311–320 of 564 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
As long as the code he submits is correct, I don't see any issues.
His PGP key got stolen, so someone else could have been submitting code as him. Hopefully he didn't also lose any SSH keys with push rights to the repo.
Context now that the editorialised title has changed, this is a core Bitcoin developer. These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion)
>These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion) Based on the other comments in this thread it looks like he didn't bother using a hardware wallet (which is literally something that's recommended on bitcoin.org[1]), and kept his wallet.dat on a server exposed to the intern…
Context now that the editorialised title has changed, this is a core Bitcoin developer. These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion)
>These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion) Based on the other comments in this thread it looks like he didn't bother using a hardware wallet (which is literally something that's recommended on bitcoin.org[1]), and kept his wallet.dat on a server exposed to the intern…
Luke has specifically denied this (before you posted your comment)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion) Based on the other comments in this thread it looks like he didn't bother using a hardware wallet (which is literally something that's recommended on bitcoin.org[1]), and kept his wallet.dat on a server exposed to the intern…
So you’re saying that to use crypto properly, I have to secure a physical object that grants irrevocable ownership of my wealth? That sounds bad. Is there a way I can get my crypto held my an institution with SIPC insurance, the way I hold stocks at a brokerage, so I can outsource this issue to someone else who is backed by a government guarantee? (I obviously don’t expect them to guarantee the value of the crypto, j…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Great example of how "Bitcoin is trustless" means "Bitcoin only works is the trust is provided externally".
It's not just Goodness of heart. This case can fall under existing laws. You are not allowed to keep obvious transfer mistakes like these.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
So you’re saying that to use crypto properly, I have to secure a physical object that grants irrevocable ownership of my wealth? That sounds bad. Is there a way I can get my crypto held my an institution with SIPC insurance, the way I hold stocks at a brokerage, so I can outsource this issue to someone else who is backed by a government guarantee? (I obviously don’t expect them to guarantee the value of the crypto, j…
> So you’re saying that to use crypto properly, I have to secure a physical object that grants irrevocable ownership of my wealth? That sounds bad. Yeah, that's how most things work in the physical world. If you want to secure a widget, then you need to "secure a physical object that grants irrevocable ownership" of it. Cryptocurrencies improve on this slightly by allowing you set up multisignature schemes, so you ca…
You can’t steal my house by obtaining the deed. You can’t steal my stock by obtaining the stock certificates. That’s not how it works. The vast majority of wealth in developed countries doesn’t rely on physical security to maintain ownership. We’ve collectively outsourced that function to the government and other institutions, so we don’t have to individually hire bodyguards to prevent criminals from taking possession of our homes and stealing our assets.
Most people only hold a relatively small amount of wealth in forms that can by physically stolen (eg. petty cash, electronics). This means that you only need to defend yourself against a $1000 crime (stealing your TV), which is a lot easier than defending against a $1M crime (stealing your house or 401k).
If crypto requires holding my wealth in a hardware wallet that can be stolen, that means I’m only going to be willing to invest the amount of wealth I would spend on a TV, not the kind of wealth I am going to allocate to stocks or bonds.
Granted, crypto has utility for people who can’t use the government-backed institutions, like criminals. And in some countries where the government will steal your money, it has broader appeal. I won’t argue with that.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion) Based on the other comments in this thread it looks like he didn't bother using a hardware wallet (which is literally something that's recommended on bitcoin.org[1]), and kept his wallet.dat on a server exposed to the intern…
That's a No True Scotsman answer — it's not hard to make people keep their wallets secure, because people who got their wallets stolen don't count.
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If the level is millions of dollars, that device could be physically stolen, or some aspect of the cryptography/auth scheme could be attacked through a 0-day. Of course, it's also possible he just wanted something closer to the convenience of a bank account/credit card instead of a pile of cash and failed in the opsec.
That’s why you don’t store millions of dollars in your physical location. You break up the seed and disperse it among several bank lock boxes. (See https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir's_Secret_Sharing) . Keep a small amount in a hot wallet for convenience and a larger amount (but not too large) in a cold wallet accessed via hardware. But the bulk shouldn’t be accessible without breaking into at least two lock vaul…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>These things happen every day, but happening to a core developer (if confirmed!) who has a deep understanding of the systems and security indicates just how fragile crypto can be (in my opinion) Based on the other comments in this thread it looks like he didn't bother using a hardware wallet (which is literally something that's recommended on bitcoin.org[1]), and kept his wallet.dat on a server exposed to the intern…
> kept his wallet.dat on a server exposed to the internet Luke has specifically denied this (before you posted your comment)
edit:
if you're talking about https://twitter.com/LukeDashjr/status/1609661811455819776, my guess is that he's either omitting something (eg. the cold wallet was internet connected, or there was a backup of its wallet floating around somewhere), or suffered a stuxnet level attack.