm given that chance once (which is presumably what most participants assume, since that's not a choice that comes up often in one's life), it's really then a choice…
http://joshua.schachter.org/2008/09/amateur-economist.html
People's behavior changes at the dollar price, too. $900 is different from $9 is different from $90000.
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#58I took a stab at Prospect Theory myself: http://joshua.schachter.org/2008/09/amateur-economist.html
Took a few hours of work.
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#59Then why don't politicians say "Employment rates are at 91%" instead of the depressing "Unemployment rates are at 9%"?
Re: The quiz Daniel Kahneman wants you to fail
#60A good summary paper on behavioral economics by a professor at Caltech: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/ribe239.pdf Dan Kahneman, Richard Thaler and Dan Ariely have both published some popular books on the subject. Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow just came out last year. Predictably Irrational came out a few years ago. Nudge (Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler) looks at the implications of behavioral economics for the…