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Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

infosec.exchange

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Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#191
post #189

So I've been happily using LastPass for a long time, but it looks like it's time to migrate off this dumpster fire. What's the HN consensus on the best replacement (which must be usable by my entire family) and, at least as importantly, is there a reasonably painless migration path?

Bitwarden. Period. They are open source, written in Rust and you can very easily run your own instance. They also have incredible support (browsers, iOS, apps, etc...)

Bitwarden is not written in Rust, it's a C#.NET with MSSQL beast, so self-hosting is not for the faint of heart.

However there's an open source reverse engineered server, called vaultwarden (previously bitwarden-rs) that is indeed in Rust and quite slim.

Both can be used with the official clients (which are also open source).

Besides that, yes, Bitwarden is amazing.

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#192

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have been self-hosting bitwarden_rs for many years now, and am very happy with it. It's free as in freedom, open source, and designed to be run and operated and secured by you exclusively, so you have full control over your data and don't need to rely on a third party being available.

> designed to be run and operated and secured by you exclusively Which means you have to secure it. That's something a lot of people will not know how to do properly, and an insecure server with Bitwarden exposed to the public internet may turn out to be worse than trusting e.g. 1Password. Just something to keep in mind when making that decision.

If that's what you prefer, you can use Bitwarden.com and let them host and secure it. It's just an advantage for Bitwarden that if you want to, you can self-host.

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#193
post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Probably not the “HN consensus”, but if you have apple devices the built in password manager works great for me. Can even setup totp with each site and safari will auto fill

> if you have apple devices Does it work if you have apple devices and also non-apple devices?

Of course it doesn't, that's not how Apple operate.

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#194

Earlier quoted context omitted.

According to their security notice from a couple days ago, they have "fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data." So, according to them, they encrypt the other fields. I suppose the website field is unencrypted to enable autodetection or something like that.

As I reported, they encrypt everything but URLs, which is still very bad

This is incorrect as I understand it.

See: https://www.reddit.com/r/1Password/comments/za0zpn/any_vault...

They specifically do encrypt everything, with URLs being only briefly exposed for favicons (a feature you can turn off easily in 1P and in bitwarden where it is also done.)

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#195

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because it is better than the alternative. Pick two: (1) memorizable passwords (2) bruteforce-resistant passwords (3) account-unique passwords. The best tradeoff for me is (2)+(3) sacrificing (1), so I use a local password manager (named 'pass'). That said, I would never trust a 3rd party like LastPass.

Choose a complex base password + a memorizable _algorithm_ that combines (eg) domain names with the base password. That satisfies all of your requirements, and it's not super difficult to create an algorithm that is easy to perform mentally and hard to reverse. I started doing this in college, and it's been super easy to keep up and my passwords are pretty secure.

I did this before using a password manager. I found that it does work but it's still a pain.

For example, what do you do when you're forced to change a password? You need to remember that this website doesn't follow the rule. There's also the case of password being used by several websites with different names or urls, you need to remember which is the base one.

Also it's really convenient to store other things than passwords in the password maanger. Like some notes, your customer number, which email you signed up with, some PIN they give you...

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#196
post #179
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Your password manager should be offline, not a cloud service. Why?

Think about it for a moment. Which is more likely to be compromised: A widely advertised central location storing thousands of peoples’ passwords, or a single user’s passwords on their local computer accessed through an app which doesn’t even access the internet?

Providing that the vault is fully encrypted/unencrypted locally, in what way is it going to be compromised?

If someone wants to avoid having their vault in a LastPass/1Password/… cloud for some reason, it’s also possible to sync the vault through general use cloud solutions like Mega/Dropbox/…

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#197

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> designed to be run and operated and secured by you exclusively Which means you have to secure it. That's something a lot of people will not know how to do properly, and an insecure server with Bitwarden exposed to the public internet may turn out to be worse than trusting e.g. 1Password. Just something to keep in mind when making that decision.

Compared to 10-15 years ago, securing a deployment of a web service is trivial today. Let's Encrypt gets you TLS certificates for free. Wireguard gives you an out-of-the-box secure VPN solution so you can access services outside of your home network (setup is even easier now that it's part of the kernel). Wire everything together with Nginx/Caddy/Traefik and you're off to the races.

It may be trivial to throw something together that works (I think it's still pretty hard unless you do devops stuff a lot, which hardly anyone will) but it's not going to be very secure, at least not down the line.

- Where do you host all that? If on your home network, then your availability is probably not going to be great. Sucks to be travelling and unable to get to anything because your Wireguard Raspberry Pi died, so you need to make sure you don't need that. If using a cloud or other IaaS you run similar risks to 1Password etc., same with "conventional" root server hosters. If they get owned, you may too.

- How secure is your domain name? DNS? Your app may not warn you if the server answering isn't the one that answered yesterday.

- Is your OS hardened? What else is running on your critical machines? How do you keep everything updated, OS and the actual applications?

- How do you keep abreast of zero days and critical issues in the exposed components?

- How do you know when automatic updates fail? How do you know you've been compromised?

- Do you keep all your machines on the same network? Can a smart lightbulb be an exploit vector?

- What about machines that access Bitwarden or whatever directly – how secure are those?

- What will the whole thing cost, both in terms of time and money? What about upskilling?

- If you manage this for others, which is something that cloud services excel at, with rights management and the like: Are you ready to admin this for the long run, do "customer" service, etc.?

Not saying everyone will need to have cover all those bases, or that you couldn't or wouldn't just take some risks, but if the aim is to get better security than e.g. 1Password with their security teams and posture, then it's worth to at least try to have a complete picture and make conscious decisions on them. What needs to be covered will depend on a lot of factors, including how exposed you think you are.

There may not have been any mass-takeovers of badly secured domains, but we've seen during the Log4J incident that a lot of people believe not being listed on Google means their services cannot be discovered only to find they're getting hammered with attacks, and that attackers have levelled up their capabilities a lot, with large-scale and surprisingly well-engineered attacks springing up pretty quickly. That trend will likely continue and that combination of very capable attackers perceived as incompetent and lots of false assumptions about the actual risks is pretty dangerous; a lot of people will not realize how exposed they are because HTTPS==secure, right?

That no one has targeted self-hosted Bitwarden instances on a large scale so far is no guarantee that no one ever will. People are presumably trying to breach 1Password all the time and so far they seem to hold up well, though LastPass hasn't. What risk is bigger? That a homebrew setup is falling to an untargeted mass exploit? That someone will target you with something more sophisticated? That 1Password is breached and keeping data they say they don't? That LastPass keeps data they everyone assumes they don't but never publicly said they don't, and get breached? If anyone knows, I'd like the details of their analysis, because to me it doesn't seem straightforward at all.

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Probably Bitwarden or KeepassXC. I just use KeepassXC with the db stored on pCloud.

KeePassXC with the DB stored in Resilio Sync for me. It's just convenient that way because I've got a home server that everything gets synced with so I don't have to rely on devices being awake at the same time.

Same here but with syncthing, so no "central cloud" storage.

I've used various clients with the keepass db format for years now and have not yet been disappointed. Browser integration, Windows, Linux, Mac, and Android clients, open source, encryption I (naievely) trust... ticks all the boxes for me.

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As I reported, they encrypt everything but URLs, which is still very bad

This is incorrect as I understand it. See: https://www.reddit.com/r/1Password/comments/za0zpn/any_vault... They specifically do encrypt everything, with URLs being only briefly exposed for favicons (a feature you can turn off easily in 1P and in bitwarden where it is also done.)

I referred to lastpass, sorry for the confusion

Re: Lastpass setting the delete account div to display: none

#200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It appears not, since there's a feature request for it: https://community.bitwarden.com/t/global-keyboard-shortcut/3... (and their keyboard shortcuts doc doesn't mention any such thing) Yet another fine reason to use 1Password, which puts a lot of time and attention into user experience stuff like this. I know Bitwarden is the Internet's darling, but holy hell the user experience is so aggressively bad

Thanks! Any idea of how 1password compares with bidwarden in terms of security?

In other threads about this I was reminded that 1Password also has a security key that is known only to the client, and thus would not be leaked in the event of a cloud breach. In order to unlock the vault, one needs both pieces of information: the secret key and the master password. The secret key is cached on the client, which is why I had forgotten about it, but it is required for unlocks nonetheless

Thus the advantage goes to 1Password here, since Bitwarden does not require that "second factor" known only to the client (and I'm not talking about 2FA for logins, I mean for the vault)

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